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This publication consists of nine separate studies on payment and 
settlement systems conducted using simulation techniques. Most have 
been carried out using the payment and settlement system simulator 
BoF-PSS2 provided by the Bank of Finland. The preliminary versions 
were presented at the annual simulator seminars arranged by the Bank 
in 2005 and 2006. The main focus of the analyses is on liquidity 
requirements, settlement speed, gridlock situations, gridlock 
resolution methods, liquidity economising, systemic risk and the 
impact of shocks on system performance as well as network analysis 
and modelling of payment systems. The studies look at systems in 
several countries and cover both RTGS and netting systems as well as 
securities settlement systems. 
 
Keywords: simulation, payment and settlement system, payment 
networks, liquidity, gridlock, systemic risk, counterparty risk 
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Tiivistelmä 
Tämä julkaisu koostuu yhdeksästä erillisestä maksu- ja selvitysjärjes-
telmiä koskevasta tutkimuksesta, jotka on suoritettu simulointimene-
telmillä. Useimmat näistä tutkimuksista on tehty käyttäen Suomen 
Pankin maksu- ja selvitysjärjestelmäsimulaattoria BoF-PSS2. Alusta-
vat versiot tutkimuksista on esitelty Suomen Pankin järjestämien vuo-
sittaisten simulaattoriseminaarien yhteydessä vuosina 2005 tai 2006. 
Pääpaino tutkimuksissa on ollut likviditeettitarpeiden selvittämisessä, 
katteensiirron nopeudessa, lukkiutumistilanteissa ja niiden avaamiseen 
liittyvissä metodeissa, likviditeetin käytön tehostamisessa, systeemi-
riskeissä sekä poikkeustilanne- ja vastapuoliriskeissä ja tämän lisäksi 
maksujärjestelmäverkkojen analyyseissa ja mallinnuksissa. Tutkimuk-
set koskevat eri maissa toimivia järjestelmiä, ja niiden joukossa on 
RTGS-järjestelmiä ja nettoutusperiaatteella toimivia maksujärjestel-
miä sekä arvopaperikauppojen selvitysjärjestelmiä. 
 
Asiasanat: simulointi, maksu- ja selvitysjärjestelmä, maksuliikeverkot, 
likviditeetti, lukkiutumistilanne, systeemiriski, vastapuoliriski 
 




Payment and settlement systems are an integral part of modern 
economies. With continuous progress in globalisation and rapid 
technological advances, payment systems are in a state of transition, 
and dependencies due to technology and integration are increasing 
continuously. There are new demands on real-time liquidity and risk 
management. Banks and authorities will face new types continuity 
requirements in a complex network of business relationships. It is 
important to gain a good understanding of the systems and their 
interdependencies in order to increase their efficiency under normal 
circumstances and their resilience in any abnormal situations that 
could arise. 
  Payment and settlement systems are a complicated area into which 
simulation techniques provide a good way to penetrate sufficiently 
deeply. Models can be built which closely replicate the real operating 
environment, and these models can be used for testing and observing 
scenarios not normally found in real operating environments. 
  The Bank of Finland has a long tradition of economic research and 
economic modelling, and modern payment and settlement systems 
have been one of the focal areas. Research using simulation models 
for payment systems was initiated around the time Finland joined the 
Economic and Monetary Union as it proved to be an excellent tool for 
studying changing liquidity needs and system risks under the new 
EMU regime. Based on positive results and feedback, the Bank of 
Finland decided to develop a diversified simulator designed especially 
for external use and international distribution, called BoF-PSS2. It 
was completed in spring 2004 and is available for research purposes 
free of charge. This service is under continuous development, with the 
latest additions made this year being a network analysis module and a 
stochastic input generator. Currently the simulator has over 60 users 
worldwide and on every continent. The users are mainly central banks 
but interest in the simulator has increased among academics and 
private infrastructure organisations during recent years. 
  Investment in the simulator and the service it offers attracted great 
international interest and generated a variety of research and studies 
by different central banks. The Bank of Finland arranged four annual 
international payment and settlement seminars and workshops from 
2003 to 2006, and the fifth seminar is scheduled for later in 2007. The 
main goals of the seminars and workshops are to stimulate simulation-
based payments and securities settlement research, share research 
results and experiences among members of the user community and  
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receive ideas and feedback on simulator development needs. The 
presentations of the first two seminars were published in the first 
simulator publication (BoF publication E31:2005) and the 
presentations from the third and fourth seminar are included in this 
publication. 
  I would like to thank all the authors for their contributions to this 
publication, which I trust will provide a good introduction to the 
simulation analysis of payment and settlement systems and stimulate 
further research to enhance our understanding and improve the models 
and methodologies in the years ahead. 
  I would like to thank all other contributors, sponsors, 
commentators and users of the simulator for all the help they have 
provided during different periods of work on and with the simulator. 
  The simulator has recently been enhanced with payment network 
analysis features, for which I would like to thank the National 
Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center (NISAC, a programme 
of the US Department of Homeland Security’s Infrastructure 
Protection/Risk Management Division comprised of a core partnership 
of Sandia National Laboratories and Los Alamos National Laboratory) 
for providing parts of Loki for use by the BoF-PSS2. Loki is a 
collaborative software project containing core functionalities for the 
creation and analysis of networks and for the development of a wide 
array of application-specific agent-based models. I would like to 
especially thank Walter E Beyeler and Robert J Glass at Sandia 
National Laboratories and Kimmo Soramäki from Helsinki University 
of Technology for their help on integrating Loki functionalities with 
those of BoF-PSS2. 
  At the same time I want to extend an acknowledgement to Ville 
Ruoppi at MSG Software for continuous involvement in the IT 
developments of the simulator. A detailed list of acknowledgements 
can be found on the simulator website and in the user manual. 
  For the finalisation of the publication we are indebted to Päivi 
Nietosvaara for text editing and Teresa Magi for printing 
administration. We are also indebted to the editorial board of the 
publication, which consists of Ari Hyytinen, Harry Leinonen and 
Jouko Vilmunen. 
  I hope users of the simulator will continue to be active and that the 
simulator will attract new users and sponsors. It is a great pleasure for 
me to present, via this second simulation-related publication, the fruits 
of this continuing productive cooperation between central banks. 
 
Helsinki, May 2007 
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The last decade have seen a growing interest among central banks in 
deepening the analysis made in oversight assessments. Different kinds 
of stress-testing scenarios and tools have emerged in order to study 
concretely ‘what if’-type failure and crisis situations. Among the 
factors behind the growing interest in this area are international 
cooperation and globalisation in general, technological advances and a 
growing dependency on payment systems and their important 
relationships to each other. Payment systems have become large 
networks or popularly ‘webs’ of relationships. Network analysis has 
therefore become a growing type of payment research. We seem to be 
on the verge of a new era of truly global payment and settlement 
systems operated completely through network-based interfaces and 
connections. The key official and international bodies for oversight 
and supervisory cooperation – the payment system committee of G10 
central banks (CPSS), the Payment and Settlement System Committee 
of the Eurosystem (PSSC) and the committees and other groups of the 
European Commission – will need to increase and deepen their 
cooperation in order to fulfil the task of overseeing and supervising 
the web of international payment systems. 
  Payment system simulations started to attract interest in the 1990s 
and were to a large extent used to discover how new settlement 
conventions would affect the participants and the overall system and 
to find out the hidden credit and liquidity risks, especially in cross-
border systems. These studies viewed the payment systems mostly as 
static machineries for booking transactions. Currently there is an 
emphasis on trying to better understand the network design of 
payment systems and the impact of the behaviour of individual 
participants or a group of participants. Customers and banks are 
particularly likely to react to external stimuli and change their 
payment behaviour in crisis situations. Agent-based simulation models 
are one way to try to catch the behavioural patterns in the payment 
infrastructure. More research is clearly needed in order to find out 
more about agent reactions in changing circumstances. 
  The Bank of Finland has hosted annual simulator seminars since 
2003. This is the second publication of studies presented at these 
seminars and mainly consists of the outcome of seminars held in 2005 
and 2006. It is interesting to view development over the years and see 
how analysis is becoming deeper and more profound step by step. 
Counterparty risks and dependencies in payment systems are of 
continuous concern to central banks and stress-testing systems are  
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becoming a common tool for overseers. Algorithms for real-time 
settlement efficiency have improved over the years and become 
standardised features of RTGS systems. Network analysis is a new 
expanded area, which tries to describe the network structure of 
payment systems, for example the strong and weak dependencies in 
the system. The aim is at some point to be able to describe the 
behavioural patterns in payment networks. 
  The articles of this publication cover four main topics or views of 
payment and settlement systems as depicted in Figure 1.1. 
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This publication starts with chapters on network analysis of payment 
systems, continues with articles about liquidity issues and ends with a 
smooth gradual transition to risk issues and different kinds of failure 
scenario in particular. Each chapter provides an individual stand-alone 
analysis, but some clearly build on earlier analyses. Each chapter is 
contributed by named authors. 
  Chapter 2 (Soramäki, Beyeler, Bech and Glass) presents new 
directions for simulation research in interbank payment systems that 
integrates network topology, network dynamics and agent-based 
modelling of bank behaviour. In the process it also reviews literature 
in the field and presents applications of the ideas presented. While the 
focus of the article is on systemic risk in interbank payment systems, 
the concepts and models presented are applicable for addressing 
questions related to other payment systems and topics such as liquidity 
flow efficiency as well.  
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  Chapter 3 (Renault and Pecceu) studies the effects of queuing rules 
and optimisation algorithms for queued payments and especially FIFO 
(first-in first-out) rules compared to other processing orders. The 
authors aim to quantify to what extent non-FIFO optimisation 
algorithms can be more efficient than FIFO algorithms based on the 
algorithms used in the French large-value payment system PNS and in 
the planned TARGET2 system. Finally, the impact of the different 
optimisation algorithms is also investigated by simulating the 
complete PNS system using real data. In the context of a liquidity 
crisis created by a technical default of the largest participant of the 
system, the use of some non-FIFO algorithms is shown to reduce the 
number of rejected payments at the end of the day. 
  Chapter 4 (Arjani) explores a fundamental trade-off that occurs 
between settlement delay and intraday liquidity in the daily operation 
of large-value payment systems (LVPS), with specific application to 
Canada’s Large Value Transfer System (LVTS). Intraday liquidity 
and settlement delay can be costly for LVPS participants, and 
improvements in the trade-off are desirable. The analysis shows that 
increased use of the LVTS central queue (which contains a complex 
queue-release algorithm) reduces settlement delay associated with 
each level of intraday liquidity considered, relative to a standard 
queuing arrangement. 
  Chapter 5 (Imakubo and McAndrews) describes the changes in 
liquidity characteristics due to the implementation of the next-
generation RTGS of the BOJ-NET Funds Transfer System in Japan. 
Under the project, the new system will have liquidity-saving features 
and will incorporate large-value payments that are currently handled 
by two private-sector designated-time net settlement systems, the 
Foreign Exchange Yen Clearing System and the Zengin System. The 
authors analyse the characteristics of optimal funding levels under the 
new features using simulation analysis and find that optimal funding 
levels can be described with the total balances in the system, the 
distribution of the total balances across participants, and the timing of 
funding. 
  Chapter 6 (Lasaosa and Tudela) quantifies the tiering effects 
within the UK large-value payment system (CHAPS) by analysing 
node, credit and liquidity risks for different tiering scenarios. The 
results show that node risk would rise substantially in what is already 
a highly concentrated system. As for credit risk, the size of intraday 
exposures compared with settlement banks’ capital is very small and 
therefore the likelihood of contagion is remote. The increase in credit 
risk brought to the system by settlement banks leaving CHAPS bears 
little relationship to the values settled by each individual bank.  
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Increasing the degree of tiering in CHAPS would lead to substantial 
liquidity savings within CHAPS. 
  Chapter 7 (Schmitz and Puhr) presents a statistical analysis of 
liquidity, risk concentration and network structure in the Austrian Real 
Time Interbank Settlement system and quantifies the contagion effect 
of an operational incident at one of participants’ sites on other 
participants. The main results are that in general the value and number 
of payments received and submitted were quite concentrated among 
the top three banks and that the contagion effect in the payment 
system was substantial. 
  Chapter 8 (Ledrut) assesses the effect of counterparties’ reaction to 
an operational failure at one of the biggest participants in the Dutch 
interbank payment system in which counterparties react according to 
two basic rules: they stop sending payments to the stricken bank either 
after some pre-determined time or after their exposure to the stricken 
bank reaches a certain level. Based on historic liquidity levels and 
payment flows, reacting seems to be more cost-effective when 
determined by the individual exposure of the stricken banks’ 
counterparties than when triggered by the elapsed time after the 
disruption, but also depends on the degree of reciprocity among 
participants. 
  Chapter 9 (McVanel) provides an empirical analysis of 
participants’ robustness to defaults in Canada’s Large Value Transfer 
system (LVTS) by creating unanticipated defaults in LVTS. 
According to the findings all participants are able to withstand their 
loss allocations in all cases of large defaults created using actual 
LVTS data. 
  Chapter 10 (Hellqvist and Snellman) presents stress-testing results 
from HEXClear, the Finnish securities settlement system for equities, 
for four different scenarios: failure of the entire settlement process, 
failure of individual participants, failure of certain ICT connections 
and failure of the most common settlement algorithms. According to 
the results the current settlement system is a robust construction. 
  These research projects and studies have resulted in a deeper 
knowledge of payment systems and of the internal and external factors 
and parameters that affect them. The articles also show the learning 
curve brought about by international research cooperation which has 
helped the design of more efficient and stable operational systems. 
The new features tested via simulations have been implemented in 
several real-life systems. The Bank of Finland is grateful for the 
rewarding cooperation behind this kind of publication. 
  The Bank of Finland intends to continue with its successful 
research service in the form of simulator software development and  
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support, arranging simulator seminars and stimulating simulation-
based payment systems research and publications. A payment system 
is a network of cooperating participants and payment systems are 
currently forming links between each other, resulting in a multilayered 
network structure. Network analysis techniques will probably also 
become interesting new research topics and we hope that the new 
network analysis module in the simulator will stimulate research in 
this area. An interesting research topic is the use of behavioural and 
adaptive input models, such as agent-based models, which can be used 
to study behavioural and adaptive responses among agents in a 
payment systems. We hope to be able to develop the simulator in this 
area for the next larger update. There seems to be a growing interest in 
simulating securities settlement systems, and this is an important 
research area as the risks are less studied and known than those of 
basic payment systems. One interesting possibility would also be to 
expand the system participants/agents to include end-users such as 
companies and consumers. This would provide a possibility to 
simulate payment flows in the economy and study the effects of 
changing customer payment patterns on the banking sector and 
perhaps even the intriguing relationships between payment flows and 
monetary value. We hope that this publication will inspire new studies 
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2  New approaches for payment 
system simulation research 
Abstract 
This article presents new directions for simulation research in 
interbank payment systems that integrates network topology, network 
dynamics and agent-based modelling of bank behaviour. In the 
process it also reviews literature in the field and presents applications 
of the ideas presented. While the focus of the article is on systemic 
risk in interbank payment systems, the concepts and models presented 
are applicable to address questions related to other payment systems 




At the apex of the financial system is a network of interrelated 
financial markets by which domestic and international financial 
institutions allocate capital and manage their exposure to risk. Critical 
to the smooth functioning of these markets are a number of financial 
infrastructures that facilitate clearing and settlement. The events of 11 
September 2001 underscored both the resiliency and the 
vulnerabilities of these financial infrastructures to wide-scale 
disruptions. Any interruption in the normal operations of these 
infrastructures may seriously impact not only the financial system but 
also the economy as a whole. 
  A growing body of policy-oriented research is available. One 
segment of the literature focuses on simulating the default of a major 
participant and evaluating the effects on other institutions in 
payments
1 and securities settlement systems
2. Another segment 
presents detailed case studies on the responses of the US financial 
system to shocks such as the 1987 stock market crash and the attacks 
of 11 September 2001.
3 Much of the research has been conducted 
                                          
1 See Humphrey (1986), Angelini et al (1996), Kuussaari (1996), Bech et al (2002), 
Northcott (2002), Bech and Soramäki (2005), Bedford et al (2005) and Mazars and 
Woelfel (2005). 
2 See Hellqvist and Koskinen (2005) and Devriese and Mitchell (2006). 
3 See Bernanke (1990), McAndrews and Potter (2002) and Lacker (2004).  
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using data from real operating environments with the given payment 
flows and settlement rules of the respective systems. As such they are 
useful for assessing the operation of the particular system under 
disruptions, but the results are difficult to generalise to systems with 
other characteristics. Little research has focused on explaining the 
relationship between the characteristics of the system and its 
performance during and following disruptions. Also the behaviour of 
participants has been generally exogenously defined or assumed 
unchanged (or to change in a predetermined manner) when the policy 
parameters of the system change or when a bank changes its 
settlement behaviour as a consequence of operational or financial 
problems. Such assumptions are unlikely to hold in the case of real 
disruptions. 
  This article argues that three aspects are important for answering 
the still unanswered questions on what makes a payment system and 
its participants robust or fragile towards disruptions, and what are the 
most efficient measures to reduce the likelihood and magnitude of 
disturbances. First, understanding the pattern of liquidity flows among 
the system participants. Second, understanding how the rules of the 
system affect the dynamics of liquidity flows. Third, the ability to 
evaluate likely behavioural changes of the participants before, during 
and following disruptions or as a consequence of policy changes. 
  This article presents new approaches at answering the above 
questions. It is organised as follows. Section 2.2 discusses how 
payment system interactions can be described by means of network 
topology and presents empirical results for the US Fedwire system. 
Section 2.3 describes dynamics that can take place in interbank 
payment systems and presents a simple model of a payment system 
based on simple rules of settlement. Section 2.4 presents some 
possible directions for modelling participant behaviour in payment 
systems. Section 2.5 concludes. 
 
 
2.2  Modelling interbank payment flows 
A payment system can be treated as a specific example of a complex 
network (see eg Newman, 2003). In recent years, the physics 
community has made significant progress towards understanding the 
structure and functioning of complex networks. The literature has 
focused on characterising the structure of networked systems and how 
the properties of the observed topologies relate to stability, resiliency 
and efficiency in case of perturbations and disturbances.  
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  From a technical perspective, most payment systems are star 
networks where all participants are linked to a central hub (the 
operator) via a proprietary telecommunications network. From a 
payment processing perspective, payment systems are generally 
complete networks as all nodes (participants) are linked in the sense 
that they can send and receive payments from each other. However, 
these representations do not necessarily reflect the actual behaviour of 
participants that controls the flow of liquidity in the system and thus 
the channels for contagious transmission of financial disturbances.  In 
common with other of social networks mediated by technology (such 
as email or telephone calling), the networks formed by actual 
participant behaviour are of more interest than the network structure 
of the underlying communication system. 
 
 
2.2.1  Network representation of payment systems 
Networks have been modelled in several disciplines such as in 
mathematics and computer science under graph theory, in applied 
mathematics and physics under network theory and in sociology under 
social network analysis. While the terminologies and research 
questions in the different traditions vary, common to all is the 
representation of the topic under study as (at minimum) two types of 
elements: nodes and connections between them, ie links. The 
following paragraphs summarise the main concepts. 
  Links can be either undirected or directed. Links can have weights 
attached to them representing the importance of the relationship 
between nodes. The strength of a node can be calculated as the sum of 
the weights of all the links attached to it. For a directed network, 
strength can be defined over both the incoming and outgoing links. 
  A link from a node to itself is called a loop. The neighbours of a 
node are all the nodes to which it has a link. The predecessors of a 
node are the nodes that have a link to the node and the successors are 
the nodes that have a link from the node. A walk is a sequence of 
nodes in which each node is linked to the next. A walk is a path if all 
its nodes are distinct. The length of a path is measured by the number 
of links. If the start node and the end node of a path are one and the 
same, then it forms a cycle. 
  A complete network is a network where all nodes have a link to 
each other. A tree is a network in which any two nodes are connected 
by exactly one path. A connected network is a network where any two 
nodes can be joined by a path while a disconnected network is made  
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up of two or more connected components or sub-networks. These 
concepts are illustrated in Figure 2.1a. 
 
Figure 2.1  Network modelling 
 
a) 
successor of node 1


















The most basic properties of a network are the number of nodes n and 
the number of links m. The number of nodes defines the size of a 
network while the number of links relative to the number of possible 
links defines the connectivity of a network. The degree of the network 
is the average number of links for each node in the network. 
  A starting point for the quantitative analysis of a network is to 
partition the set of nodes into components according to how they 
connect with other nodes. Dorogovtsev et al (2001) divide a network 
into a single giant weakly connected component (GWCC) and a set of 
disconnected components (DCs). The GWCC is the largest component 
of the network in which all nodes connect to each other via undirected 
paths. The DCs are smaller components for which the same is true. 
The GWCC consists of a giant strongly connected component 
(GSCC), a giant out-component (GOUT), a giant in-component (GIN) 
and tendrils. The GSCC comprises all nodes that can reach each other 
through a directed path. A node is in the GOUT if it has a path from 
the GSCC but not to the GSCC. In contrast, a node is in GIN if it has a 
path to the GSCC but not from it. Tendrils are nodes that have no 
directed path to or from the GSCC. They have a path to the GOUT or 
a path from the GIN (see Figure 2.1b). 
  Application of the component analyses to liquidity flows between 
banks provides insights on the structure of these flows within the 
payment system and gives clues with respect to the relative 
importance and vulnerability of banks in the system in case of 
disruptions. As banks in GOUT only receive funds from other banks 
in the GSCC, a disruption by a bank in GOUT would only affect other 
banks in that component. Banks in GIN are affected only by 
disruptions in the same component, and not by banks in other 
components as their payment processing is not dependent on incoming 
liquidity from these banks. Banks outside the GSCC tend to be smaller 
whereas all money center banks belong to the GSCC. 
  Two important characteristics of a node in a directed network are 
the number of links that originate from the node and the number of 
links that terminate at the node. These two quantities are referred to as 
the  out-degree and in-degree of a node respectively. The average 
degree of a node in a network is the number of links divided by the 
number of nodes, ie <k>=m/n. Networks are often categorised by their 
degree distributions. The degree distribution of a classical random 
network (ER-network, Erdõs and Rényi, 1959) is a Poisson 
distribution. Many real networks have fat-tailed degree distributions 
and a large number have been found to follow the power law  
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P(ki = x)∼k
-y for large-degree nodes. Networks with a power-law 
distribution are sometimes referred to as scale-free networks
4. Scale-
free networks have been found to remain better connected when 
subjected to random failures than other types of networks. Albert et al 
(1999) and Crucitti et al (2004) find that the connectedness of scale-
free networks is robust to random failures but vulnerable to targeted 
attacks. However, one must be a bit careful here as the process acting 
on the network influences such analyses of robustness and 
vulnerability. 
  Simply put, banks that have a low in-degree and high weights for 
these links are likely to be more vulnerable to disturbances than other 
banks as the removal of one link will severely limit the amount of 
incoming funds. Conversely, banks with high out-degree have ceteris 
paribus the potential to affect more counterparties if their payment 
processing is disrupted. Understanding the topology of payment flows 
is likely to be important in assessing the resiliency of a payment 
system to wide-scale disruptions. 
  It is also common to analyse distances between nodes in the 
network. The distance from node i to node j is the length of the 
shortest path between the two nodes. The average distance from a 
node to any other node in a strongly connected network is commonly 
referred to as the average path length of a node. If the network is not 
strongly connected, paths between all nodes may not exist. In a 
payment network the path length may be important due to the fact that 
the shorter the distances between banks in the network, the easier 
liquidity can re-circulate among the banks. On the other hand, a 
payment system where liquidity flows over short paths is also likely to 
be more vulnerable to disruptions in these flows. 
  Sociologists have long studied clustering in social networks, ie the 
probability that two nodes which are the neighbours of the same node 
themselves share a link. This is equivalent to the observation that two 
people, each of whom is your friend, are likely to be friends with each 
other. One way of measuring the tendency to cluster is the ratio of the 
actual number of links between the neighbours of a node over the 
number of potential links among them. A tree network has a clustering 
coefficient of zero, and a complete network a coefficient of one. In a 
classical random network, the clustering coefficient is the 
unconditional probability of connection, ie <C> = p. 
                                          
4 This is because the power law distribution is the only scale-free distribution, ie if the 
scale by which x is measured is increased by a factor, the shape of the distribution p(x) is 
unchanged, except for an overall multiplicative constant (see Newman, 2005).  
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  In a payment network, the clustering coefficient measures the 
prevalence of payments between a bank’s counterparties. In terms of 
resilience one could hypothesise that disturbances in banks with a 
higher clustering coefficient might have a compounding impact on 
their counterparties, as some of the disturbance may be passed on by 
the bank’s neighbours to each other – in addition to the direct 
contagion from the source of the disruption. 
  There are various measures of the centrality that indicate the 
relative importance of nodes in a network. Four measures of centrality 
are commonly used in network analysis: degree, closeness, 
betweenness, and eigenvector centrality. The first three were 
described in their current form by Freeman (1979) while the last was 
proposed by Bonacich (1972). Degree centrality takes into account 
only the immediate neighbourhood of the node, ie it is simply the 
number of links the node has. Closeness centrality as defined by 
Freeman is the sum of shortest paths from all other nodes. 
Betweenness centrality may be defined loosely as the number of times 
that a node is on the shortest path between any pair of nodes. 
Eigenvector centrality encapsulates the idea that the centrality of a 
node depends also on the centrality of the nodes that it is linked by (or 
links to). A famous commercialisation of this centrality measure is the 
PageRank algorithm by Google (Brin and Page, 1995). In general, the 
importance of the node will depend on process taking place in the 
network. Borgatti (2005) provides a good overview of alternative 
processes in networks and centrality measures applicable for their 
analysis. 
  Finally, a key question in the study of networks is how the 
topologies that are seen in reality have come into being. There are two 
classes of network formation models some times referred to as 
equilibrium and non-equilibrium models (Dorogovtsev and Mendes, 
2003). Equilibrium models have a fixed set of nodes with randomly 
chosen pairs of nodes connected by links. Erdõs and Rényi (1959) 
develop a basic model of a n node network, with each pair of nodes 
connected by a link with probability p. This type of network is 
commonly referred to as a classical random network. Non-equilibrium 
network models grow a network by successively adding nodes and 
setting probabilities for links forming between the new nodes and 
existing nodes and between already existing nodes. Many of these 
models, notably the Barabasi and Albert (1999) model (BA model), 
are based on preferential attachment. Preferential attachment assigns a 
probability of a link forming with a node that is increasing with the 
number of prior links of the node. 
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2.2.2  Fedwire as an example of a complex network 
Soramäki et al (2007) analyse the topology of daily networks formed 
by the payment flows between commercial banks over Fedwire for a 
period of 62 consecutive business days. Apart from a few holidays, 
the statistics characterising the network were quite similar from day to 
day. These networks shared many characteristics with other empirical 
complex networks, such as a scale-free degree distribution, high 
clustering coefficient and the small world phenomenon (short path 
lengths in spite of low connectivity). Like many other technological 
networks, high-degree nodes tend to connect to low-degree nodes. 
Similar conclusions can also be reached from analysis on BoJ-NET by 
Inaoka et al (2005). 
  Moreover, Soramäki et al (2007) report that the topology of the 
network was significantly altered by the attacks of 11 September 
2001. The number of nodes and links in the network and its 
connectivity was reduced, while the average path length between 
nodes was significantly increased. Interestingly, these alterations were 
of both similar magnitude and direction to those that occurred on 
several of the holidays contained within the period. 
  Figure 2.2a shows liquidity flows in Fedwire as a visual graph. 
The figure includes over 6,600 nodes and more than 70,000 links. 
Each link between two banks is shaded by the value of payments 
exchanged between them, with darker shades indicating higher values. 
Despite the appearance of a giant fur ball, the graph suggests the 
existence of a small group of banks connected by high value links. To 
gain a clearer picture of this group, a subset of the network where the 
focus is on high value links is displayed in Figure 2.2b. This graph 
shows the largest undirected links that comprise 75% of the value 
transferred. The network consists of only 66 nodes and 181 links. The 
prominent feature is a densely connected sub-graph, or clique, of 25 
nodes to which the remaining nodes connect. By itself it is almost a 
complete graph. A small number of banks and the links between them 
thus dominate the value of all payments sent over the network. 
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Figure 2.2  Visualisation of the liquidity flow network 
      (Soramäki et al, 2007) 
 
a) b) 
   
 
 
The analysis finds that payment networks have characteristics similar 
to other social and technological networks. An unanswered question is 
why the network has the structure it does: the network may grow over 
time by a logic that is very general or that is particular to payment 
systems, or to specific policies of a given system. This is an 
interesting topic for future research. The network structure has also 
implications for its robustness. Robustness of the network, however, 
also depends on the processes taking place in it. This is the topic of 
the next sections. 
 
 
2.3  Modelling payment system dynamics 
2.3.1 Network  dynamics 
A number of payment system simulations carried out in recent years 
have used actual or generated payment data. These simulations have 
studied the actual dynamics of payment systems, where system rules 
have varied from simple real-time gross settlement to complex hybrid 
settlement mechanisms with offsetting and multilateral settlement 
capabilities. The research can be summarised as trade-off questions 
between liquidity, speed of settlement and risks. The impact of bank 
behaviour has not been taken endogenously into account in these 
simulations. A summary of this line of research is provided in 
Leinonen (2005) and is not presented here.  
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  From a network perspective, the performance of banks (nodes) is 
often dynamically dependent on the performance of other banks 
within the network and upon the structure of linkages between banks. 
A failure by one node in the network, for example, may hinder flows 
in the network and adversely impact the performance of the other 
nodes as the disturbance propagates in the network. 
  One branch of network literature has investigated the resilience of 
different network topologies in terms of a connectivity threshold (ie 
percolation threshold)
5 at which a network dissolves into several 
disconnected components. A well-known finding is that scale-free 
networks are more robust to random failures than other types of 
networks. However, they are very susceptible to the removal of the 
very few highly connected nodes. These static failure analyses may be 
applicable to some networks if the interest is the availability of paths 
between nodes in the network – but are less applicable to networks of 
monetary flows which contain both flows via the shortest paths as 
well as longer walks within the network. 
  Another branch of the literature has studied the impact of 
perturbations that cascade through the network on the basis of 
established theoretical or domain-specific rules
6. In these dynamical 
models nodes generally have a capacity to operate at a certain load 
and, once the threshold is exceeded, some or all of the node’s load is 
distributed to neighbouring nodes in the network (Bak et al, 1987). 
While the detailed dynamics depend on the rules applied for the 
cascades, generally the most connected nodes (or nodes with highest 
load in relation to overall capacity) are more likely than average nodes 
to trigger cascades. Increased heterogeneity makes the system more 
robust to random failures, but more susceptible to targeted attacks that 
may cause global cascades. 
  Cascade models have been applied by physicists to systems within 
fields ranging from geology to biology to sociology (eg Jensen, 1998). 
This research has demonstrated that models made of very simple 
agents, interacting with neighbouring agents, can yield surprising 
insights about system-level behaviour. In the spirit of these cascade 
models, Beyeler et al (2007) formulate a simple agent-based model for 
liquidity flows within a payment system. 
 
 
                                          
5 Eg Bollobas (1985), Moore and Newman (2000) and Callaway et al (2000). 
6 Eg Watts (2002) and Crucitti et al (2004b) for random and complex networks, 
respectively, and Sachtjen et al (2000) and Kinney et al (2004) for power networks.  
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2.3.2  Simple payment system model 
The model of Beyeler et al includes only the essential processes of a 
payment system and its accompanying liquidity market. A set of 
banks exchange payments through a single common payment system. 
All payments occur only along the links of a scale-free network – as 
was shown to be representative of Fedwire liquidity flows. Banks’ 
customers randomly instruct them to make a unit payment to a 
neighbouring connected bank. Banks are reflexively cooperative: they 
submit the payment if the balance in their payment system account 
allows; otherwise they place the instruction on a queue for later 
settlement. 
  If the receiving bank has instructions in its queue, the payment it 
just received enables it to remove a queued instruction and submit a 
payment in turn. If the bank that receives that payment is also queuing 
instructions, then it can make a payment, and so on. In this way a 
single initial payment made by a bank can cause many payments to be 
released from the queues of the downstream receiving banks. This is 
an example of the cascade processes typically studied in other models 
of self-organised criticality. Statistics on these settlement cascades are 
an indicator of the extent of interdependence of the banks, and in the 
model they are a controlled by two parameters: the overall liquidity 
and market conductance. 
 
Figure 2.3  Simple payment system model 




In the absence of a liquidity market, only abundant liquidity allows 
banks to operate independently; reducing liquidity increases the 
likelihood that a given bank will exhaust its balance and begin 
queuing payments. A bank that has exhausted its balance must wait 
for an incoming payment from one of its neighbours. When liquidity 
is low a bank’s ability to process payments becomes coupled to its 
neighbours’ ability to process. The output of the payment system as a 
whole is no longer determined by overall input, but instead becomes 
dominated by the internal dynamics of the system. Figure 2.4a shows 
how the correlation between arriving instructions and submitted 
payments degrades in the model as liquidity is reduced (1: high 
liquidity; 2: medium liquidity; 3: low liquidity). A settlement cascade, 
that is the release of queued payments as a result of a single initiating 
payment, can comprise hundreds of queued payments as illustrated in 
Figure 2.4b. 
  To explore how liquidity markets reduce coupling among network 
neighbours and thereby reduce congestion, market transactions were 
represented as a diffusive process where a bank’s balance plays the 
role of a potential energy or pressure. Banks with high balances tend 
to contribute liquidity to the market, while banks with low balances 
tend to draw liquidity from the market. There is no decision-making or 
price-setting in this simple market model, but it reflects two essential 
features of a real market: liquidity flows from banks with surplus 
funds to banks that need funds, and liquidity can flow from any bank 
to any bank – flows are not confined to the links of the payment 
network. It creates a separate global pathway for liquidity flow. The 




Figure 2.4  Instruction and Payment Correlation (a) 
      and Settlement Cascade Length 
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With a liquidity market included, the number of payments closely 
tracks the number of instructions as the coupling between banks is 
weakened and the size of the settlement cascades is reduced. The rate 
of liquidity flow through the market relative to the rate of flow 
through the payment system was surprisingly small. The performance 
of the system can be greatly improved even though less than 2% of the 
system through-put flows through the market. 
 
 
2.4  Modelling bank behaviour 
2.4.1 Decision-making,  learning and adaptation 
Wide-scale disruptions may not only present operational challenges 
for participants in the interbank payment system, but they may also 
induce participants to change the way they conduct business. The 
actions of participants have the potential to either mitigate or 
exacerbate adverse effects. Hence, understanding how participants 
interact and react when faced with operational adversity will assist 
operators and regulators in designing countermeasures, devising 
policy, and providing emergency assistance, if necessary. 
  The first approach to study bank behaviour in payment systems 
has been to use standard game theory. Angelini (1998) and 
Kobayakawa (1997) use a setup derived from earlier literature on 
precautionary demand for reserves. Angelini (1998) shows that in a 
RTGS system, where banks are charged for intraday liquidity, 
payments will tend to be delayed and that the equilibrium outcome is 
not socially optimal. Kobayakawa (1997) models the intraday 
liquidity management process as a game of uncertainty, ie a game 
where nature moves after the players. Kobayakawa (1997) shows that 
both delaying and not delaying can be equilibrium outcomes when 
intraday overdrafts are priced. McAndrews and Rajan (2002) study the 
timing and funding of transfers in the Fedwire funds transfer system. 
They show that banks benefit from synchronising their payment 
pattern over the course of the business day because it reduces the 
overdrafts. Bech and Garratt (2003) develop a stylised two-period-
two-player model with imperfect information. They analyse the 
strategic incentives under different intraday credit policy regimes 
employed by central banks and characterise how the Nash equilibria 
depend on the underlying cost parameters for liquidity and delays. It 
turns out that two classical paradigms in game theory emerge: the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma in the case where intraday credit is provided  
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against collateral and the Stag Hunt coordination game in the case 
where the central bank charges a fee. Hence, many policy issues can 
be understood in terms of well-known conflicts and dilemmas in 
economics. 
  Other approaches that have been applied to similar problems of 
repeated interaction among a large number of players are evolutionary 
game theory and reinforcement learning (such as Q-Learning by 
Watkins et al, 1992). Agents who learn about each others’ actions 
through repeated strategic interaction is a leading theme in 
evolutionary game theory. In most of the existing literature it is 
customary to look at the players’ asymptotic behaviour in situations 
where the payoffs are some known function of players’ strategies. In 
one strand of the literature, this knowledge is a prerogative of the 
players, who can therefore use adaptive rules of the type ‘choose a 
best reply to the current strategy profile’. In a second research line, the 
learning rules do not require knowledge of the payoff function on the 
part of the learners. Such rules are instead of the kind ‘adopt more 
frequently a strategy that has given a high payoff’. 
  Galbiati and Soramäki (2007) use methods from reinforcement 
learning (Barto and Sutton, 1998) and fictitious play (Brown, 1951) to 
numerically solve a model with interactions among a large number of 
banks that settle payments on a continuous basis under imperfect 
information, stochastic payoffs and a finite but long sequence of 




2.4.2  Multi-agent model of bank behaviour 
Galbiati and Soramäki (2007) develop a dynamic multi-agent model 
of an interbank payment system where payments are settled on the 
basis of pre-committed funds. In the model banks choose their level of 
committed funds on the basis of private payoff maximisation. 
  The model consists of a sequence of settlement days. Each of these 
days is a simultaneous-move game, in which each bank chooses the 
amount of liquidity to commit for payment processing and receives a 
stochastic payoff. Payoffs are determined by means of simulating the 
settlement day with the amounts of liquidity chosen by the banks. 
Instructions to be settled by the banks arrive on the basis of a Poisson 
process and are ex-ante unknown to the banks. As shown in Section 
2.3.2, the relationship between instruction arrival and payment 
settlement is very complex and could not so far be described 
analytically. Adaptation takes place through reinforcement learning  
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with Bayesian updating, with banks maximising immediate payoffs. 
Figure 2.5 shows the sequence of decisions, events and learning in the 
model. 
 
Figure 2.5  Overview of a multi-agent learning model 
      of a payment system 






By the process of individual pay-off maximisation, banks adjust their 
demand for liquidity up (reducing delays) when delay costs increase 
and down (increasing delays), when they rise. It is well known that the 
demand for intraday credit is generated by a tradeoff between the 
costs associated with delaying payments and liquidity costs. 
Simulating the model for different parameter values, they find that the 
demand for intraday credit is an S-shaped function of the cost ratio 
between intraday credit costs and the costs associated with delaying 
payments
7 (see Figure 2.6a). 
 
                                          
7 In the model both costs are assumed to be linear.  
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Figure 2.6  Demand for intraday credit (a), 




































































An interesting question is how good the performance of the banks is in 
absolute terms. To understand this we compare the payoffs received 
by the banks through adaptation with two extreme strategies: 
 
a)  delay all payments to the end of the day; 
b) commit enough liquidity to be able to process all payments 
promptly. 
 
The performance of these three strategies is shown in Figure 2.6b. For 
any level of the delay cost, the adaptive banks obtain better payoffs 
than either of the two extreme strategies as they manage to learn a 
convenient trade-off between delay and liquidity costs. On the 
contrary, the strategy under a) becomes quickly very expensive as 
delay costs increase, and the strategy under b) is exceedingly 
expensive when delays are not costly. 
  Ideally, banks should be taking into consideration the future 
stream of pay-offs as well. This would create a value of information to 
the banks as discounting expected future payoffs would create an 
explicit trade-off between exploitation (the use of actions that appear 
optimal in the light of the available information) and exploration (the 
use of seemingly sub-optimal actions, which might appear such 
because of lack of experimentation). Banks may also be risk-averse, 
interested not only in the expected pay-off but also its variability. 




This article presented three elements of payment systems, new 
approaches for understanding and analysing them, and examples on 
how these approaches can be applied to specific research questions. It 
argues that performance of a payment system is a function of network 
topology, the ‘physics’ of the system and the behaviour of banks – one 
factor alone is not enough to evaluate efficiency or robustness. 
  First, the payment system can be understood as a network of 
liquidity flows and can be modelled as a graph. Each model of a 
payment system assumes some topology, be it random, complete or a 
topology closer to the system being modelled - such as the scale-free 
topology of Fedwire. Graph theory and social network analysis 
provide good tools for analysing the structure of interbank payment 
systems and their liquidity flows. Understanding how banks are 
connected in the payment network is important for analysing their  
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robustness. The concepts developed in the field can help us 
structurally analyse payment flows in the system (see eg Newman, 
2003). Measures of average path length can tell us how quickly 
disturbances are likely to reach other banks in the network. More 
research is clearly needed to identify measures that explain the 
connection between system topology and its robustness. Centrality 
measures can help us identify banks that are not only important 
through their size, but also due to their position in the network and due 
to their linkages to other banks (see eg Borgatti, 2005). A likely 
fruitful area in payment system research would be to use such 
approaches for the identification of important (and vulnerable) banks 
in networks representing RTGS or netting systems. 
  Second, payment systems have rules, procedures and technical 
constraints for the processing of individual payments that may 
produce emergent behaviour at the system level.  An example of these 
is the settlement cascades that take place at low levels of liquidity and 
low market conductance. The model of payment system dynamics 
exhibits a transition from independent to highly interdependent 
behaviour and allows the study of factors that control system-wide 
interdependence. Complexity theory and models developed in 
statistical mechanics (see eg Bak, 1987, and Sachtjen et al, 2000) can 
help explain how simple local rules create emergent system-level 
behaviour. 
  Third, banks react to changes in the environment – be these 
changes in policy or disruptions to the system’s operation or changes 
in the behaviour of other banks. Understanding how banks might 
react, and the impact of simultaneous reactions at the system level, 
greatly helps in evaluating risks and efficiencies of payment systems. 
While the incentives of banks may be analysed individually in 
isolation or when operating in a stipulated environment, their 
interaction in a system of banks with their own incentives necessitates 
a model. In modelling bank behaviour, methodologies developed 
under reinforcement learning (Sutton and Barto, 1998) and learning in 
games (Fudenberg and Levine 1998) may prove useful. As seen by the 
given example, mere simple ‘intelligence’ by agents can produce 
realistic behaviour and add value to the analysis of payment systems. 
In the development of more realistic behaviour for banks in settling 
payments, an important unanswered question is whether and what 
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3  From PNS to TARGET2: 
the cost of FIFO in RTGS 
payment systems 
Abstract 
Most of the recent RTGS payment systems are equipped with various 
optimisation algorithms that are able to increase the settlement speed 
by resolving fully or partially some of the gridlock situations that arise 
in the system. Today, most of the optimisation algorithms in use 
follow – at least partially– the FIFO (First In First Out) rule, meaning 
that they always settle the queued payments in their order of arrival. 
While the FIFO rule may be desirable based on some other 
considerations, for example legal ground, it creates an additional 
constraint to the optimisation problem, potentially leading to a less 
efficient solution in terms of settled value. The aim of this paper is to 
try to quantify to which extent non-FIFO optimisation algorithms can 
be more efficient than FIFO algorithms. 
  In the first part of this paper, some simulations performed on 
randomly generated sets of payments are used to evaluate the 
efficiency of several FIFO and non FIFO optimisation algorithms. 
This analysis is conducted both in the case of bilateral optimisation 
and in the case of multilateral optimisation. The results show that in 
those conditions, some non-FIFO algorithms are able to improve 
significantly on their FIFO counterparts. 
  In a second part, the impact of the different optimisation 
algorithms is investigated further by simulating the complete PNS 
system using real data. In the context of a liquidity crisis created by 
the technical failure of the largest participant of the system, the use of 
some non-FIFO algorithms is shown to reduce the number of rejected 




3.1  Optimisation in RTGS 
3.1.1  From net to hybrid systems 
The last two decades have witnessed important transformations in the 
field of payment systems. Pure DNS (Deferred Net Settlement) 
systems, in which payment orders are stored throughout the day and 
the resulting net balances are settled only once at the end of the day, 
were the predominant form of LVPS (Large Value Payment Systems) 
in the 1980s. Although DNS systems are extremely efficient in terms 
of central bank money usage, the absence of intraday finality leading 
to potentially large intraday exposures raised some concerns in the 
context of ever-increasing values exchanged. Indeed if one participant 
fails to meet its end-of-day payment obligations in an unprotected 
DNS system, some or all payments involving this participant have to 
be unwound, potentially leading to the default of other participants 
and further unwinding. This potential domino effect can have 
unpredictable consequences on the final cash balances of each 
participant and on the number of rejected payments at the end of the 
day and thus undermines confidence in the payment system. 
  For these reasons, DNS systems were progressively replaced in the 
1990s by RTGS (Real Time Gross Settlement) systems, in which 
payments are settled one by one as soon as the payment orders enter 
the system (and provided sufficient liquidity is available). Compared 
to DNS systems, RTGS systems tremendously reduce the risks 
associated with exchanging large value payments, but they also 
require significantly higher levels of central bank money to operate. 
  In order to reduce the central bank money usage of their 
participants, RTGS systems progressively adopted several payment-
offsetting features.
1 Payments that cannot be settled immediately are 
held in a centrally-organised queue, and more or less sophisticated 
optimisation algorithms are used to try and simultaneously settle 
groups of queued payments that can not be settled individually. 
  Examples of such RTGS systems with offsetting mechanisms, 
sometimes referred to as ’hybrid systems’, include the French LVPS 
PNS (Paris Net Settlement) and the future pan-European system 
TARGET2. Besides offsetting algorithms, those two systems offer the 
participants the possibility to establish bilateral sending limits towards 
                                          
1 Here offsetting is to be understood as the gross execution of individual payments 
simultaneously within one legal and logical second. From a legal perspective, offsetting 
in RTGS is very different from the netting process in DNS.  
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their counterparties. A bilateral limit is the net amount of money a 
participant is willing to pay another participant before being paid 
back. This feature is helpful for risk management purposes and creates 
incentives to submit payments early into the system. Indeed, when 
intraday liquidity is scarce in a payment system, some participants 
might delay their payments in order to get a free ride on other 
participants’ liquidity (see eg Bech and Garratt, 2003). When no 
bilateral sending limit feature is available, if bank A is not willing to 
grant bank B free intraday credit, the only solution bank A has is to 
retain its payments towards bank B in its own internal queue (located 
in its private IT infrastructure and invisible to the system and other 
participants). Conversely, if bank A can establish a bilateral limit 
towards bank B, bank A can submit payments towards bank B and let 
them be blocked by the RTGS system. Bank B is therefore 
incentivised to submit payments towards bank A. Doing so will not 
deplete bank B’s liquidity stock because bank B’s submission of 
payments towards bank A will trigger the release of bank A’s 
payments towards bank B. Bilateral sending limits, together with 
offsetting mechanisms, thus transform intraday liquidity management 
from a competitive game (whoever submits his payments last wins) 
into a cooperative game (I will pay you at the exact time you pay me, 
so it is optimal for you to pay me early). 
 
 
3.1.2  Optimisation and the FIFO rule 
The benefits provided by offsetting algorithms in terms of lower 
liquidity needs in RTGS have been extensively investigated in recent 
years, notably thanks to the development of simulation tools for 
RTGS systems. Koponen and Soramäki (2005) and Leinonen and 
Soramäki (2005), among others, clearly showed how offsetting 
algorithms could for a given level of liquidity reduce the settlement 
delay and conversely reduce the liquidity needs for a given level of 
delay. 
  However, most of the analysis done until now relates to the use of 
optimisation algorithms that follow the First In First Out (FIFO) rule, 
meaning that payments have to be settled in the order they entered the 
system. While this constraint might be supported by some participants 
wishing to keep full control of their payment queue and might also be 
desirable from a legal point of view, it potentially lowers the 
efficiency of the optimisation algorithm in terms of settled value. 
Clearly, if a single very large payment is first in the queue, it might  
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block many later-submitted smaller payments, and a FIFO algorithm 
will not be able to do anything about it. 
  The aim of this paper is to investigate other types of offsetting 
algorithms which do not necessarily follow the FIFO rule and to try 
and quantify to what extent non-FIFO optimisation algorithms can be 
more efficient than FIFO algorithms. In other words, we will try to 
calculate the cost of the FIFO rule for RTGS systems in terms of 
decreased efficiency of the optimisation mechanisms. 
  Bech and Soramäki (2001 and 2005) formalised the problem by 
introducing a clear distinction between the Gridlock Resolution 
Problem (GRP, ie the problem of optimisation under the FIFO 
constraint, as defined by Bech and Soramäki) and the Bank Clearing 
Problem (BCP, ie the free optimisation problem, as referred to by 
Güntzer et al, 1998). 
 
 
3.1.3  Formalisation of the problem 
The notations used in this section come from Bech and Soramäki 
(2001). We consider n banks (i  =  1…n) participating in a RTGS 
system, each characterised by its initial amount of liquidity Si. The 
queue of bank i contains mi payments waiting to be settled. The k
th 
payment sent by bank i is characterised by its value ai,k and the 
receiving bank designated by the integer  {} { } i \ n ,..., 2 , 1 r k , i ∈ . 
  In order to be able to characterise any subset of the queued 
payments, we will use the indicators  } 1 , 0 { x k , i ∈ . A value of 1 
(respectively 0) attributed to xi,k simply means that the k
th payment of 
bank i is included (respectively not included) in the considered subset. 
  Bech and Soramäki define the Gridlock Resolution Problem as 
finding the ()
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The first condition is the liquidity constraint. It simply states that a 
bank cannot have a negative cash balance within the considered 
payment system. The second condition is the sequence constraint. It 
simply translates the fact that bank i wants its payments settled in the 
chronological order in which they were received by the system. 
 The  Bank Clearing Problem, as defined by Güntzer et al (1998) 
is similar to the Gridlock Resolution Problem with the difference that 




3.1.4  Non-FIFO features in PNS and TARGET2 
Neither the French LVPS PNS nor the future pan-European RTGS 
TARGET2 totally comply with the sequence constraint of the GRP 
problem, as explained in the previous section. Indeed, the FIFO rule is 
arguably breached on several occasions. 
  First, in both PNS and TARGET2, the FIFO principle is to be 
understood on a bilateral basis. A payment from bank A to bank B can 
be settled before a payment from bank A to bank C that entered the 
system earlier. Moreover, it is clear that such an exception to the FIFO 
rule will be present in all systems offering the participants the 
possibility to set bilateral limits towards their counterparties. Indeed, 
if the payment from bank A to bank C is queued because the bilateral 
limit bank A has set towards bank C has been reached, bank A will 
still want to be able to settle payments towards its other 
counterparties. 
  Furthermore in PNS, a low value payment (whose value is lower 
than EUR 1 million) from bank A to bank B will be settled directly by 
the entry mechanism of the system, provided bank A has the necessary 
funds and whether or not earlier submitted payments from bank A to 
bank B are present in the queue. The aim of this rule is to avoid a 
situation where a very large queued payment creates a blockage, 
unnecessarily delaying the settlement of many small payments. A 
similar feature exists in the entry mechanism of TARGET2: indeed 
when a normal priority payment
2 is submitted, ‘it is not checked 
whether the normal [priority payments] queue is empty, because the 
FIFO principle can be breached for normal [priority] payments’.
3 
                                          
2 In TARGET2, the participants will be able to choose either normal priority or urgent 
priority for each payment they emit. 
3 TARGET2 User Detailed Functional Specifications, first book version 2.0, page 145.  
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Even when retaining a bilateral definition of the FIFO rule, PNS (for 
payments lower than EUR 1 million) and TARGET2 (for normal 
priority payments) do not comply with this rule in the entry 
mechanism. 
  Finally, another breach of the FIFO rule occurs in the multilateral 
optimisation algorithm of the PNS system which attempts to settle 
simultaneously all queued payments of all participants. In case it is 
impossible to settle all queued payments because one or several 
participants do not have sufficient liquidity, the algorithm will 
consider the participant having the largest net debit position and de-
activate the smallest of its payments whose value exceeds the value of 
its net debit position (in case no payment exceeds the value of the net 
debit position, the biggest payment of the participant having the 
largest net debit position is de-activated). In this special case, the 
payments are then selected according to their value, and not according 
to the order they arrived in the system. 
 
 
3.1.5  Objectives of the paper 
We have just shown that the settlement process of PNS, in particular 
for low value payments, and of TARGET2 in the case of normal 
priority payments, breach the FIFO rule on several occasions. 
Moreover, in TARGET2 normal priority payments can by-pass other 
queued payments in the entry mechanism while they are treated 
according to a strict FIFO rule (in a bilateral-FIFO sense) in the 
bilateral optimisation algorithm. One can thus feel entitled to 
investigate the benefits non-FIFO optimisation algorithms could bring 
to the system. 
  There are several good reasons for a payment system to follow the 
FIFO principle: it makes the rules of the system easier and allows 
participants to keep full control of the order their payments are settled. 
For this last reason in particular, some treasurers are very fond of the 
FIFO principle. Moreover, FIFO optimisation algorithms are fast, 
simple to understand and easy to implement while efficient enough to 
solve many gridlock situations. 
  In theory the drawback associated with the lack of flexibility the 
FIFO principle represents is decreased settlement efficiency. All other 
things being equal, a pure FIFO RTGS is characterised by a higher 
settlement delay than a RTGS equipped with more advanced non-
FIFO offsetting algorithms. 
  The aim of this paper is not to discuss whether or not the FIFO 
principle should continue to be applied in today’s RTGS, as many  
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other considerations may influence the conclusion that could be made 
regarding this topic. Instead, the objective of this contribution is to try 
and quantify the expected increase in settlement efficiency that would 
allow the use of non-FIFO offsetting algorithms. 
  Two types of optimisation algorithms co-exist in PNS and in the 
future TARGET2 system: bilateral optimisation and multilateral 
optimisation. We will examine them successively in a theoretical 
framework before moving to a ‘real-life case’ in the PNS system. 
 
 
3.2 Bilateral  optimisation 
In this section we focus on bilateral optimisation, ie we examine two 
participants A and B and consider only queued payments from A to B 
and from B to A. The objective of a bilateral optimisation algorithm is 
to settle simultaneously a set of queued payments for as high a total 
cumulated value as possible (the number of settled payments is also of 
interest as a ‘secondary objective’, although the settled value is 
usually considered more important). 
  One may wonder why optimisation should be performed on a 
bilateral basis rather than directly on a multilateral basis, ie 
considering all queued payments of all participants at the same time. 
In theory, any solution provided by a bilateral optimisation algorithm 
could also be found by a multilateral optimisation algorithm while the 
opposite is not true. In practice, bilateral optimisation takes profit 
from the usually relatively high level of reciprocity of payment 
networks in order to drastically reduce the number of variables and the 
complexity of the problem. Another important element is the presence 
of bilateral sending limits (cf 3.1.1) which create a strong linkage 
between the payments exchanged by a pair of participants (A will pay 
B if and only if B pays A). While the treatment of bilateral limits is 
cumbersome in a multilateral optimisation algorithm, it is very easily 
implemented and effective in a bilateral optimisation algorithm. 
  For those reasons, bilateral optimisation and multilateral 
optimisation can be considered as complimentary and are both used in 
PNS and in TARGET2. 
 
 
3.2.1  Bilateral optimisation in PNS and TARGET2 
The two systems, PNS and TARGET2, rely on the same bilateral 
optimisation algorithm. This algorithm follows the FIFO rule in a  
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bilateral sense. First, the algorithm tries to settle all payments queued 
between the two banks simultaneously. If this is not possible, the most 
recent payment from the participant lacking liquidity is de-activated. 
This process is iterated until all payments have been de-activated or 
until a solution has been found. The ‘FIFO bilateral optimisation 
algorithm’ is described in detail in Appendix 1. 
  The fact that PNS and TARGET2 rely on the same bilateral 
optimisation algorithm comes as no surprise. It is indeed quite easy to 
show that the bilateral optimisation algorithm used in PNS and 
TARGET2 is the best algorithm that abides by the bilateral-FIFO rule, 
in the sense that it will always provide the unique solution maximising 
both the volume and value settled (Bech and Soramäki, 2001). 
 
 
3.2.2  The bilateral Greedy algorithm 
The bilateral Greedy algorithm was proposed by Güntzer et al in 1998. 
Payments are not retained according to their arrival order but 
according to their value. As in the FIFO bilateral optimisation 
algorithm, the Greedy algorithm first tries to settle all payments 
queued between the two banks simultaneously. If this is not possible, 
all payments from the participant lacking liquidity are de-activated 
and are then re-activated whenever possible given the liquidity 
constraint in the decreasing order of their value. This process is 
iterated until all payments have been de-activated or until a solution 
has been found. The details of the algorithm can be found in Appendix 
1. Compared to the FIFO algorithm used in PNS and TARGET2, 
bigger payments are favoured at the expense of payments that entered 
the system early. One of the advantages of the Greedy algorithm over 
the FIFO algorithm is that queues will not be blocked due to a single 
very large payment that would prevent all subsequent payments from 
settling. 
  A very interesting property of the Greedy algorithm is that it yields 
a solution that maximises the value of payments settled when the 
sequences of values of the queued payments are superincreasing, that 
is to say when every queued payment from A to B is larger than the 
sum of all the smaller queued payments from A to B and every queued 
payment from B to A is larger than the sum of all the smaller queued 
payments from B to A. A proof of this claim is presented in Appendix 
3. In the case of the PNS system, it can be shown that any average set 
of 3 payments has a 95% chance of forming a superincreasing 
sequence. This probability drops to 65% if we consider a set of 5 
payments and to only 2% if we consider a set of 10 payments. The  
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ideal case of superincreasing sequences is therefore not unrealistic 
when there are only few queued payments between two given 
participants (as is often the case in PNS in normal working 
conditions). It is also important to keep in mind that the Greedy 
algorithm can very well provide the best solution even if the payment 
sequences are not superincreasing, although this is not guaranteed in 
this case. 
  Another interesting feature of the Greedy algorithm lies in its 
simplicity and speed. Indeed, once queued payments have been 
ordered according to their value, the number of operations to perform 
is only proportional to the number of queued payments, that is to say 
the Greedy algorithm is not slower than the simple FIFO algorithm 
used in PNS and TARGET2. The time needed to order a set of N 
payments is typically proportional to N.log(N) but such a task only 
needs to be performed once. Furthermore, the tests showed that 
compared to the FIFO algorithm, fewer iterations were needed for 
Greedy to produce a solution. 
 
 
3.2.3 New  ideas  regarding bilateral optimisation 
We present some new ideas regarding bilateral optimisation. The 
Greedy algorithm is already very efficient but is not guaranteed to 
give the best solution when payment values are not superincreasing. Is 
it possible to improve on Greedy? 
  Two distinct ideas were investigated. The first idea is to introduce 
some flexibility to Greedy, which always re-activates payments in the 
decreasing order of their value. We consider the problem of bilateral 
optimisation between bank A and bank B and denote payments from 
A to B as the (ai)i=1...N where a1 is the biggest payment and aN is the 






k i a a  as we know that the Greedy algorithm will yield 
the best answer for a superincreasing payment sequence (see 
Appendix 3). On the other hand, if the sequence is not locally 





k i a a , it is unclear whether the payment ai 
should be re-activated or not. The idea behind the Las Vegas Greedy 
bilateral optimisation algorithm is to try both solutions, stochastically. 
The algorithm is presented in more detail in Appendix 1. It is 
important to note that for superincreasing payment value sequences, 
the Las Vegas Greedy algorithm degenerates into Greedy.  
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  The other idea investigated was to try and benefit from the ever-
increasing computational power available to try more settlement 
possibilities than Greedy does. While this computational power might 
not be sufficient to try each of the 2
N+M possibilities involved (N is the 
number of queued payments from A to B and M is the number of 
queued payments from B to A), it is reasonable to consider that some 
of them might be tested to the limit of, say, a thousand cases. The key 
question is now how to select those cases to be tested. The idea behind 
Greedy++ is to run the Greedy algorithm, and after each iteration that 
does not yield a solution because one of the participants does not have 
the needed liquidity, to test all possibilities involving the 10 payments 
closest to the error (ie the 2
10 = 1024 cases obtained when considering 
the re-activation/de-activation of the 10 payments closest to the error, 
all other payments staying in the same state). If a solution is found, 
then the solution maximising the settled value will be chosen. When 
this treatment yields no solution, a Greedy iteration is applied, hence 
the name of Greedy++ for this algorithm. The algorithm is presented 
in more detail in Appendix 1. 
 
 
3.2.4  A few basic examples 
The aim of this section is to help understand concretely how the 
algorithms work on practical examples. 
 
Example 1 
  Bank A  Bank B 
Cash balance  10  10 
1
st 500  20 
2
nd 20  20 
3





th 20  20 
 
 
In this example a large payment from bank A to bank B (of value 500) 
is preventing subsequent payments from settling. Clearly, nothing can 
be settled with a FIFO algorithm as any solution would involve the 
by-passing of bank A’s earliest-sent payment. The Greedy algorithm, 
as well as Greedy++ and the bilateral Las Vegas Greedy, will however 
find the value maximising solution (settle bank A’s second, third and 




  Bank A  Bank B 
Cash balance  0  10 
1 140  20 
2   20 




arrival  4   100 
 
 
This example is typical of non-superincreasing payment sequences 
(here  30  <  20+20 so the sequence of Bank B’s payments is not 
superincreasing). The Greedy algorithm will start by activating all 
payments, and as bank B has a negative virtual position (-30), will de-
activate all payments from B to A and re-activate them in the 
decreasing order of their value. By re-activating the payment of value 
30, Greedy will miss the trivial solution (140  =  100  +  20  +  20) and 
terminate without settling any payment. 
  The Greedy++ algorithm will start by activating all payments, and 
as settlement is impossible, will examine all possibilities involving the 
10 payments closest to the error (here the error is equal to 30, and as 
there are only 5 payments in the queue, the 2
5 = 32 possibilities will 
be tried, and the value maximising solution will be retained). 
Greedy++ will therefore find the correct solution – as always when the 
number of queued payments is fewer than 10. 
  The bilateral Las Vegas Greedy algorithm will also start by 
activating all payments, and after noticing that B has a negative virtual 
position, will de-activate all payments from B to A. Payments from B 
to A will then be considered for re-activation in the decreasing order 
of their value, up to a total cumulated value of 140 (the sum of the 
activated payments from A to B + B’s position). Bank B’s biggest 
payment, of value 100, will be re-activated with a probability of 100% 
since the cumulated value of the lower payments, 70, is strictly lower 
than B’s virtual position of 140. The payment of value 30 is then 
considered for re-activation. It will be re-activated with a probability 





. If the algorithm is launched 10 times, the 





3.2.5 Relative  efficiency  of bilateral optimisation 
algorithms 
In order to compare the different bilateral optimisation algorithms 
presented in the previous pages, the following test was developed: 
 
Figure 3.1  Payment value distribution 
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•  We considered two banks, A and B. We assumed that there are N 
queued payments from bank A to bank B, the (ai)i=1...N, and N 
queued payments from bank B to bank A, the (bi)i=1...N. The value 
of each of these 2N payments was generated randomly according 
to the observed payment value distribution in the PNS system: as 
shown in the above graph, the payment distribution in PNS can be 
approximated by a log normal law of mean 4.3 and of standard 
deviation 1.25 with great accuracy. 
 
•  We can assume without any loss of generality that the sum of the 
values of the payments emitted by A, designated by  ∑ =
i
i a G  
exceeds the sum of the values of the payments emitted by B, noted 
as  ∑ =
i
i b H . The starting balance of bank B, SB is then set to zero, 
while the starting balance of bank A, the net emitter, is set to 
SA = α(G − H),  where  α is a parameter ranging from 0 (no 
liquidity is present at all), to 1 (all queued payments can be settled 
simultaneously).  
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•  The presented problem of bilateral optimisation was run with the 
PNS/T2 FIFO algorithm, Greedy, Greedy++ and Las Vegas 
Greedy bilateral algorithm. Regarding the Las Vegas Greedy 
bilateral algorithm, it was applied 5 times in a row (ie it was 
applied a first time to the initial problem, then it was applied a 
second time to what had not settled the first time, and so on…). 
The results were averaged over 5,000 different payment 
distributions generated randomly, according to the presented log 
normal law. 
 
•  The results obtained in terms of value and volume settled are 
shown in Figure 3.2. While the volume efficiency is defined 
simply as the ratio between the number of settled payments and the 
total number of queued payments 2N, it was thought more 
significant to define the value efficiency as the ratio between the 
cumulated value of settled payments and the maximum amount 
that can be settled if payments can be split: 2H + SA. 
  
56 
Figure 3.2  Bilateral optimisation, value (top) and 




























































3.2.6 Conclusion  regarding bilateral optimisation 
In terms of settled value, while the three presented non-FIFO 
algorithms perform significantly better than the standard FIFO 
algorithm, especially at low liquidity levels, the use of the most 
complicated algorithms (Las Vegas Greedy and Greedy++) does not 
yield better results than the use of the simple Greedy algorithm. 
  In terms of settled volume, however, the Greedy algorithm 
performs significantly worse than the standard FIFO algorithm, with 
only 60% of the total number of payments settled when 90% of 
liquidity is available. On the other hand, the Greedy++ algorithm is 
basically able to settle 99% of all queued payments whenever more 
than 5% of the liquidity needed to settle all payments is present. 
  The best overall performance is arguably realised by the Las 
Vegas Greedy bilateral algorithm, which performs extremely well 
both in terms of volume and value. If only the settled value matters, 
the simple Greedy algorithm – simpler and faster than Las Vegas 
Greedy and Greedy++ – is the natural choice. Finally, the bilateral 
optimisation algorithm implemented in TARGET2 and PNS provides 




3.3 Multilateral  optimisation 
This section focuses on multilateral optimisation. This time, all 
participants and all queued payments are considered simultaneously. 
The aim of multilateral optimisation is to find a set of payments – as 




3.3.1  Multilateral optimisation in PNS and TARGET2 
The multilateral optimisation algorithm of both PNS and TARGET2 
starts by activating all queued payments. Of course, if all participants 
have a positive virtual cash balance,
4 all the payments are settled 
                                          
4 Throughout this paper, the virtual cash balance of a participant designates its cash 
balance if all the activated payments of all participants in the system are settled 
simultaneously. Clearly a necessary condition for all activated payments to be settled is 
that all participants should have a positive virtual cash balance.  
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simultaneously. In the opposite situation, the participant with the 
largest net debit position is considered by the multilateral optimisation 
algorithm of both TARGET2 and PNS. The approach followed is then 
slightly different in the two systems. 
  In TARGET2, the algorithm will simply de-activate the most 
recent payment of the participant with the largest net debit position. 
  In PNS, the algorithm will consider the participant with the largest 
net debit position but this time de-activate the smallest payment whose 
value exceeds the value of its net debit position. (In case no payment 
exceeds the value of the net debit position, the biggest payment of the 
participant having the largest net debit position is de-activated, then 
the second biggest, and so on until one payment exceeds the value of 
the participant’s net debit position.) 
 
 
3.3.2  A new concept: pre-conditioning 
The concept of pre-conditioning is a new idea in the field of 
multilateral optimisation. The basic idea is to make the most of the 
existing liquidity by simply letting it flow towards the central core of 
the payment network. In order to do so, we de-activate as many as 
possible of the queued payments towards the peripheral participants, 
who only exchange payments with a single other bank. (In the sketch 
below, the peripheral participants are B, E and C. By recursion, once 
the payment from D to C has been de-activated, D will also become a 
peripheral participant and the payment from W to D will be de-
activated.) 
 




























There are two kinds of peripheral participants: 
 
•  The net emitters such as B (B is a net emitter because the 
cumulated value of queued payments from B to X is larger than 
the cumulated value of queued payments from X to B), which are a 
source of liquidity for the network. However, the reason for some 
payments between X and B being held in the queue is that B does 
not have the necessary liquidity to settle its net position. As B 
cannot receive liquidity from any other participant, the set of 
queued payments between X and B will never be settled as a 
whole. 
 
•  The net receivers (such as C and E) are liquidity traps for the 
network (C is a net receiver because the cumulated value of 
queued payments from C to D is smaller than the cumulated value 
of queued payments from D to C). Indeed the liquidity transmitted 
from Y to E will not be used again for further settlement. 
 
We can then conclude that whatever their net position (net emitters or 
net receivers), peripheral participants always have a negative impact 
on the network. We can therefore try and improve the efficiency of a 
multilateral optimisation algorithm by removing them before the 
algorithm is launched. 
  In the example presented in Figure 3.3, the pre-conditioning 
algorithm will therefore de-activate all payments from or towards 
participants B, E, C and then D. Once the multilateral optimisation 
algorithm has been applied to the network, payments involving 
peripheral participants will be dealt with separately with the help of 
bilateral optimisation algorithms. 
  This pre-conditioning algorithm was implemented in the following 
algorithms presented in this paper: the Multilateral Greedy Las Vegas, 
the Multilateral PNS Las Vegas and the OPM1010 algorithm. 
 
 
3.3.3 The  multilateral  Las-Vegas algorithms 
As in bilateral optimisation, some algorithms trying to use randomly 
generated numbers to improve on the efficiency of standard 
algorithms were developed, such as the Multilateral Greedy Las Vegas 
and the Multilateral PNS Las Vegas algorithms. 
  The Multilateral PNS Las Vegas algorithm is based on the 
algorithm used in PNS. However, instead of de-activating the smallest 
payment that is larger than the deficit of the bank with the largest  
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debit position, the algorithm randomly chooses which payment to de-
activate. In order to so, each payment is affected by a certain ‘de-
activation probability’ based on three different criteria: payments 
whose value is close to the net debit position of the emitter, payments 
whose de-activation allows the emitter to reach a net credit position 
and, finally, payments whose de-activation neither creates nor 
aggravates the deficit of another participant are de-activated with a 
higher probability. Appendix 2 provides more insight on the details of 
the algorithm. 
  The Multilateral Greedy Las Vegas algorithm is somewhat similar, 
with the exception that instead of de-activating payments of 
participants with a net debit position payment by payment, a ‘Greedy 
approach’ is followed. All payments originating from the considered 
participant with a net debit position are de-activated and are 
considered for re-activation in decreasing order of their value, as in 
Greedy, but also taking into account the position of the receiver of the 
payment (payments towards participants with a net debit position are 
re-activated with a higher probability). 
  As in bilateral optimisation, the use of random numbers is a way to 
create algorithms which can be run several times. In the following 
tests, the Las Vegas algorithms were applied five times in a row (ie 
the algorithm was applied a first time to the initial problem, then it 
was applied a second time to what had not settled the first time, and so 
on…). 
  The last algorithm tested is the OPM1010 algorithm. It is quite 
close to the Multilateral PNS Las Vegas algorithm, with the difference 
that the payments are not de-activated randomly but in a deterministic 
way. For each payment, a ‘de-activation score’ is calculated by 
considering the net positions of the emitter and of the receiver, and the 
payment with the higher score is de-activated. 
 
 
3.3.4 Relative  efficiencies  of multilateral optimisation 
algorithms 
A test case was derived to assess and compare the settlement 
efficiency of the presented multilateral optimisation algorithms. We 
considered ten banks participating in a large value payment system 
and assumed that a severe operational problem affecting the payment 
system IT infrastructure had resulted in the unavailability of the  
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banks’ cash balances.
5 As a consequence, the cash position of every 
participant was considered to be zero until some fresh collateral was 
provided by the banks. 
  This liquidity shortage prevented a highly urgent ‘all or nothing’ 
ancillary system from settling. We assumed the net position of the 
banks within the ancillary system was as shown on the left part of 
Figure 3.4, with nine participants being equally long in the system 
with a net credit position of EUR 11 million, and only one short 
participant with a net debit position of EUR 100 million. 
 
Figure 3.4  Multilateral optimisation test case: 
      settlement of an urgent Ancillary System 







































































































The Central Bank operating the large value payment system wished to 
speed up as much as possible the settlement of the highly urgent 
ancillary system and to do so asked the participant with a net debit 
position in the ancillary system to provide some additional collateral. 
As fresh collateral might have been scarce in a period of crisis, the 
Central Bank was interested in trying to reduce the liquidity burden 
affecting the participant with a net debit position in the AS. To 
achieve this goal, the system operator could have made use of normal 
priority payments that were held in the queue due to the lack of 
available liquidity in the system. It is clear that simultaneously settling 
the pending AS with some normal priority payments from the long 
participants to the short participant could lower the amount of 
collateral the short participant has to find in order to be able to settle 
                                          
5 In the context of Target2, such situation could occur for example in case of a regional 
disaster.  
62 
the ancillary system. To do so, we can use a multilateral optimisation 
algorithm that ‘locks the AS settlement’, meaning that the algorithm 
can not settle any payment unless the highly urgent AS is settled 
simultaneously with it. Such an approach is in particular used in 
TARGET2, with algorithm 4
6 (‘Partial optimisation with ancillary 
system’). 
  In our test case, we assumed a given number of low priority 
payments were queued between participants. The low priority 
payments were generated randomly according to the log normal law 
that describes the payments value distribution in the PNS system (see 
Section 3.2.5), and choosing the emitter and the receiver of the 
payments from the list of the participants with an equal probability. 
  This test case was run with the presented multilateral optimisation 
algorithms. The obtained results, averaged over 100 randomly 
generated low priority payment distributions, are shown in Figure 3.5. 
The liquidity ratio, defined as the ratio between the remaining 
collateral value that the short participant has to find, and its net debit 
position in the ancillary system (EUR 100 million), is plotted on the y-
axis against the total number of available low priority payments at the 
beginning. As an example, in the graph provided in Figure 3.4, the 
obtained liquidity ratio is 38%. Clearly, when no low priority 
payments are present to offset the AS, the short participant has to 
provide the entire 100 millions and the liquidity ratio is one, whatever 
the algorithm used. When more low priority payments are available, 
the collateral needs of the short participant are reduced, to an extent 
that depends on the chosen algorithm. 
 
                                          
6 TARGET2 User Detailed Functional Specifications, first book version 2.0, page 161.  
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The results clearly show the interest of multilateral optimisation for 
the settlement of ancillary systems. When many payments are 
available, the best algorithm is able to divide by five the value of fresh 
collateral the short participant has to provide. The best algorithm is 
OPM 1010, followed by the Multilateral Las Vegas Greedy 
Algorithm, the Multilateral Las Vegas PNS algorithm and the 
algorithm implemented in the PNS system. 
 
 
3.4  Optimisation in PNS in case of an 
operational failure 
3.4.1  The PNS system 
PNS (Paris Net Settlement) is a French LVPS which operates 
alongside TBF, the French RTGS component of the TARGET system. 
It provides real-time settlement of transactions on central bank money 
accounts that must always remain in credit. In 2006, 17 banks and 
credit institutions were participating in the PNS system and 
exchanging an average of 27,000 payments on a daily basis, with a 
total value between EUR 45 and EUR 90 billion per day. A cash link  
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established between PNS and TBF allows the participants to transfer 
liquidity between their TBF account and their PNS account at any 
time of the day, depending on their cash needs. 
  PNS is often presented as a hybrid system because it is equipped 
with efficient optimisation algorithms that are able to settle 
simultaneously several queued payments, thus allowing the system to 
operate at lower liquidity levels. The study of the PNS system is of 
special interest to the central banks of the Eurosystem because the 
algorithms implemented in the PNS system are extremely similar to 
the ones that will be used in the future pan-European TARGET2 
system. Moreover as in TARGET2, bilateral sender limits (which can 
be defined as the maximum net amount a participant is willing to pay 
to another participant before being paid in return) can be set and 




3.4.2 Simulating  the  technical default of the largest 
participant in the system 
Following Banque de France’s previous paper on the PNS system,
7 we 
investigated the role of optimisation mechanisms under special crisis 
circumstances. A previous study showed that an operational problem 
preventing a major participant from issuing payments could lead to a 
liquidity shortage within the PNS system and finally to the rejection of 
several queued payments at the closure of the system. Indeed, as the 
biggest participant is still able to receive payments, but can no longer 
issue payments, it turns into a ‘liquidity trap’, depriving the system of 
the liquidity needed to settle the pending payments. The settlement 
delay thus increases and eventually some payments can even be 
rejected at the end of the day. Being able to use advanced non-FIFO 
algorithms at this point could allow a significant reduction in the 
number of rejected payments. The case of the technical default of the 
biggest participant in PNS was therefore revisited after the algorithms 
presented in this paper had been implemented in Banque de France’s 
PNS/TBF simulator. 
 
                                          
7 Analysis by simulation, of the impact of a technical default of a payment system 
participant (Liquidity, risks and speed in payment and settlement systems – a simulation 
approach, Bank of Finland Studies, 2005), Mazars, E and Woefel, G.  
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Figure 3.6  Screenshot of Banque de France’s 





The simulator used for those simulations is able to reproduce the exact 
functioning of PNS (bilateral limits, optimisation algorithms, liquidity 
transfers between PNS and the TBF) and processes the operations one 
by one as in the real system. In contrast to the test cases presented in 
Section 3.2.5 (bilateral optimisation) and Section 3.3.4 (multilateral 




The month of March 2006 was selected and for each day of the month 
the consequences of the technical default of the largest participant 
were investigated with Banque de France’s PNS simulator. We 
assumed that the other participants would not retain their payments in 
reaction to the technical default of the biggest participant and would 
not change their behaviour in any way. The most severe consequences 
were observed for 17 March. Indeed, on this day, provided the default 
had no influence at all on the behaviour of the other participants, the 
technical default of the biggest participant would have resulted in 32 
payments, representing a total value of EUR 14 billions or 28% of the 
total value of the submitted payments being rejected at the end of the 
day. The consequences of the technical default of the biggest 
participant appear, therefore, to be extremely strong. In reality, 
however, it is likely that the non-defaulting participants would have 
tried to mitigate the consequences of the crisis by injecting more  
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liquidity into the system, thus reducing the number and value of the 
rejected payments. 
  The potential impact of the implementation of the presented 
advanced algorithms into the PNS system as replacements for the 
original algorithms was investigated with the PNS simulator for 17 
March 2006. 
 
Simulations were made using: 
 
•  PNS bilateral optimisation algorithm and PNS multilateral 
optimisation algorithm (pure PNS); 
•  Greedy bilateral optimisation algorithm and PNS multilateral 
optimisation algorithm; 
•  Greedy++ bilateral optimisation algorithm and PNS multilateral 
optimisation algorithm; 
•  Las Vegas Greedy bilateral optimisation algorithm and PNS 
multilateral optimisation algorithm; 
•  PNS bilateral optimisation algorithm and the multilateral Las Vegas 
Greedy algorithm; 
•  PNS bilateral optimisation algorithm and the multilateral Las Vegas 
PNS algorithm; 
•  PNS bilateral optimisation algorithm and the OPM 10–10 
algorithm. 
 
The algorithms making use of random numbers for optimisation 
(bilateral Las Vegas Greedy, Multilateral Las Vegas Greedy, 
Multilateral PNS Las Vegas) were run five times. No significantly 
better results were found by increasing the number of iterations. 
  Figure 3.7 shows the impact of the various optimisation algorithms 
on the number and total value of the payments rejected at the end of 
the day. In this given case, it appears that non-FIFO algorithms 
presented in this paper perform significantly better than the algorithms 
used in the PNS system. We can also note that the chosen algorithm 
can also significantly shift the outcome of the settlement, either 
towards an outcome less favourable to the defaulter (with the 
multilateral Greedy Las Vegas algorithm) or characterised by a 
decreased average value of rejected payments (with OPM 1010 or the 
Multilateral Greedy Las Vegas algorithm). 
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Figure 3.7  Effect of the technical default of the biggest 
      participant in the PNS system. Rejected 
      payments towards the defaulter (light) and 
      between non-defaulters (dark) at the end of 
      the day according to the algorithms 
      implemented, in terms of value (top) and 































































































































The influence of optimisation algorithms on the settlement delay is 
shown Figure 3.8. In normal conditions (ie without any technical 
default), the use of non-FIFO optimisation algorithms lowered the 
settlement delay by about 50% in terms of value, while the settlement 
delay in terms of volume remained constant. Multilateral optimisation 
algorithms have a much smaller influence on the settlement delay, as 
in PNS the multilateral optimisation algorithm is called only three 
times a day, at 10:30, 12:30 and 16:00. When the biggest participant 
defaults, the edge given by the non-FIFO algorithms in terms of value 
becomes significantly bigger. 
 
 
3.4.4 Payments  rejected  at the end of closure 
In order to provide the reader with a clearer insight of the effect of the 
optimisation algorithms on settlement efficiency, Table 3.1 presents 
the list of payments rejected between two participants in the PNS 
system, designated here as participant A and participant B. It appears 
that the cumulated value of rejected payments between those two 
participants is extremely high, and represents the main part of the total 
value of rejected payments. 
  The PNS bilateral optimisation algorithm is unable to settle any of 
those payments, given the cash balances of participants A and B. 
However, it is easy to see that the Greedy bilateral algorithm will 
simultaneously settle the payments with a value of EUR 1,500 and 
EUR 2,000 million from A to B and EUR 3,500 million from B to A. 
In this situation, the Greedy++ algorithm will simultaneously settle 
the payment with a value of EUR 3,500 million from B to A and the 
payments with a value of EUR 313, EUR 956, EUR 2,000, EUR 51 
and EUR 180 million. As none of those solutions complies with the 
FIFO rule, the PNS FIFO bilateral optimisation algorithm will not 
consider them. 
  In this situation, the use of an advanced optimisation algorithm 
results in a reduction of EUR 7 billion reduction in the total value of 
the payments rejected at the end of the day. 
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Figure 3.8  Effect of the technical default of the biggest 
      participant in the PNS system. Settlement 
      delay in terms of value (top) and volume 
      (bottom), in normal conditions (dotted line) 
      and in case of the technical default of the 































































































Table 3.1  Simulation of the technical default of the 
      biggest participant in the PNS system 
      (17 March 2006, standard PNS algorithms), 
      rejected payments between two selected 
     participants. 
 
  Participant A  Participant B 
Cash balance in EUR at closure  3.5 million  22.5 million 
1 160  million  1,000  million 
2 313  million  3,500  million 
3  956 million  87 million 
4 1,500  million   
5 2,000  million   
6 51  million   
Queued payments between 
participants A and B rejected 
at closure, in order of arrival 




In this paper several optimisation algorithms that do not follow the 
FIFO constraint, ie algorithms that are allowed to settle queued 
payments irrespective of their order of arrival, were presented and 
their efficiency was investigated in several tests. The results of these 
tests suggest that the simple Greedy algorithm of Güntzer et al and the 
suggested OPM1010 algorithm are able to improve respectively on 
their bilateral and multilateral FIFO counterparts. 
  Of course, the choice of an optimisation algorithm in a RTGS 
involves many other considerations than the mere settlement 
efficiency of the algorithms. In particular, the rules of the system have 
to be legally sound and have to match the needs of the users as much 
as possible. No definitive conclusion regarding the use of non-FIFO 
algorithms in RTGS can therefore be drawn from this paper. 
  The standard case of the technical default of the biggest participant 
in a RTGS was also revisited in the context of the PNS system and 
with several different optimisation algorithms. On the business day 
chosen for this exercise, (chosen as the ‘worst day’ of the month of 
March 2006 in terms of rejected payments resulting from the technical 
default of the biggest participant), the use of non-FIFO algorithms was 
shown to greatly reduce the value of rejected payments at the end of 
the day while shortening the settlement delay. However, when the 
same exercise was carried out for certain other days of the same 
month, the use of non-FIFO algorithms did not bring any 
improvement. It was even the case that the use of non-FIFO  
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algorithms led to a slight deterioration of the situation at the end of the 
day. This is due to the fact that efficient algorithms tend to settle 
payments earlier, as shown by Figure 3.8. Sometimes a slightly less 
efficient algorithm stockpiles many payments in the queue during the 
day and is then able to profit from the optimisation opportunities 
created by the large number of queued payments, resulting in better 
end-of-the-day results. 
  This observation having been made, it could make sense to 
imagine an RTGS in which FIFO algorithms, which combine the 
advantages of being fast, reasonably efficient, predictable and 
perfectly transparent to the users, would be used throughout the day, 
while some more advanced, non-FIFO algorithms could be used in 
case of a liquidity shortage. In the case of TARGET2, for example, 
those algorithms would be launched at the closure of the system in 
case some payments remain in the queue. If the advanced algorithms 
are then able to settle some additional payments, the number and 
cumulated value of the rejected payments would be lowered. In the 
opposite case, the use of those algorithms would not have affected the 
functioning of the system. 
  Advanced non-FIFO algorithms could also be useful to accelerate 
the settlement of a highly urgent ancillary system in the context of a 
liquidity shortage, as presented in Section 3.3.4. Such specially 
designed non-FIFO algorithms would only be run in case the standard 
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Bilateral optimisation: notations 
 
We denote the payments from bank A to bank B (respectively from bank B to 
bank A) as the (ai) and the (bi). The (xi) and the (yi) are two vectors of 
indicators. For each k, xk = 0 (resp. xk = 1) means that the payment ak is not 
activated (resp. activated); similarly for each k, yk = 0 (resp. yk = 1) means that 
the payment bk is not activated (resp. activated). 
 S A is the initial cash balance of bank A and SB is the initial cash balance of 
bank B. For given (xi) and (yi), bank A’s virtual cash balance is equal to 




i i A A y b x a S B  and bank B’s virtual cash balance is 




i i B B y b x a S B.  
FIFO bilateral optimisation algorithm (PNS, TARGET2 …) 
Activate all payments between the two considered banks. 
WHILE the simultaneous settlement of all activated payments is impossible 
•  De-activate the most recent activated payment from the deficient bank. 
END WHILE 
Settle all activated payments 
LAS VEGAS GREEDY bilateral optimisation algorithm 
 
Activate all payments between the two considered banks. 
 
WHILE one of the two banks has a negative Virtual Cash Balance 
•  De-activate all payments from the deficient bank (let us suppose it is bank 
A). 
•  Go through the payments of bank A, the (ai)i=1...N from A’s biggest 
payment a1 to A’s smallest payment aN. When considering payment ak for 
re-activation: 

























 o  Next  ak 
END WHILE 
 
Settle all activated payments. 
 
The point of this algorithm is to launch it several times. In the tests presented 
in this paper, it was applied 5 times in a row (ie it was applied a first time to 
the initial problem, then it was applied a second time to what had not settled 
the first time, and so on). Another possible use is to run it a certain number of 
times on the initial problem and to retain the best solution. 
GREEDY bilateral optimisation algorithm (Güntzer et al, 1998) 
 
Activate all payments between the two considered banks. 
 
WHILE one of the two banks has a negative Virtual Cash Balance 
•  De-activate all payments from the deficient bank (let us suppose it is bank 
A). 
•  Go through the payments of bank A, the (ai)i=1...N from A’s biggest 
payment a1 to A’s smallest payment aN. When considering payment ak for 
re-activation: 
 o  IF  ak > Bank A’s Virtual Cash Balance THEN ak can not be re-
activated. 
  o  ELSE re-activate ak 
 o  Next  ak 
END WHILE 
 
Settle all activated payments 





i k a R  sum of all the payments smaller 
than ak 
•  IF Rk < Bank A’s Virtual Cash Balance THEN ak is 
activated 
•  ELSE: 
















GREEDY++ bilateral optimisation algorithm 
 
Activate all payments between the two considered banks, bank A and bank B. 
 
WHILE one of the two banks has a negative virtual cash balance 
 
• Let  ∑ =
i
i ix a G a n d   ∑ =
i
i iy b H 
•  The error is defined as:  ) S S (
2
1
H G B A − − − = Δ  
•  Pick up the 10 payments (from either bank, selected or not) closest to the 









•  Try all possibilities involving the 10 picked up payments (1024 
possibilities) 
•  IF at least one of the possibilities allows settlement 
  o  THEN choose the possibility that maximises the value settled. 















Settle all activated payments 
•  De-activate all payments from the deficient bank (let us 
suppose it is bank A). 
•  Go through the payments of bank A, the (ai)i=1...N from A’s 
biggest payment a1 to A’s smallest payment aN. When 
considering payment ak for re-activation: 
  •  IF ak > Bank A’s Virtual Cash Balance THEN ak can 
not be re-activated. 
  •  ELSE re-activate ak 
  •  Next ak  
76 
Appendix 2 
Multilateral optimisation algorithms 
 
Multilateral PNS Las Vegas 
 
Activate all payments 
 
1. Attempt to settle all queued payments simultaneously (‘all or nothing’) 
 
2. As long as there is a peripheral participant: 
  De-activate all payments to or from a peripheral participant. 
 
3. WHILE there is a participant with a negative Virtual Cash Balance 
 
  3.1  Randomly choose a participant with a negative Virtual Cash Balance 
(Uniform law). 
  3.2  The chosen participant, bank i, has a negative Virtual Cash Balance Bi. 
We are then going to de-activate one of bank i’s outgoing payments. In 
order to do so, for each activated payment k emitted by bank i, we 






k , i k , i b γ γ γ =  where: 
   •  2
suf
k , i = γ  if the inactivation of payment k makes bank i’s Virtual 
Cash Balance positive, else  1
suf
k , i = γ . 






























k , i  so that payments whose value are 
close to the deficit are de-activated with a higher probability. 
   •  4
cre
k , i = γ  if the inactivation of payment k does not create nor 
aggravate the deficit of another participant, else  1
cre
k , i = γ . 
    •  We then randomly select one of bank i’s outgoing payments so that 







 to be de-activated. 
  3.3  If bank i now has a positive Virtual Cash Balance, attempt to re-





4. When all participants have a positive Virtual Cash Balance, all activated 









Multilateral Greedy Las Vegas 
 
Activate all payments 
 
1. Attempt to settle all queued payments simultaneously (‘all or nothing’) 
 
2. As long as there is a peripheral participant: 
  De-activate all payments to or from a peripheral participant. 
 
3. WHILE there is a participant with a negative Virtual Cash Balance 
 
  3.1. Consider all the banks with a negative Virtual Cash Balance in the 
increasing order of the number of participants they send payments to, 
then in the decreasing order of their deficit (we then start by the banks 
which emit payments towards a single counterparty). 
 
  3.2  The considered bank i, has a negative Virtual Cash Balance Bi. De-
activate all its outgoing payments, then consider them for re-activation 
in the decreasing order of their value, under the constraint that the 
virtual position of bank i remains positive. We then have, for payment 
number l of bank i, 
l
i p:  
   a. IF  i
l
i B p >  then payment number l can not be re-activated. 
   b. ELSE  IF  i
l








i p R  is the cumulated value of Bank i’s payments smaller 
than 
l
i p)  
 
Re-activate all de-activated payments (including those involving peripheral 
participants) and go through all bilateral relations, from the most balanced to 
the most unbalanced and run the Las Vegas Greedy bilateral optimisation 
algorithm. 
 
The point of this algorithm is to launch it several times. In the tests presented 
in this paper, it was applied 5 times in a row (ie it was applied a first time to 
the initial problem, then it was applied a second time to what had not settled 
the first time, and so on). Another possible use is to run it a certain number of 




    c.  ELSE the payment 
l












i , where: 

















    •   m
+ (resp. 
− m ) is the number of participants receiving 
payments from bank i whose Virtual Cash Balance is positive 
(respectively negative). 
    •  
+ ± = b b  if the receiver of the payment has a positive Virtual 
Cash Balance, else 




4. When all participants have a positive Virtual Cash Balance, all activated 
payments are settled. 
 
Re-activate all de-activated payments (including those involving peripheral 
participants) and go through all bilateral relations, from the most balanced to 
the most unbalanced and run the Las Vegas Greedy bilateral optimisation 
algorithm. 
 
The point of this algorithm is to launch it several times. In the tests presented 
in this paper, it was applied 5 times in a row (ie it was applied a first time to 
the initial problem, then it was applied a second time to what had not settled 
the first time, and so on). Another possible use is to run it a certain number of 




Algorithm OPM 1010 
 
Activate all payments 
 
1. Attempt to settle all queued payments simultaneously (‘all or nothing’) 
 
2. As long as there is a peripheral participant: 
  De-activate all payments to or from a peripheral participant. 
 
3. WHILE there is a participant with a negative Virtual Cash Balance 
 
  3.1  Go through all banks with a positive Virtual Cash Balance and re-
activate the payments that can be re-activated. 
  3.2  Randomly choose a bank with a negative Virtual Cash Balance. 
    WHILE the chosen bank i has a negative Virtual Cash Balance Bi: 
      Calculate for each activated payment k sent by bank i, the 






k , i k , i b γ γ γ =  where: 
    •   A
suf
k , i = γ  if the inactivation of payment k makes bank i’s virtual 
position positive, else  1
suf
k , i = γ . 






























k , i  in order to favour the payments 
whose value is close to  i B  the net debit position of bank i. 
    •   C
cre
k , i = γ  if the inactivation of payment k does not create nor 
aggravate the deficit of another participant, else  1
cre
k , i = γ . 
      •  A sensitivity study performed at several levels of liquidity 
concluded that the OPM alrorithm have better results with 
A = C = 10, hence the name of OPM1010 for this given 
variation of the algorithm. 
      De activate the payment with the highest coefficient bi,k. 
 
   END  WHILE 
 
    If there are some of bank i’s de-activated payments can be re-activated, 




4. When all participants have a positive Virtual Cash Balance, 
  4.1  Go through all banks and re-activate the payments that can be re-




5. Settle all activated payments. 
 
Re-activate all de-activated payments (including those involving special 
participants) and go through all bilateral relations, from the most balanced to 
the most unbalanced and run the Las Vegas Greedy bilateral optimisation 
algorithm. 
 
The point of this algorithm is to launch it several times. In the tests presented 
in this paper, it was applied 5 times in a row (ie it was applied a first time to 
the initial problem, then it was applied a second time to what had not settled 
the first time, and so on). Another possible use is to run it a certain number of 
times on the initial problem and to retain the best solution.  
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Appendix 3 
The Greedy algorithm of Güntzer et al
8 and superincreasing 
payment values distributions 
Superincreasing sequences 
 
Let p be a strictly positive integer. A sequence of positive reals 
p






i 1 k u u . For a central banker, a good example of a 
superincreasing sequence is the sequence of the values of the euro 
banknotes (5 euros, 10 euros, 20 euros, 50 euros, 100 euros, 200 euros 
and 500 euros). Indeed, any banknote is worth more than the sum of 
the smaller banknotes. This highly desirable property ensures that a 
cashier can minimise the number of banknotes to be given back to a 
customer by simply following a Greedy type of algorithm, that is to 
say by always using the biggest banknote whose value is lower than 
the remaining amount of money to be handed back. Should a 400-euro 
banknote be introduced, the Greedy solution (500+200+100, 3 
banknotes) would be beaten by a non-Greedy solution (400+400, 2 
banknotes) if 800 euros had to be handed back by the cashier. This 





•  Let there be two banks A and B, characterised by their respective 
liquidity SA and SB. There are N queued payments from A to B and 
M queued payments from bank B to bank A. 
 
•  We assume that the sequences of the queued payments from A to 
B and from B to A, respectively the () N ... 1 i i a =  and () M ... 1 i i b =  are 
superincreasing sequences, that is to say that we have 
{} ∑
+ =
> − ∈ ∀
N
1 i k
k i a a , 1 N ... 1 i  and  {} ∑
+ =
> − ∈ ∀
M
1 i k
k i b b , 1 M ... 2 i  (a1 is 
                                          
8 Güntzer, M – Jungnickel, D – Leclerc M (1998) Efficient algorithms fort he clearing of 
interbank payments. European Journal of Operational Research 106, 212–219.  
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therefore the biggest payment from bank A to bank B, and aN is the 
smallest). 
 
•  The  () { }
N
N ... 1 i 1 , 0 x ∈ =  and the () { }
M
M ... 1 i 1 , 0 y ∈ =  are two vectors of 
indicators. For each k, xk = 0 (resp. xk = 1) means that the payment 
ak is not activated (resp. activated); similarly for each k, yk = 0 
(resp. yk  =  1) means that the payment bk is not activated (resp. 
activated). 
 





Provided the sequence of the payment values is superincreasing, the 
Greedy algorithm re-activates at each iteration the payments whose 





Without any loss of generality, we can assume that the bank in deficit 
is bank A. At the beginning of an iteration, all payments emitted by 
bank A are de-activated and are then considered for re-activation in 
the decreasing order of their value. It is clear that the total cumulated 






i i A y b S  where yi indicates whether the i
th payment of bank B is 
activated. 
  The Greedy algorithm first considers bank A’s biggest payment a1 





i i A 1 y b S a  then a1 can clearly not be re-






i i A 1 y b S a , the Greedy algorithm will therefore re-activate 
payment a1. Any algorithm which would choose not to re-activate this 






k 1 a a  (because the sequence is superincreasing), any solution not 
retaining a1 would be worse than any solution retaining a1.  
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  By induction, the same result applies to all of bank A’s payments, 
hence we can conclude that for a given iteration, the value of the 





The Greedy algorithm is the most efficient in terms of settled payment 










i i k x a G  be the cumulated value of the activated payments 
from A to B after the k
th iteration of the Greedy algorithm where bank 





i i k y b H  be the cumulated value of 
the activated payments from B to A after the k
th iteration of the 
Greedy algorithm where bank B is in deficit. 
  The settlement condition can be written as the dual inequality: 
A B S H G S ≤ − ≤ − . 











i 0 b H . Without any loss of generality, we can 
assume that bank B will be the first bank to be in deficit. The pairs of 
payment flows that will be considered will then be: (G0, H0), (G0, H1), 
(G1, H1) ... 
  It is easy to demonstrate that the Greedy algorithm will terminate, 
by noticing that the Gk and Hk are two strictly decreasing sequences 
taking only a finite number of positive values. We denote as t the 
subscript of the last iteration of the Greedy algorithm. The final state 
will therefore be either (Gt, Ht) or (Gt-1, Ht). 
  Given the characteristics of the Greedy algorithm, we already 
know that we will have:  t 1 0 G .... G G > > >  and  t 1 0 H .... H H > > > . 
The underneath sketch shows how the pairs (Gk, Hk) converge towards 
a solution satisfying the settlement condition (the pairs satisfying the 
settlement condition are located between the two parallel red lines). 
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Figure 3.9  Illustration of the convergence 
      of the Greedy algorithm 
 
 
Sum of activated payments from B to A 
 
 
Let G* and H* be the values of the payment flows characterising the 
solution maximising the settled value. This value maximising solution 
trivially exists (at worse we have G* = H* = 0). 
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As we assumed that B was initially in deficit, after k iterations on G 
and k iterations on H, B is still the bank in deficit. Greedy then has to 
evaluate the new cumulated payment flows of bank B, Hk+1. Let us 
show that Hk+1 ≥ H*. 
  According to the lemma, Hk+1 is the highest possible value that can 
take the cumulated sum of the activated payments of bank B under the 







































  Now we also have Gk ≥ G* according to our inductive hypothesis 
and we know in addition that H* verifies the settlement condition 
H* ≤ SB + G*, since the pair (G*, H*) is a solution to the problem. 
That gives us the inequality H* ≤ SB + Gk and as Hk+1 is the highest 
possible value lower than SB + Gk we can then conclude that 
Hk+1 ≥ H*. 
  Now A is in deficit and the same demonstration applies to prove 
that Gk+1 ≥ G*. We can then conclude. 
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When the payment value sequences are superincreasing, the Greedy 
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4  Examining the tradeoff between 
settlement delay and intraday 
liquidity in Canada’s LVTS: 
a simulation approach 
Abstract 
The paper explores a fundamental tradeoff occurring in the daily 
operation of large-value payment systems (LVPS) – between 
settlement delay and intraday liquidity – with specific application to 
Canada’s Large-Value Transfer System (LVTS). To reduce settlement 
delay, participants generally must maintain greater intraday liquidity 
in the system. Intraday liquidity and settlement delay can be costly for 
LVPS participants, and improvements in the tradeoff are desirable. 
The replacement of standard queuing arrangements with a complex 
queue-release algorithm represents one such improvement.  These 
algorithms are expected to lower intraday liquidity needs and speed up 
payment processing in an LVPS. Simulation analysis is used to 
empirically test this proposition for the case of Canada’s LVTS. The 
analysis is conducted using a payment system simulator developed by 
the Bank of Finland, called the BoF-PSS2. It is shown that increased 
use of the LVTS central queue (which contains a complex queue-
release algorithm) reduces settlement delay associated with each level 
of intraday liquidity considered, relative to a standard queuing 





A well-functioning large-value payment system (LVPS) is an integral 
component of any advanced financial system. In a market economy 
such as Canada’s, virtually all economic transactions ultimately 
involve a transfer of funds between a buyer and a seller. An LVPS 
provides the electronic infrastructure necessary to facilitate such an 
exchange of funds between financial institutions in order to discharge 
large-value payment obligations on behalf of their own business and 
that of their customers. There are different designs of LVPS currently  
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operating around the world, with each achieving a different balance 
between the minimisation of systemic risk, the speed of payment 
settlement, and the liquidity and operational costs of settlement. 
  This paper examines a fundamental tradeoff occurring in the daily 
operation of an LVPS – between settlement delay and intraday 
liquidity – with particular application to Canada’s LVTS.
1 Settlement 
delay refers to a potential time lag occurring between a participant’s 
intended submission of a payment to the system and when it is 
processed by the LVPS with finality.
2 Intraday liquidity refers to a 
participant’s ability to meet its outgoing payment obligations 
immediately when intended. Generally speaking, to achieve shorter 
settlement delay participants must maintain greater intraday liquidity 
in the system. When sufficient intraday liquidity is not maintained, 
payments will be queued and will be released only when the 
participant’s liquidity position improves. Settlement delay, then, 
reflects the amount of time that a payment is queued before being 
processed by the system. 
  Intraday credit is an important source of liquidity. To control credit 
risk, grantors of intraday credit (typically central banks) usually 
require eligible collateral, which is likely to entail a cost for 
participants. At the same time, settlement delay may also be expensive 
for participants. The cost of settlement delay may be borne both 
internally by the participant that delays sending the payment and 
externally by the receiving participant. Participants generally must 
tradeoff the cost of settlement delay and the cost of intraday liquidity 
in conducting their daily payment operations. It follows that a 
reduction in the amount of intraday credit provision to participants 
will entail both a benefit and cost. The benefit is that participants’ 
liquidity (ie collateral) cost can be reduced, but possibly only at the 
expense of a higher settlement delay cost. 
  A simple graphical framework of the general risk-efficiency 
tradeoff in payment systems, inspired by Berger, Hancock and 
Marquardt (1996), is useful when thinking about the nature of the 
tradeoff between settlement delay and intraday liquidity in an LVPS. 
Given the cost to participants of both settlement delay and intraday 
                                          
1 The LVTS is owned and operated by the Canadian Payments Association (CPA). For a 
more thorough description of the LVTS, including an overview of the Bank of Canada’s 
multiple roles within the system, see Dingle (1998) and Arjani and McVanel (2006). 
2 Use of the term ‘intended’ is made so that this definition of settlement delay could apply 
to LVPS designs with and without a central queue. Under the latter design, a participant 
may intend to submit a payment to the LVPS at a certain time but, due to lack of intraday 
liquidity and the absence of a central queue, must hold the payment internally until it can 
be successfully processed by the system.  
90 
liquidity, improvements in the tradeoff are desirable. An improvement 
in the tradeoff is characterised by this paper as reduced settlement 
delay associated with each level of intraday liquidity, for the same 
value of payment activity. Innovations in LVPS design may make this 
possible. The replacement of standard queuing arrangements with a 
complex queue-release algorithm represents such an innovation. The 
potential benefit of such algorithms includes both lower liquidity 
needs for the release of queued payments and thus faster processing of 
these payments by the LVPS. 
  A simulation approach is used to empirically test the proposition 
that a complex queue-release algorithm can lower liquidity costs and 
speed payments processing relative to a standard queuing arrangement 
– that is, improve the tradeoff between settlement delay and intraday 
liquidity. Using actual intraday transaction and credit limit data, 
simulation analysis is employed to quantify the current tradeoff 
between settlement delay and intraday liquidity in the Canadian 
LVTS. Then, improvements in this tradeoff are sought by simulating 
an alternative LVTS environment in which current restrictions on use 
of the LVTS central queue are relaxed. The LVTS queue employs a 
complex queue-release algorithm that seeks to partially offset batches 
of queued payments on a multilateral basis throughout the day. 
However, under current system rules, participants’ excessive use of 
the central queue is not encouraged.
3 Instead, standard internal 
queuing arrangements are typically employed by participants. 
  The analysis reveals that a tradeoff does indeed exist between 
settlement delay and intraday liquidity in Canada’s LVTS. Moreover, 
the results indicate that increased use of the central queue will reduce 
settlement delay in the LVTS for each level of intraday liquidity 
considered according to three different settlement delay measures. 
Some important discussion points also emerge from these results. 
  The remainder of this paper is as follows. Section 4.2 discusses the 
nature of the tradeoff between settlement delay and intraday liquidity 
in greater detail. The graphical framework is presented in Section 4.3, 
and potential improvements in the tradeoff are also discussed in that 
section. Section 4.4 contains relevant background information on the 
LVTS. Section 4.5 provides an overview of the simulation 
                                          
3 See LVTS Rule No. 7. There are several hypothesised reasons for this. Perhaps the 
foremost reason pertains to the issue of whether queue transparency may cause 
participants to take on credit risk by crediting clients’ accounts with expected incoming 
funds prior to these payments actually being received.  This was a major concern of 
central banks at the time the LVTS was being developed. See RTGS (1997) and 
discussion in Section 4.6.2.  
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methodology as well as a description of the data. Section 4.6 presents 
results from the simulations and related discussion. Section 4.7 offers 
concluding remarks and some caveats to the analysis. 
 
 
4.2  Settlement delay and intraday liquidity 
in an LVPS 
Participants in an LVPS typically maintain a daily schedule of 
payments which they must send through the system on behalf of their 
own business and that of their customers. Included in this schedule is 
the time that each payment is due to be sent. For example, certain 
payments are considered ‘time-sensitive’ and thus have to be sent by a 
specific time during the day. The remaining majority of payments is 
considered ‘non-time-sensitive’ and simply must be sent by the end of 
the day. In practice, however, participants generally do not wait until 
the end of the day to submit all of their non-time-sensitive payments 
for reasons that will be outlined below. 
  In Real-Time Gross Settlement (RTGS) and RTGS-equivalent 
LVPS (such as Canada’s LVTS), participants must maintain intraday 
funds in the system to send a payment to another bank. Hence, the 
concept of intraday liquidity in an LVPS specifically refers to a 
participant’s ability to access sufficient intraday funds to meet its 
outgoing payment obligations in a timely manner. There are two main 
sources of intraday funds available to an LVPS participant: 1) funds 
acquired from other participants due to either regular transaction 
activity or through an interbank loan arrangement and 2)  funds 
acquired through an intraday credit extension. Incoming funds from 
regular transaction activity are the cheapest source of liquidity for 
participants, and it is expected that participant banks will try to use 
these funds as much as possible to finance their own payment 
activity.
4 For various reasons (eg the differing nature of individual 
participants’ business), however, it may not always be possible for 
participants to coordinate their daily payment activity so that 
incoming payments largely finance their outgoing payment needs. 
  The inability of participants to perfectly coordinate their incoming 
and outgoing payment activity creates a role for the provision of 
intraday credit. Martin (2005) emphasises the importance of intraday 
                                          
4 See McAndrews and Rajan (2000) and McAndrews and Potter (2002) for discussion and 
identification of this type of coordination behaviour among participants in the US 
Fedwire system.  
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credit as a source of intraday funding for participants. The author 
argues that the coordination of incoming payments to meet outgoing 
obligations is often difficult (especially for time-sensitive payments), 
and therefore a well-designed LVPS should allow participants to 
acquire funds when necessary through intraday credit. Where intraday 
credit is available to participants on a free and unlimited basis, 
participants can borrow funds any time that a payment is due, thus 
eliminating potential settlement delay in the LVPS. However, 
although settlement delay would cease to exist in this case, lenders of 
intraday credit (typically central banks) could face large risk 
exposures vis-à-vis borrowers, which is not desirable from a public 
policy perspective. Consequently, intraday credit in RTGS and 
equivalent systems is not free and unlimited, but rather is often subject 
to net debit caps, (eligible) collateral requirements which typically 
entail an opportunity cost, and in certain cases an explicit interest 
charge, eg the US Fedwire system. Maintaining intraday liquidity in 
the system can therefore be costly for participants. 
  Where a participant does not have sufficient funds available to 
meet a payment obligation upon intended submission, processing of 
the payment by the LVPS will be delayed. Settlement delay can be 
defined as a time lag occurring between a participant’s intended 
submission of a payment to the LVPS, and when the payment is 
processed by the LVPS with finality, ie when intraday funds are 
exchanged between participants on an unconditional and irrevocable 
basis in order to discharge the payment obligation.
5 Payments that 
cannot be processed because of a participant’s lack of intraday 
liquidity may be held in that participant’s internal queue. 
Alternatively, these payments could be submitted to the LVPS and 
held in the system’s central queue if one is available. Under standard 
queuing procedures, internally and centrally queued payments are 
released and processed by the LVPS on an individual basis when a 
sending participant’s intraday liquidity improves to the extent that 
these payments can be passed.
6 The settlement delay associated with 
an individual payment essentially reflects the amount of time that the 
payment must wait in the queue before being processed by the LVPS. 
                                          
5 A key feature of RTGS and equivalent LVPS is that these systems offer immediate 
intraday finality. Payments in these systems are considered final upon being processed. 
6 This liquidity improvement could occur as a result of the participant receiving a 
payment, or gaining access to more intraday credit.  
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  Figure 4.1 provides a graphical characterisation of settlement delay 
within the context of the life-cycle of a large value payment.
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Just as there is a cost associated with maintaining intraday liquidity in 
the system, given the high speed and high value of daily payments 
processed by an LVPS, settlement delay may also entail a significant 
cost for participants. Further, the nature of this delay cost is likely to 
depend on whether a payment is time-sensitive or not. Time-sensitive 
payments may include those related to the final funds settlement of 
other important national and international clearing and settlement 
systems, large government receipts and disbursements, and also 
payments related to the daily implementation of monetary policy. A 
participant that is unable to meet a time-sensitive payment obligation 
when due may therefore face large internally borne costs because of 
the delay, such as reputation damage with its peers and, possibly, a 
loss of its clients’ business. Explicit penalty charges may even be 
imposed by the system operator since the delay of these payments 
could cause a disruption elsewhere in the financial system. 
  For the remaining majority of (non-time-sensitive) payments, there 
is no formal intraday deadline to submit these payments. It is not 
expected that a participant will incur an (immediate) reputation loss or 
penalty charge, nor a loss of its clients’ business, if processing of these 
                                          
7 The paper recognises that achieving payment finality need not encompass the transfer of 
the settlement asset. Therefore, the notion of settlement delay applies equally to RTGS 
and RTGS-equivalent LVPS, where this transfer occurs on a multilateral net basis at the 
end of the day in the latter.  
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payments is delayed until the end of the day.
8 However, there may be 
other external costs imposed on the system in this case. Despite being 
non-time-sensitive, intended receiving banks may be expecting these 
payments by a certain time of day, and such a delay will result in a 
shortfall in their intraday funds position. If these participants are 
planning on using these funds to send their own payments, then they 
may have to incur additional costs in order to replace these funds on 
short notice. Where they cannot find other funds in time to meet their 
obligations, additional settlement delay is created in the system. 
Settlement delay created by one participant in an LVPS could quickly 
spread to others in the system. Moreover, a comparable disruption to 
the liquidity position of a receiving bank’s client may also occur 
(where a delayed payment is ultimately intended for this customer), 
resulting in potentially broader consequences for economic activity. 
  Prolonged delay of these payments may also intensify the potential 
losses associated with other risks in the system, such as operational 
risk. An operational event (such as a computer outage that prevents 
one or more participants from sending payments) will likely have a 
larger impact in a case where a number of payments remain 
unprocessed at the time that the incident occurs.
9 At the same time, a 
large backlog of payments being submitted all at once to the LVPS 
late in the day could increase the potential likelihood that an 
operational event occurs in the first place. Lastly, where the potential 
for settlement delay could discourage use of an LVPS in favor of 
systems that are not as well risk-proofed, the existence of settlement 
delay may translate to higher systemic risk in the broader financial 
system. 
  It follows that, to eliminate the potential costs associated with 
settlement delay, participants will likely have to borrow a large 
amount of intraday credit and thus incur high liquidity costs. 
Conversely, participants need not incur any intraday liquidity cost, but 
will then have to bear (possibly along with other participants in the 
                                          
8 Prolonged delay of non-time-sensitive payments is unlikely to cause reputation loss 
immediately, but such a loss could occur if repeated over time. In a relatively 
concentrated payment system like Canada’s LVTS, participants maintain frequent 
communication with each other throughout the day and are able to develop fairly accurate 
forecasts of certain incoming payment flows based on historical payment patterns with 
other participants. Thus, a participant that often delays its non-time-sensitive payments in 
favor of lower liquidity costs is unlikely to go unnoticed among its peers in the system. 
9 Conversely, an operational disruption could also lead to settlement delay in an LVPS 
since it may result in a participant’s inability to send payments through the system. For 
this reason, contingency measures are usually available in an LVPS for the release of time 
sensitive payments in the event of a disruption.  
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system) the costs of the accompanying settlement delay. It is unlikely 
that participants will not maintain sufficient liquidity to meet their 
time-sensitive payment obligations since the cost of delaying these 
payments is very high. Consequently, the discussion of a tradeoff 
between settlement delay and intraday liquidity may not apply to time-
sensitive payments in practice. However, for non-time-sensitive 
payments, the tradeoff is likely to exist. Since settlement delay may 
entail costs and repercussions for the system as a whole, any 
innovation in LVPS design that can increase settlement speed for a 
given level of intraday liquidity is desirable. 
 
 
4.3  A simple graphical framework 
4.3.1  Description of the framework 
The expected relationship between settlement delay and intraday 
liquidity in an LVPS is illustrated in Figure 4.2 below. Figure 4.2 is 
inspired by the concept of an ‘efficient frontier’ presented by Berger, 
Hancock and Marquardt (1996).
10 This framework will help in 
interpreting the empirical results later in the paper. 
 
                                          
10 In describing this framework, the terms ‘intraday liquidity’ and ‘intraday credit’ are 
used synonymously.  
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The framework is presented in delay-liquidity space. All points in the 
space represent possible settlement delay-intraday liquidity 
combinations necessary to produce a given level of payment activity. 
The vertical axis measures the magnitude of overall settlement delay 
in the LVPS while the horizontal axis measures the provision of 
intraday credit. It is useful to think of the magnitude of settlement 
delay in an LVPS as reflecting both the number of payments entering 
the queue upon intended submission and also each payment’s duration 
in the queue until being processed. The tradeoff is captured by the 
curve denoted FF, and this curve is generated based on the existing 
technology for processing payments (ie the existing LVPS design). 
Specifically, the curve shows how settlement delay and intraday credit 
provision can be traded off against each other for a given level of 
payment activity under current LVPS arrangements. The slope of FF 
captures the reduction in settlement delay that can be achieved by 
participants following a unit increase in the provision of intraday 
credit. 
  The decreasing convex shape of the tradeoff curve reflects the 
assumption of diminishing marginal returns to liquidity. An increase 
in intraday credit provision is anticipated to have a lesser impact in 
terms of reduced settlement delay when moving further along the 
frontier from left to right. This assumption is attributed to the 
positively skewed nature of the distribution of individual payment  
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values in an LVPS.
11 At a very low level of liquidity (point A), a small 
increase in intraday credit provision will lead to a higher reduction in 
settlement delay since many smaller payments that would otherwise 
have been delayed can now be immediately processed upon intended 
submission. As intraday credit provision is continuously increased, it 
is expected that more payments will be processed upon intended 
submission and the delayed finality of these payments will be averted. 
However, even at higher levels of intraday credit provision (such as 
point B), it is expected that a few very large payments will still be 
delayed. Only a substantial injection of intraday credit would allow 
these payments to be processed immediately. 
  All combinations along the curve, and also above and to the right 
of the curve, represent feasible combinations of settlement delay and 
intraday liquidity for a given level of payment activity under the 
existing LVPS design. The tradeoff curve is the most technologically 
efficient of these feasible combinations and, therefore, an LVPS is 
considered to be technically efficient if it is processing payments 
anywhere along the curve. This notion of efficiency captures the idea 
that, when operating along the curve, reductions in settlement delay 
can only be achieved by an increase in intraday credit provision, and 
vice versa, for a given level of payment activity. Processing the same 
level of payment activity at a point above, or to the right, of the 
tradeoff curve represents inefficiency. For instance, producing at a 
point like C in Figure 4.2 means that intraday credit provision could 
be reduced and participants’ liquidity costs lowered without causing 
any increase in settlement delay. In fact, intraday credit provision 
could be lowered from point C all the way to point D before any 
further reductions lead to increased settlement delay in the LVPS. 
Point D represents the familiar upper bound of liquidity as described 
in Leinonen and Soramäki (1999, 2003). Points below the efficient 
frontier are currently unattainable given the existing LVPS technology 
and can only be achieved through some form of innovation. 
 
 
                                          
11 For instance, in Canada’s LVTS, the average payment value is around CAD 7.5 million 
while the median value is around CAD 50,000. Moreover, the value of some payments in 
the LVTS is well over CAD 100 million.  
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4.3.2  Innovation: a complex queue-release algorithm 
As mentioned above, points below the tradeoff curve are not 
attainable given the existing LVPS technology. An improvement that 
allows lower settlement delay for any given level of intraday liquidity, 
or vice versa, is required to attain such an outcome. The impact of this 
improvement appears in Figure 4.2 as a shift of the tradeoff curve FF 
to its new position closer towards the origin at F’F’. Along the new 
curve, the same amount of payment activity can be produced with 
lower settlement delay for each level of intraday liquidity, and 
therefore at a lower overall cost to participants. 
  Such an improvement can be achieved through a technological 
innovation in LVPS design. Reductions in settlement delay can be 
achieved through either faster processing of queued payments or 
fewer payments entering the queue upon submission, where the latter 
may occur as a result of the former. Faster processing of queued 
payments means that intended receivers will obtain incoming funds 
more quickly, reducing the likelihood that their own subsequent 
outgoing payments will become queued upon submission. It is argued 
that the replacement of standard queuing arrangements with the 
introduction of central queuing with a complex queue-release 
algorithm represents such an innovation. The benefit of these types of 
algorithms, in terms of both reduced settlement delay and intraday 
liquidity needs in an LVPS, are frequently highlighted throughout the 
payments literature. For example, see McAndrews and Trundle 
(2001), BIS (2005), Leinonen and Soramäki (1999), Bech and 
Soramäki (2001), Güntzer, Jungnickel, and Leclerc (1998) and 
Koponen and Soramäki (1998). 
  These algorithms are designed to simultaneously search for and 
offset batches of queued payments, thus serving as an effective 
coordination device for participants’ incoming and outgoing 
payments. Recall, under standard queuing procedures, payments are 
released from the queue individually when a participant’s intraday 
liquidity is sufficient for them to be processed. In contrast, under 
central queuing with a complex queue-release algorithm, the 
simultaneous processing and release of a batch of queued payments is 
attempted at regular intraday intervals. In this latter case, LVPS 
participants no longer must wait to obtain sufficient intraday funds for 
their queued payments to be released individually, but rather they only 
need to hold the amount of intraday funds necessary to settle any net 
debit position resulting from the payment offset. The anticipated 
benefits to LVPS participants from this innovation include lower 
intraday liquidity needs and related costs for the release of queued  
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payments, faster processing times for these queued payments, and a 
reduction in average intraday queue length, when compared to a 
standard queuing arrangement. 
  The addition of a complex queue-release algorithm will not 
necessarily represent a new development in all LVPS, since these 
algorithms have been used in some systems in the past as a gridlock 
resolution mechanism. However, over the last decade increases in 
computing power have led to the improved design and more frequent 
use of these algorithms within an LVPS central queue. The 
complexity of these algorithms has also risen considerably; the choice 
of full or partial optimisation is available and offsetting may take 
place on a bilateral and/or multilateral basis; BIS (2005). 
  To sum up, it is expected that the addition of a central queue with a 
complex queue-release algorithm will lead to an improvement in the 
tradeoff between settlement delay and intraday liquidity in an LVPS 
and will allow participants to complete the same level of payment 




4.4  Empirical study: estimating the tradeoff in 
Canada’s LVTS 
This empirical exercise considers the tradeoff between settlement 
delay and intraday liquidity in Canada’s LVTS. Some questions that 
may arise are: What does the tradeoff curve look like for the LVTS? 
Does it have the same shape as outlined above? Are there possible 
LVTS design changes, relating to queuing arrangements or otherwise, 
that could potentially improve this tradeoff, where the same level of 
payment activity can be processed with either reduced settlement 
delay or lower intraday liquidity needs or both? The remainder of this 
paper is devoted to answering these questions using simulation 
analysis. Simulation analysis is a recent development in payment 
systems research. Simulation models are a valuable tool since they 
often can be calibrated to replicate a specific LVPS environment. 
These models can then be used to assess the impact of changes in the 
structural arrangements and decision parameters of an LVPS without 




4.4.1  Background on the LVTS
12 
The LVTS is an RTGS-equivalent system, where individual payment 
messages are processed on a gross basis in real-time and settlement of 
the system occurs on a multilateral net basis at the end of the day. The 
LVTS’s risk controls and collateral arrangements, coupled with a 
settlement guarantee provided by the Bank of Canada, provide 
certainty of settlement for the system.
13 Certainty of settlement 
facilitates intraday finality for all individual payments sent through the 
LVTS. Recipients of LVTS payments can make use of these funds 
immediately upon receipt without any possibility that a payment will 
become unwound. The LVTS consists of two payment streams – 
Tranche 1 (T1) and Tranche 2 (T2) – and participants may use either 
stream when sending payments through the system. Each stream has 
its own real-time risk controls and collateral arrangements. The focus 
of this analysis is on the T2 payment stream since, due to its more 
economical collateral requirements relative to T1, it is the dominant 
stream for LVTS activity.
14 
  Intraday liquidity in T2 is facilitated by T2 payments previously 
received and also by drawing on a T2 intraday line of credit. This 
intraday line of credit is subject to both a (indirect) collateral 
requirement and a net debit cap. Specifically, LVTS participants grant 
bilateral credit limits (BCLs) to each other, where the value of a BCL 
represents the maximum bilateral T2 net debit position that a grantee 
(credit line recipient) may incur vis-à-vis the grantor (credit line 
provider) at any time during the payment cycle. A participant’s T2 
intraday credit limit, known as its T2 Net Debit Cap (T2NDC), is 
calculated as the sum of all BCLs granted to it by others in the system 
multiplied by a system-wide parameter (SWP), which is currently 
equal to 0.24.
15 The T2NDC represents the maximum multilateral T2 
                                          
12 Only LVTS background information relevant to the analysis is provided here. For more 
information on the LVTS, see Dingle (1998) and Arjani and McVanel (2006). 
13 In the extremely remote event of multiple participant defaults in the LVTS, and if 
collateral value pledged by participants to the Bank of Canada is not sufficient to cover 
the final net debit positions of all defaulters, the Bank stands ready to exercise its 
settlement guarantee by realising on available collateral and absorbing any residual loss. 
14 Approximately 87% of daily LVTS value and 98% of daily LVTS volume are sent 
through the T2 payment stream, on average. T1 consists of mostly time-sensitive 
payments between LVTS participants and the Bank of Canada. 
15 The SWP is an exogenous parameter established by the CPA. When the LVTS began 
operations in February 1999, the SWP was equal to 0.30. Since then, it has been 
gradually reduced and has been equal to 0.24 since March 2000. The choice of SWP 
value (SWP < 1) reflects the effect of multilateral netting; Engert (1993). See LVTS Rule 
No. 2 for information on the SWP.  
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net debit position that a participant can incur during the LVTS 
payment cycle. The T2NDC of hypothetical bank n (where n = 1,..,N) 
is calculated as follows 
 









It follows that two real-time risk controls are applied to payments 
submitted to the T2 payment stream. A payment will only be 
processed if it does not result in the sending participant exceeding 
either its BCL vis-à-vis the receiver or its T2NDC. 
  A survivors-pay collateral pool is used in T2 to facilitate LVTS 
settlement in the event of participant default. Eligible collateral 
consists mainly of government securities and also high-quality 
corporate debt. Participants are required to pledge T2 collateral equal 
to the value of the largest BCL that they grant to any other participant, 
multiplied by the SWP. The value of this T2 collateral obligation is 
referred to as a participant’s Maximum Additional Settlement 
Obligation, or MaxASO. Essentially, a participant’s MaxASO 
represents its maximum financial loss allocation as a result of another 
participant’s default in the LVTS. Hypothetical bank n’s MaxASO is 
calculated as follows 
 
SWP ) BCL max( MaxASO n j , n
n ⋅ = ≠  
 
The LVTS employs a central queue. Submitted payments to the LVTS 
failing the real-time risk controls are stored in this queue.
16 The queue 
is equipped with  an offsetting algorithm that runs at frequent intervals 
(every 15 minutes) throughout the payment cycle. This complex 
queue-release algorithm, called the Jumbo algorithm, searches for and 
offsets full or partial batches of queued payments on a multilateral 
and/or bilateral basis.
17 Payments successfully released by this 
mechanism are processed by the LVTS as normal. However, current 
LVTS rules state that excessive use of the central queue is not 
                                          
16 Payments are stored on a First-In First-Out (FIFO) basis within each tranche type. 
Currently, only ‘Jumbo’ payments (> CAD 100 million) failing the real-time risk controls 
become centrally queued in the LVTS. 
17 For queued T2 payments, the Jumbo algorithm applies partial offsetting on both a 
bilateral and multilateral basis over two stages. See Arjani and McVanel (2006) for more 
information on this algorithm.  
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encouraged.
18 Instead, participants utilise internal queues to store 
payments that are unable to pass the real-time risk controls upon 
intended submission. Internally queued payments are typically re-
submitted against the LVTS’s risk controls (within a participant’s 
internal LVTS workstation) individually on a by-pass FIFO basis each 
time that its intraday liquidity position is increased.
19 If this process 
reveals that an internally queued payment can pass the risk controls, it 
is automatically released to the LVTS for processing. 
 
 
4.4.2 Settlement  delay  and  intraday liquidity in T2: 
tradeoff and improvement 
Deciding on how to hypothetically impose a reduction in participants’ 
intraday liquidity represents a key aspect of the analysis. For the 
LVTS T2 payment stream, one way to accomplish this is to constrain 
the intraday credit available to participants by lowering the value of 
the SWP.
20 As in the earlier discussion, a reduction of the SWP will 
entail both a benefit and cost for LVTS participants, holding BCL 
values constant. The benefit is that a reduction in the value of the 
SWP will lower participants’ T2 collateral requirement and related 
liquidity cost. However, assuming that no migration of payments from 
T2 to T1 occurs, reducing the SWP will likely also increase the level 
of settlement delay in the T2 payment stream. This is because 
participants’ T2NDCs will decline, lowering T2 intraday liquidity in 
the system, and causing more payments to become queued upon their 
intended submission. Under current queuing arrangements, delayed 
payments will accumulate in participants’ internal queues until the 
sending participants’ T2 liquidity is sufficient for these payments to be 
processed by the LVTS. 
  The tradeoff curve between settlement delay and intraday liquidity 
in the LVTS is expected to have a decreasing convex shape as 
outlined in the earlier graphical framework. As the SWP is reduced 
further, overall settlement delay in the system is expected to rise at an 
                                          
18 LVTS Rule No. 7 states that participants are able to track their bilateral and multilateral 
positions in real-time through their internal LVTS workstations and are expected not to 
submit payments that will fail the risk controls. 
19 Under bypass-FIFO, a participant’s first (earliest) queued payment will be re-tried 
against the risk-controls. If it does not pass, this payment will be by-passed and the 
participant’s second queued payment will be re-tried, and so on. 
20 Alternatively, such reductions in intraday credit availability can also be achieved 
through reductions in the value of BCLs that participants grant to each other, while 
maintaining the current SWP value of 0.24.  
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increasing rate. Participants will become constrained by their T2NDC 
more quickly and frequently throughout the day when trying to send 
payments. In the extreme case, an SWP equal to zero will result in a 
state of payments deadlock where settlement delay reaches a 
maximum. No participant will have access to T2 intraday credit and 
therefore will not be able to incur a T2 net debit position. 
Consequently, no payments will be sent and all will remain unsettled 
in participants’ internal queues until the end of the day. 
  It has been argued that an improvement in the tradeoff between 
settlement delay and intraday liquidity can be achieved with the 
introduction of a complex queue-release algorithm in the central 
queue. The LVTS already contains a central queue with a partial 
offsetting algorithm, but use of this queue is currently discouraged. It 
is anticipated that, by allowing increased use of the LVTS central 
queue (and this algorithm), overall settlement delay could be reduced 
for each hypothetical level of T2 intraday credit provision. Under this 
alternative scenario, participants would no longer need to manage an 
internal payments queue and instead would submit all payments to the 
LVTS at the time they are intended regardless of whether these 
payments could be immediately processed by the system. Release of 
these queued payments could then be attempted on a multilateral net 
basis rather than individually.
21 This proposed change in queuing 
regime is expected to increase the efficiency of the system since, even 
where the amount of T2 intraday credit available to participants (and 
related cost) is lowered, the processing time for queued payments can 
be faster, and average queue length could decrease, compared with 
current internal queuing arrangements. 
  In the next sections, a simulation approach will be utilised to shed 
light on the following questions: 
 
–  Under current internal queuing arrangements, what does the 
tradeoff between settlement delay and intraday liquidity in the 
LVTS look like? Is it consistent with the assumptions of the 
graphical framework presented above? 
–  Could increased use of the LVTS central queue improve this 
tradeoff? In other words, can the level of settlement delay 
associated with each amount of intraday credit be reduced for a 
given level of payment activity?  
 
                                          
21 The key benefit of central queuing compared to internal queuing is that multilateral 
offsetting of payments is only possible in the former case.  
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4.5  Data description and simulation 
methodology 
4.5.1  Description of data 
Three months of LVTS T2 transaction and credit limit data have been 
extracted over the period July-September 2004. Transaction data 
include the date and time that each transaction was submitted to the 
LVTS as well as the value of each payment and the counterparties 
involved in the transaction. It is assumed that the time stamp attached 
to each payment represents the intended submission time of the 
payment. Transactions data include only those payments processed by 
the LVTS and do not include rejected or unsettled payments. Data on 
credit limits include the value of the T2NDC available to each 
participant as well as the date and time that the value of the T2NDC is 
effective. These data represent 64 business days and approximately 
1.05 million transactions and are believed to be representative of 




Table 4.1  Summary of LVTS T2 transaction data 
 
  Jul 2004  Aug 2004  Sep 2004 
Total value of T2 payments (CAD billion) 







Total volume of T2 payments 







Daily average value (CAD billion)  108.7  100.2
23 116.5 
Daily average volume  16,664  15,653  16,985 
Average payment value (CAD million)  6.52  6.40  6.86 
Median payment value (CAD)  42,436  40,377  45,719 
                                          
22 In addition, the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index (HHI) suggests that payment activity over 
the sample period is somewhat concentrated. The HHI will vary between 0.50 
(concentration among only two banks) and 1/N (equal distribution of payment activity 
among all participants), where N represents the number of banks in the sample. In this 
case, 1/N = 0.08. The average HHI value for the sample is 0.1944 and 0.1813 for T2 
payments value and volume, respectively. A value in this range is consistent with 
payment activity being distributed evenly across approximately 5–6 banks. Indeed, the 
largest five Canadian banks account for between 85–90% of daily LVTS value and 
volume. 
23 A lower average daily T2 payments value in August is expected given that the Canadian civic 
holiday occurs during this month. Total value reached only CAD 6.9 billion on this holiday in 
2004.  
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4.5.2  Simulation description and methodology 
The simulation analysis is conducted using a payment and settlement 
simulator developed by the Bank of Finland (the BoF-PSS2). This 
software application is currently being used by over thirty central 
banks. It should be noted that the version of the BoF-PSS2 used for 
this analysis does not contain BCL functionality, which is an 
important component of the LVTS.
24 As a result, the methodology in 
this paper includes the assumption that BCL values remain constant in 
light of proposed changes to LVTS rules on queue usage. Further, 
participants’ payment-sending behaviour is also treated as exogenous 
and therefore the same transactions data are used throughout the 
analysis. Potential implications associated with these assumptions are 
addressed later in the paper. 
  Two batches of simulations will be run where each batch is 
intended to replicate a different LVPS design. In particular, batch one 
replicates the current internal queuing arrangement in the LVTS, 
while batch two replicates the alternative central queuing 
arrangement. Each batch consists of eight individual simulations 
(s  =  1,2,..,8), where each simulation is distinguished by tighter 
constraints on participants’ intraday liquidity. Changes in intraday 
liquidity are introduced by altering the value of each participant’s 
T2NDC. Since it is assumed that BCLs remain constant, a reduction in 
each participant’s T2NDC is achieved by hypothetically lowering the 
value of the SWP. Specifically, each individual participant n’s 










s BCL SWP NDC 2 T  
 
where SWP1,...,8 = 0.24, 0.21, 0.18, 0.15, 0.12, 0.09, 0.06, 0.03.
25 
  In specifying the first batch of simulations, the objective is to 
mimic participants’ decision to either submit a payment to the LVTS 
for processing or hold the payment internally when sufficient intraday 
funds are unavailable. Settlement delay occurring in this batch 
                                          
24 A version of the BoF-PSS2 was released in 2006 that includes both multilateral and 
bilateral credit limits functionality. Bank of Canada staff were involved in the 
development and testing of this new version. 
25 Transactions data include only processed payments under the current SWP value of 
0.24. Thus, it is not possible to observe potential reductions in settlement delay from an 
SWP value greater than 0.24, due to a lack of readily available data on delayed or 
unsettled transactions for this SWP value.  
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represents payments being held internally by participants, ie the 
simulator’s queue is replicating participants’ internal queues. A 
bypass-FIFO queue-release algorithm is specified to imitate current 
internal queuing practices of LVTS participants. When this algorithm 
is applied, a participant’s queued payments are re-submitted from the 
queue and re-tried against the risk controls on an individual bypass-
FIFO basis whenever its intraday liquidity position improves. In the 
real LVTS, this occurs within the participant’s internal workstation. 
Internally queued payments that can successfully pass the risk controls 
are assumed to be released from the participant’s queue and submitted 
to the LVTS for processing. In interpreting the simulation results for 
this first batch, settled transactions are assumed to be those that 
participants were able to submit to the LVTS for processing, while 
unsettled transactions represent those remaining in participants’ 
internal queues due to lack of intraday liquidity. 
  Specification of the second batch is intended to replicate a central 
queuing regime similar to that available in the LVTS. In these 
simulations, two queue-release algorithms are specified that closely 
match the LVTS’s actual release mechanisms. The first of these 
algorithms is a FIFO (no by-pass) queue-release algorithm which re-
submits a participant’s centrally queued payments against the risk 
controls on an individual FIFO basis each time its intraday liquidity 
position improves. The second is a complex queue-release algorithm 
which employs partial offsetting on a multilateral basis and is 
scheduled to run every twenty minutes, similar to the LVTS’s Jumbo 
algorithm.
26 Settlement delay captured in this second batch of 
simulations is meant to represent payments being held in the system’s 
central queue, ie the simulator’s queue is replicating the LVTS central 
queue. In the simulation results for this batch, all payments in the 
sample are assumed to have been submitted to the LVTS at their 
intended time of submission, and unsettled transactions are those 
remaining in the central queue which cannot be processed due to a 
sender’s lack of intraday liquidity. 
                                          
26 At the time that the analysis was conducted, the frequency of the Jumbo algorithm was 
every 20 minutes. The frequency of this algorithm increased to every 15 minutes in 
December 2005. Since bilateral credit limit functionality is currently not incorporated in 
the simulation application, the partial offsetting algorithm used in the simulations does 
not exactly replicate the LVTS Jumbo algorithm for T2 payments. Despite this limitation, 
the results generated by the simulations are still expected to be useful and relevant. 
Further, in specifying this second batch of simulations, it is also assumed that the LVTS’s 
queue expiry algorithm is no longer utilised and all payments failing the risk control 
check become centrally queued (not just ‘Jumbo’ payments).  
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  Three alternative measures of settlement delay are calculated for 
each simulation within each batch. These measures are intended to 
capture the daily level of settlement delay associated with each 
amount of intraday credit provision under both the current and 
alternative queuing environments described above for the same level 
of payment activity. They are described as follows 
 
  1.  Daily proportion of unsettled transaction value (PU): 
 










t ns transactio submitted of Value
ns transactio unsettled of Value
PU  
 
    This indicator is calculated on an aggregate level (ie across all 
participants) for each day t in the sample, where t = (1,…,64). 
This measure represents the occurrence of the maximum 
settlement delay possible for a payment in this analysis. 
Unsettled transactions represent those that enter the queue 
upon intended submission and remain there until the end of the 
day. 
 
  2.  Daily system-wide delay indicator (DI): 
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N n n ≤ ρ ω ≤  
 
    Adapted from Leinonen and Soramäki (1999) and commonly 
used in payment simulation analyses, this indicator is 
calculated on an aggregate level and is based on a weighted 
average of each individual (n) participant’s daily delay 
indicator (ρ). This indicator (and the ratio ρ) can take on any 
value between 0 and 1, where a value of 0 is achieved when all 
payments are successfully processed by the LVPS upon 
intended submission and no settlement delay occurs. A value 
of 1 is calculated where all payments become queued upon 
intended submission and remain unsettled at the end of the 
day. Weights (ω) are based on participants’ average share of  
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total transaction value over the 64-day sample period. 
Calculation of this measure requires dividing each LVTS 
business day into T=108 ten-minute intervals (i = 1,..,T). The 
numerator of ρ represents the sum of a participant’s queued 
payment value (Q) over all T ten-minute intervals throughout 
the day. The denominator represents the sum of the cumulative 
value of a participant’s submitted payments (V) over all T ten-
minute intervals throughout the day. It follows that this 
indicator is influenced by both the value and delay duration of 
each payment in the queue calculated for each intraday 
interval. 
 




























    This is an aggregate measure which calculates the average 
value of queued payments in an interval over day t. It is found 
by dividing the sum of total queued payment value (Q) over all 
T ten-minute intervals on each day by the number of intervals 
per day (T=108). 
 
 
4.6  Simulation results and discussion 
4.6.1 The  delay-liquidity  tradeoff in the T2 payment 
stream 
Simulation results for each of the three delay measures are presented 
in Figures 4.3 through 4.5. Two curves are presented in each graph 
corresponding to each batch of simulations.  The curve denoted 
‘internal queuing’ portrays the simulation results estimated under 
current LVTS (internal) queuing arrangements. The curve denoted 
‘central queuing’ depicts results estimated under the alternative LVTS 
(central) queuing environment. 
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Figure 4.3  Average daily proportion of unsettled 
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Earlier hypotheses regarding the tradeoff between settlement delay 
and intraday liquidity are confirmed by the simulation results. Under 
current LVTS queuing arrangements, a tradeoff exists in the LVTS’s 
T2 payment stream according to all three delay measures. Like the 
earlier graphical framework, the curve is convex; as intraday credit 
constraints are further tightened (by lowering the value of the SWP), 
participants’ intraday liquidity becomes more scarce and settlement 
delay in the system rises at an increasing rate. The slope of this curve 
increases substantially at low amounts of intraday credit provision. 
  The introduction of a design innovation – allowing increased use 
of the LVTS central queue – results in an improvement to this tradeoff 
and the curve shifts closer towards the origin according to all three 
measures. Settlement delay associated with each level of intraday 
credit provision is reduced following the introduction of the partial 
offsetting algorithm. The relative benefit of partial offsetting (in terms 
of reduced delay) increases gradually as intraday liquidity is further 
constrained. At the SWP value of 0.06, the difference in settlement 
delay between the two queuing regimes is greatest. In this case, the 
average proportion of unsettled transactions value is reduced by 9 
percentage points or about CAD 10 billion (Figure 4.3), the system-
wide delay indicator is reduced by 28% (Figure 4.4) and average 
intraday queue value is reduced by 29% or about CAD 1.6 billion 
(Figure 4.5), relative to the first batch of simulations. 
  Gains from the alternative central queuing design begin to decline 





















approach a state of deadlock. When the SWP value is 0.03, settlement 
delay is only slightly reduced following the introduction of a partial 
offsetting algorithm, which could mean that participants’ intraday 
liquidity levels are so low that only very small batches of queued 
payments can be processed each time this algorithm runs. At this level 
of SWP, close to half of all daily payment value remains unsettled on 
average under both queuing regimes (Figure 4.3). 
  The simulation results also reveal another finding that is closely 
related to the notion of technical efficiency described earlier. The 
above results suggest that, under current queuing arrangements, 
settlement delay in T2 increases when the SWP value is lowered from 
0.24 to 0.21. However, it remains to be seen whether reductions in the 
SWP below 0.24 but still greater than 0.21 can be achieved without 
inducing any further settlement delay in the LVTS. In other words, 
can a lower amount of T2 intraday credit (and an associated reduction 
in T2 collateral requirements) be accommodated without increasing 
the level of settlement delay for payment activity during the three-
month sample period, holding all other factors constant? If this were 
the case, it would be similar to operating at point C in the graphical 
framework. Indeed, the simulation results suggest that the current 
value of SWP (= 0.24) is needed to process payments in this sample 
and cannot be reduced further without increasing the level of 
settlement delay. This is not necessarily a surprising result since one 
might expect participants to conform to this value of SWP when 
sending payments through the system. A complete discussion of this 
analysis, including full details of the simulation methodology used, is 




Some other interesting discussion points emerge from these results, 
offering areas for future research. First, the simulation results suggest 
that, under both existing LVTS queuing arrangements and also under 
the alternative central queuing arrangement, settlement delay in T2 
will increase only marginally as the SWP is initially reduced from its 
current value of 0.24, holding all other factors constant. For example, 
a reduction in the SWP from 0.24 to 0.18 is estimated to increase the 
average proportion of unsettled daily transaction value by only 0.15 
per cent under the current queuing regime and 0.14 per cent under a 
central queuing arrangement (Figure 4.3). Similar results are also 
observed according to the other two delay measures. Reducing the 
SWP entails a benefit for LVTS participants in the form of lower T2  
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collateral requirements and related liquidity cost, as has already been 
mentioned. Specifically, a reduction in the SWP to 0.18 reduces the 
aggregate value of T2 collateral required by about CAD 750 million 
per day on average over the sample period, holding BCL values 
constant. On one particular day in the sample, the value of T2 
collateral required is about CAD 1 billion less when the SWP is equal 
to 0.18. 
  This raises the question as to whether or not a lower-cost 
combination of intraday credit provision and settlement delay 
currently exists for LVTS participants in the T2 payment stream.
27 Put 
differently, is it the case that the marginal settlement delay cost 
incurred by moving to an SWP value of 0.18 equals the marginal cost 
of additional intraday credit provision (and collateral) associated with 
the current value of  0.24? If the former cost is less than the latter, 
then lowering the SWP to 0.18 could lead to overall cost-savings for 
participants. Of course, answering this question entails, among other 
things, the difficult task of quantifying the cost of the additional 
settlement delay associated with moving to a SWP value of 0.18. 
  Secondly, the analysis highlights the possible benefit of central 
queuing with a complex queue-release algorithm with respect to 
settlement delay and intraday credit provision. Nonetheless, 
participants face other types of risk and cost in the LVPS 
environment, and such a change in LVTS queuing arrangements could 
increase participants’ other costs. For example, as outlined in BIS 
(1997), a possible implication of permitting unrestricted use of the 
central queue pertains to the issue of queue transparency and 
specifically whether the reduction in settlement delay could be 
replaced by an increase in credit risk taken on by participants. A 
participant, upon observing an incoming payment in the central queue, 
may choose to provisionally credit its client’s account with these 
expected funds before the payment actually arrives, thus exposing 
itself to credit risk until the payment is successfully received. If these 
funds do not eventually arrive for some reason, the participant would 
seek to unwind this payment, which would be costly for both the 
participant and its client. This issue is pertinent to the LVTS because 
participants have the ability to track expected incoming and outgoing 
payments in the queue in real-time through their internal participant 
workstations. Although details regarding client recipients of incoming 
queued payments are not included in these workstation reports, 
                                          
27 Alternatively, the question could instead be posed as whether current values of BCLs 
granted by participants to each other are cost-minimising holding the current SWP value 
constant.  
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participants could informally access this information. However, it is 
not clear that LVTS participants would be willing to incur this credit 




4.7 Conclusions  and  caveats 
The objective of this paper has been to gain a better understanding of 
the tradeoff between settlement delay and intraday liquidity in an 
LVPS, with a specific focus on the Canadian LVTS. Simulation 
analysis shows that a tradeoff exists in the LVTS between settlement 
delay and intraday liquidity, and that this tradeoff exhibits a 
decreasing convex shape. Further, allowing increased use of the LVTS 
central queue (and the Jumbo algorithm) is expected to improve this 
tradeoff, ie, reduce settlement delay in the system for all levels of 
intraday liquidity considered. Such an innovation improves the 
efficiency of the system, leading to overall cost-savings for 
participants. 
  At the same time, it was found that under both the current and 
proposed queuing regimes, a modest reduction in the SWP below its 
current value results in only a marginal increase in the level of 
settlement delay in the LVTS, while providing substantial T2 
collateral cost-savings for system participants. Further research is 
necessary to quantify whether this collateral cost-saving benefit is 
worth the associated increase in settlement delay cost. It was also 
argued that, although increased use of the central queue is expected to 
reduce total settlement delay and liquidity costs for participants, this 
may result in a potential increase in credit risk taken on by 
participants. However, LVTS participants may not necessarily react to 
a change in LVTS queuing arrangements in this manner. 
  These results are preliminary, and certain caveats exist. These 
caveats are raised here with the intention of motivating further 
research. The first caveat relates to behavioural assumptions made 
throughout the analysis. Significant changes to LVTS queuing 
arrangements were proposed in the analysis. However, despite these 
changes, the current simulation methodology assumes that LVTS 
                                          
28 This credit risk issue may also be avoided in the LVTS since a client beneficiary of 
funds can always request a Payment Confirmation Reference Number (PCRN) from its 
participant bank. All payments processed by the LVTS are assigned a PCRN indicating 
that the payment has successfully passed all LVTS risk control tests and is thus 
considered final and irrevocable. Upon obtaining the PCRN, the beneficiary does not 
have to worry about the funds being revoked at a later time.  
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participants’ payment sending and bilateral credit granting behaviour 
remains unchanged. One must question whether this is a realistic 
assumption. For example, following discussion in McAndrews and 
Trundle (2001), the availability of netting is likely to increase the 
incentive for participants to submit payments to the system earlier in 
the day, relative to these payments’ current intended submission 
times, essentially increasing the scope for multilateral netting of 
payment messages. The benefit of netting is expected to increase with 
the number and value of payments in the queue at the time that it 
occurs. Anecdotal evidence suggests that LVTS participants typically 
receive information regarding outgoing payment requests well in 
advance of their intended submission time. Participants’ collective 
submission of as many payments as early as possible to the system 
under a central queuing regime is anticipated to result in a greater 
turnover of intraday funds, a lesser need for costly intraday credit, and 
faster processing of these payments. This may result in a further 
downward shift of the tradeoff curve closer to the origin thus leading 
to further cost-savings for participants. 
  At the same time, it is argued that participants, in granting BCLs to 
each other, strive to minimise the value of their T2 collateral 
requirement subject to achieving an established level of throughput 
efficiency, ie an acceptable level of settlement delay. It is likely that 
payment activity under current internal queuing arrangements may 
already reflect participants’ acceptable levels of settlement delay. 
Thus, participants may not perceive the benefit of central queuing to 
be a further reduction in settlement delay, but instead may treat this as 
an opportunity to realise lower T2 collateral requirements (and costs) 
while maintaining the same level of settlement delay in the system. 
This suggests that, under the central queuing arrangement, participants 
may collectively choose to reduce the BCLs they grant to each other 
in order to achieve these cost-savings. This reduction in BCLs is 
expected to continue to the extent that any decline in settlement delay 
resulting from increased use of the central queue is fully offset.
29 
  A second caveat follows closely with a discussion found in 
Bedford, Millard and Yang (2005) and relates to the statistical 
robustness of the simulation findings. The simulation analysis is 
                                          
29 Initially, participants are not likely to know exactly how much BCLs must be reduced 
to achieve the same level of settlement delay under the alternative central queuing 
regime. Instead, this will be an iterative process that eventually converges to the 
equilibrium of a perfect offset. In the interim, it may be the case that participants 
‘overshoot’ this target level of BCL reduction, temporarily resulting in a higher level of 
settlement delay in the system relative to the existing level.  
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intended to estimate the increase in settlement delay brought on by a 
reduction in LVTS participants’ intraday liquidity over a three-month 
sample period. Point-estimates of this impact for each amount of 
intraday liquidity are used to generate the tradeoff curves presented in 
Figures 4.3 through 4.5. Previous internal research conducted by the 
Bank of Canada shows that annual LVTS payment activity is affected 
by specific calendar events and also monthly trends. Consequently, 
the estimated impact on settlement delay following reductions in 
intraday liquidity is expected to take on different values based on the 
specific dataset used in the analysis. Although using a three-month 
sample helps to capture the effect of certain monthly and quarterly 
calendar effects occurring during this period, there is a desire to 
reduce the risk of small-sample bias and to obtain more statistically 
robust results. For example, it has been observed that the same 
calendar event may yield a different effect on LVTS payment activity 
depending on when it occurs throughout the year. Similarly, use of a 
single three-month sample may not capture the effect that semi-annual 
and/or annual calendar events may have on the simulation results. Nor 
will it capture the potential impact of monthly trends in LVTS T2 
payment activity. 
  In order to achieve more statistically robust results, it is suggested 
that the same simulation methodology be repeated as many times as is 
feasible using real and/or artificially generated LVTS payment flow 
data over some fixed sample duration. Grouping the point-estimates of 
the impact on settlement delay for each amount of intraday liquidity 
from all of the samples will facilitate generation of an empirical 
distribution of this potential impact (Figure 4.6). It follows that the 
shape of the empirical distribution may be different for each amount 
of intraday liquidity. For example, the impact on settlement delay may 
be more volatile and will thus deviate from its mean value more often 
at lower amounts of intraday credit provision. The shape of the 
empirical distribution may also change over time. 
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Figure 4.6  Plotting distribution of settlement delay 










A third and final caveat pertains to the absence of BCL functionality 
in the version of the BoF-PSS2 used in this analysis. This absence 
creates the possibility that the estimated tradeoff curves provided in 
Figures 4.3 through 4.5 represent a ‘lower bound’ of the impact on 
settlement delay resulting from reduced intraday liquidity. As the 
value of the SWP is reduced and payments become delayed upon 
failing the T2 multilateral risk-control test, intended receivers of these 
payments may consequently be prohibited from sending their own 
payments when due. All of this will result in added volatility in 
bilateral net positions, possibly to a point where some participants’ 
bilateral net debit positions are greater than the BCLs granted to them. 
In the LVTS, this cannot occur due to a bilateral risk control test being 
applied to every payment which guarantees that participants do not 
exceed their BCL vis-à-vis a receiving participant. Payments failing 
the bilateral risk control test become queued until the sending 
participants’ bilateral liquidity position improves. This added delay is 
not captured in the results generated by the current version of the 
simulator. This forces the assumption that all LVTS payments, when 
processed by the simulator, have passed not only the multilateral risk 
control test, but also the bilateral risk control test. Thus, it would be 
useful to repeat the analysis again with Version 2.0 of BoF-PSS2 to 
compare how much greater is potential settlement delay in the system 
when bilateral risk controls are also taken into account.  
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Is the T2 payment stream technically efficient? 
The objective of this supplemental analysis is to find the minimum 
SWP (call this SWP*) necessary to process all payments in the sample 
without delay, holding all other factors constant. It may be the case 
that SWP* < 0.24, which means that existing levels of T2 intraday 
credit, and perhaps more importantly for participants, T2 collateral 
requirements could be lowered without inducing additional settlement 
delay during the three-month sample period (recall point C in Figure 
4.2). 
  Simulation results produced by the BoF-PSS2 can provide insight 
into this issue. Treating participants’ payment-sending behaviour as 
exogenous, a simulation is run using the same sample data but this 
time specifying unlimited intraday credit. Under this simulation 
scenario, all payments will pass the risk controls immediately upon 
submission and therefore no queuing algorithms need to be specified. 
The daily T2NDC each participant actually needs in order for its 
payments to be passed without delay can be derived from these 
simulation results, and is equal to the largest multilateral net debit 
(negative) position incurred by each participant during the day. This 
value is defined as a participant’s upper bound (UB) of T2 liquidity. 
The daily UB of T2 liquidity for each participant can then be used to 
calculate a value of SWP* that, when multiplied by the sum of the 
actual BCLs granted to each participant, will produce this UB value. It 
follows that the highest value of SWP* calculated for any participant 
on any day is considered the minimum SWP* value necessary to send 
all payments in the sample through the system without delay. This 
SWP* can then be compared with the current value of 0.24. 
  The results from this simulation analysis reveal that on 45 of the 
64 days, SWP* reached 0.24 for at least one LVTS participant. This 
means that the current value of SWP was necessary for the immediate 
processing of T2 payment activity during this three-month sample 
period. Hence, further T2 collateral cost-savings could not be realised 
without an increase in the level of settlement delay, holding payment 
activity constant. The results also indicate that the T2NDC constraint 
(when SWP=0.24) is binding more often for large LVTS participants 
(denoted ‘B5’ in Figure 4.7). Figure 4.7 below shows that on 42 days 
in the sample at least one of the major Canadian banks reached their 
T2NDC at some point in the day. 
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Focusing on the large LVTS participants, the simulation results show 
that, on these 42 days, four different institutions bumped up against 
their T2NDC at least once intraday. One of these participants reached 
its T2NDC at least once on 37 different days, while the three others 
reached this limit on 10, 2 and 1 day(s), respectively. The results also 
indicate that participants did not reach their T2NDC constraint at the 
same time each day. For example, regarding the first two large 
participants mentioned above, the LVTS day has been divided into 
four periods and the time that each of these participants reached its 
T2NDC has been located in the simulation results and tabulated. A 
summary of these findings is provided in Table 4.2. 
 
Table 4.2  Percentage of instances where T2NDC is 
      binding by time of day 
 





00:30–06:00 0  0 
06:00–12:00 19  0 
12:00–17:00 73  40 
17:00–18:30 8  60 
 
 
It also deserves mention that, where a high number of instances occur 
within a certain period (eg 27 instances for Bank 1 during the interval 
between 12:00 and 17:00 hours), these occurrences typically do not  
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take place at the same time within the interval, but rather were 
scattered throughout the period. 
  It is not necessarily surprising that SWP* reaches 0.24 on most 
days in the sample period. The gradual reduction of the SWP from 
0.30 to 0.24 between February 1999 and March 2000 was influenced 
by participants’ preferences, and this value has held steady at 0.24 
since that time. Given participants’ perceived contentment with this 
SWP value, one might expect participants’ to conform to it, meaning 
that they choose to structure their payment submission behaviour in a 
certain way so as to make full use of their available T2 intraday credit 
when sending payments through the system. 
  Some discussion is also warranted regarding results for the eight 
smaller LVTS participants (denoted ‘S8’ in Figure 4.7). On only 4 of 
the 45 days, SWP* reached 0.24 for one of these participants. Further, 
this occurred for a different participant in each of these four instances. 
There exist a variety of possible explanations for these results. It may 
be the case that larger LVTS participants, in sending a higher volume 
of payments earlier in the day, are ‘subsidising’ smaller participants’ 
intraday liquidity in the system, to the extent that smaller participants 
need to rely less on intraday credit as a source of funding for their 
outgoing payments. Indeed, SWP* was equal to zero (ie no T2 
intraday credit was drawn upon) for at least one small participant on 
18 of 45 days in the sample. In contrast, this did not occur on any day 
for large LVTS participants. A second possible explanation could be 
that, for various reasons, small LVTS participants may tend to bump 
up against their BCLs far more frequently relative to their T2NDC. Of 
course, further research is necessary before either of these 
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5  Funding levels for the new 
accounts in the BOJ-NET 
Abstract 
The Bank of Japan decided to implement the next-generation RTGS 
project of the BOJ-NET Funds Transfer System. Under the project, 
the new system will have liquidity-saving features and will 
incorporate large-value payments that are currently handled by two 
private-sector designated-time net settlement systems, the Foreign 
Exchange Yen Clearing System and the Zengin System. We analyse 
characteristics of the optimal funding levels under the new features 
using simulation analysis and find that the optimal funding levels can 
be described with the total balances in the system, the distribution of 




In February 2006, the Bank of Japan decided to implement the next-
generation RTGS (RTGS-XG) project of the BOJ-NET Funds 
Transfer System (BOJ-NET), its primary large-value payment 
system.
1 Under the RTGS-XG project, BOJ-NET will introduce 
liquidity-saving features in a current real-time gross settlement 
(RTGS) mode. The new system will also incorporate payments from 
three different streams of the current payment activities, two of which 
now settle toward the end of the processing day in private-sector 
designated-time net settlement (DNS) systems. The project will be 
implemented in two phases, with the first phase scheduled for fiscal 
2008 (April 2008 to March 2009) and the second for 2011. One of the 
primary motivations for the development of the new system is to 
quicken settlement of large-value payments relative to the current 
pattern and to reduce intraday settlement exposure of those payments 
by allowing for intraday settlement finality and liquidity-saving at the 
same time. 
  Much of the design work for the new system is already completed, 
while some decisions related to the implementation still remain. In the 
                                          
1 See Bank of Japan (2006b) for an overview of the RTGS-XG project.  
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paper, we focus on one aspect of the new system – the levels of 
funding for newly-developed accounts that will be drawn on to effect 
settlement throughout the day in a liquidity-saving mode. 
  The first issue that we explore is whether the plan to incorporate 
the payments that are currently settled on the two private-sector DNS 
systems and most payments on the current BOJ-NET into the new 
system will yield liquidity-saving under a certain level of funding. It is 
plausible to think that maintaining separate systems might require less 
liquidity or might result in speedier settlement for a given level of 
liquidity. If incorporating the payments in the three systems turns to 
be liquidity-saving, then it can be said that there are liquidity 
complementarities among the three systems to be combined. As 
demonstrated in the paper, strong complementarities do exist among 
the three systems. 
  Second, we simulate the performance of the new system using 
several levels of initial balances for the new accounts. In general, 
there is a clear trade-off between the rate of settlement of a group of 
payments and the level of funding devoted to those settlements. With 
a large level of funding, settlement can be made more quickly. Firstly, 
the total level of funding of initial balances is important in 
establishing how much value is settled prior to the end of the 
settlement period. Once the total level of funding is determined, 
participants can seek to optimise the distribution of initial balances 
across participants. The optimum distribution of balances across 
participants leads to the greatest value of settlement within the 
settlement period for that total level of funding used. A characteristic 
of the optimum distribution of balances across participants is that 
additional balances placed in any participant’s account yield equal 
increases in amounts settled. This ‘equalisation of marginal benefits’ 
is a characteristic common to many allocation problems in economics. 
  We examine how changes in a level of initial balances affect the 
value of payments settled, the amounts left unsettled after a particular 
time, and the average time of settlement. This information can be 
useful to participants and planners in seeking the right balance 
between the value settled during the day and the liquidity-saving 
potential of the new system. In the context of Japan’s payment 
activities, this is the first examination studying effects of liquidity on 
intraday settlement. 
  The paper is organised as follows. We begin in Section 5.2 by 
briefly describing the current large-value payment landscape in Japan, 
and how the design of the new system is expected to alter that 
landscape. We also provide a rough description of the planned new 
system and explain the purpose of the new account and its funding. In  
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Section 5.3 we examine changes in liquidity efficiency of combining 
the two new payment streams with the payments on the current BOJ-
NET. In Section 5.4 we describe the problem of finding optimum 
funding levels, and in Section 5.5 we present the results of simulation 
analysis. In Section 5.6 we provide a short summary and conclusion. 
 
 
5.2  Large-value payments in Japan 
5.2.1  Current structure of large-value payment systems 
BOJ-NET plans to incorporate payments currently made on BOJ-
NET, the Foreign Exchange Yen Clearing System (FXYCS) and the 
large-value payments on the Zengin Data Telecommunication System 
(Zengin). We briefly describe some aspects of these three systems.
2 
  BOJ-NET is a pure RTGS system for the Japanese yen, owned and 
operated by the Bank of Japan. The system is one of the core financial 
infrastructures supporting economic and financial activities in Japan. 
It settles almost JPY 100 trillion daily with annual turnover ranging 40 
times as high as Japan’s nominal GDP. 
  BOJ-NET handles both Japanese government Securities (JGSs) 
and funds transfers.  The latter mainly consist of money-market 
transactions, but also include the settlement payments for various 
payment and securities settlement systems that use BOJ-NET to 
transfer the final settlement payments and the cash legs. In addition, 
money-market operations of the Bank of Japan are carried out using 
BOJ-NET. There are a limited number of third-party, or customer, 
payments settled on BOJ-NET, and those are very high-value 
payments, indicating that these are also money-market transactions 
conducted by market participants that do not have accounts with the 
Bank of Japan. Settlement amounts in 2005 indicated that on a daily 
average basis BOJ-NET settled 21,641 transfers with a total value of 
JPY 88.3 trillion. The average value per settlement was JPY 4.1 
billion. 
  FXYCS is basically a DNS system that handles yen legs of foreign 
exchange trades. It conducts the final settlement at 14:30 using BOJ-
NET. The volume and value of its daily average activities in 2005 
indicated that it settled 28,022 transactions per day with a total value 
of JPY 16.4 trillion. The average value per transaction was JPY 586 
                                          
2 For an overview of payment systems in Japan, see the Japan section of BIS (2003).  
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million. The net amount transferred on BOJ-NET in 2005 averaged 
JPY 4.1 trillion. FXYCS has not only a DNS mode but also an RTGS 
mode, although its use is rather limited. 
  Finally, Zengin is a simple DNS system, whose final payment 
takes place at 16:15. In 2005, Zengin averaged 5.4 million 
transactions per day with a total daily average value of JPY 9.5 
trillion. The average size of payments was JPY 1.8 million. It is 
mainly used for commercial payments. On average, the daily 
settlement amounts made through BOJ-NET were JPY 1.8 trillion per 
day in 2005. It is estimated that roughly two-thirds of the value 
transferred on Zengin, approximately JPY 6 trillion per day, is made 
up of payments that are larger than JPY 100 million. 
 
 
5.2.2  Future structure of large-value payment systems 
The new system plans to operate as a queue-augmented RTGS 
system.
3 The new liquidity-saving features will be provided on a new 
type of accounts as shown in Table 1. Participants will be able to 
designate payment instructions to be settled either via the new 
accounts, that will not offer intraday overdrafts capability, or via the 
standard accounts, on which collateralised overdrafts will remain 
available. The intent of both participants and the Bank of Japan is that 
most of the three payment streams described above will be settled via 
the new accounts. The standard accounts and the dedicated accounts 
for simultaneous processing of delivery-versus-payment and 
collateralisation, known as SPDC, will still operate and are intended to 
be used for the rest of settlements.
4 
  The new system will operate the new accounts as follows. The 
new accounts will be funded by participants each morning at the start 
of the processing day (9:00) with an infusion of funding from the 
standard accounts. That establishes the participants’ initial balances in 
the new accounts, because the new accounts will have a zero balance 
overnight. Participants will then submit payment instructions to the 
                                          
3 See BIS (1997), McAndrews and Trundle (2001), and BIS (2005) for basic ideas on a 
queue-augmented RTGS. 
4 The SPDC facility is another type of liquidity-saving facility used only for settlement of 
cash legs of JGSs transactions. It allows the receiver of JGSs to pledge the incoming 
securities as collateral for intraday overdrafts while using the overdrafts to pay for the 
incoming securities. Similarly, the deliverer of JGSs is able to withdraw the securities 
pledged with the Bank of Japan for delivery to the receiver while using the funds received 
to repay the overdrafts.  
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new accounts, and a bilateral offsetting algorithm will initiate a search 
for bilaterally offsetting payments on a FIFO basis. If a pair of 
bilaterally offsetting payments is found, and if funds are sufficient to 
settle the payments, settlement of the selected payments takes place 
simultaneously. At designated times, a multilateral offsetting 
algorithm will attempt to find the largest set of payments that can be 
settled using available balances.
5 See Appendix 1 for the details of 
bilateral and multilateral offsetting algorithms in the new system. 
 
Table 5.1  Account structure in the new system 
 




– interbank transfers (eg 
money market, foreign 
exchange) 
– third-party transfers 
– the cash legs of 
securities transactions 
– settlement obligations 
arising from clearing 
systems 
– transactions with BOJ/ 
government 
– the cash legs of 
JGSs transactions 
using the SPDC 
facility 
– interbank 


















Not applicable (pure 
RTGS) 





Overnight Intraday  (zero 
balance at the end of 
the processing day) 
Intraday (zero 
balance at the end 




9:00–17:00* 9:00–16:30  9:00–16:30 
* Closing time is 19:00 for participants that have applied for access to extended hours. 
 
 
Participants will be able to transfer funds between their new accounts 
and their standard accounts freely throughout the day. Payment 
instructions remaining in the queue will be rejected if insufficient 
                                          
5 The algorithm will include all queued payments in the initial offsetting and successively 
drop the largest payment from the participant with the largest funding shortfall until a set 
of payments that have no funding shortfalls is found. Bech and Soramäki (2001) show 
that this algorithm finds the largest set of payments that can be settled using a multilateral 
offsetting given that one breaks a FIFO ordering rule.  
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funds are submitted to the new accounts by 16:30. The standard 
accounts will remain open until 17:00. 
 
 
5.3  Liquidity effects of combining FXYCS, 
Zengin and BOJ-NET payments 
As described above, the new system plans to incorporate payments 
currently made on BOJ-NET and FXYCS, and the large-value 
payments on Zengin. The question is whether the combination of 
these payment streams increases liquidity efficiency by aggregating 
the currently fragmented payment systems or reduce it by eliminating 
the DNS systems but with the obvious benefit of permitting intraday 
settlement of payments. We examine this question by first simulating 
operations of the new system with payments that are currently settled 
in BOJ-NET. Then we conduct simulations of the performance of 
FXYCS and the large-value Zengin, using the settlement method of 
the new system, while assuming (contrary to the planned design) that 
they were separately operated from BOJ-NET. Adding liquidity 
required in each of these two simulations provides an indication of 
liquidity that would be used if BOJ-NET, FXYCS, and Zengin 
remained separate systems, but all adopt an intraday finality 
capability. Finally, we simulate the performance of the new system 
when payment streams from all these systems are combined and 
settled in the same system. If liquidity required to settle the combined 
payment streams is lower than that required to settle the payments 
when the systems are operated separately (for a fixed level of delay), 
then it can be expected that there are liquidity complementarities, or 
scale economies in liquidity use, in combining the payment streams. 
If, on the other hand, liquidity use is lower with the systems operated 
separately, then there are diseconomies in liquidity use in combining 
the systems. 
  For each system, we conduct three treatments on each day’s data 
(the ten days of historical data in September 2003 are used in the 
simulations that we report on here).
6 The first treatment is to endow 
participants with sufficient liquidity to settle the day’s payments 
without delay. The second is to endow them with sufficient liquidity 
only to settle their multilateral net debit, with which the payments will 
be settled as quickly as possible (using the new settlement method). 
                                          
6 See Appendix 1 for the summary statistics of simulation data.  
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Finally, in the third treatment, participants are endowed with the 
average of the two other levels of liquidity – in other words, they are 
endowed with liquidity that is halfway between the level sufficient to 
settle payments without delay and the level of multilateral net debits. 
  We examine a trade-off between liquidity necessary to settle the 
payments and delay with which the payments are settled. If the locus 
of points that describes this trade-off shifts inward or outward as the 
different payment streams are added, it can be said that there are 
liquidity efficiencies or costs respectively in combining the different 
payment streams. 
  The results of these simulations, using the ten days of historical 
data and the settlement method of the new system, are shown in 
Figure 5.1. On average it is found that there are significant liquidity 
complementarities in combining the payment streams. This can be 
seen clearly in the inward shift of the black line (new system), which 
illustrates the performance of the new system, relative to the grey line 
(current three), which illustrates the total liquidity requirements of the 
three systems when operated separately. The inward shifts show that 
at all the three levels of delay simulated the new system requires less 
liquidity to settle the payments. 
 
Figure 5.1  Delay indicator and liquidity for the 
      separate systems, the sum of the separate 
      systems operating in isolation, 





















Table 5.2 provides more details on each of the ten days of simulated 
data and presents both the delay indicator measure and the value-
weighted average time of settlement.
7 In every simulation, and for any 
average time of settlement or any indicator of delay of settlement, the 
new system requires less liquidity to settle the payments. The results 
therefore suggest that there are significant liquidity complementarities, 
or economies of scale in liquidity use associated with the combination 
of the payment streams from the three systems. On average, across the 
treatments and the days, combining the payment streams results in 
20% reduction in liquidity use. 
 
Table 5.2  Liquidity use, delay indicator and  
      value-weighted average time of settlement 
      for the separate systems and 
      for the new system 
 
    JPY billion; hh:mm
  Level (1)  Level (2)  Level (3) 
New system     
Liquidity   3,975  9,159  14,344 
Delay 0.185  0.041  0.000 
Average time  12:22  11:38  11:26 
Current three systems     
Liquidity   5,649  11,032  16,415 
Delay 0.173  0.042  0.000 
Average time  12:17  11:39  11:26 
Current BOJ-NET     
Liquidity   3,850  7,760  11,670 
Delay 0.274  0.042  0.000 
Average time  12:56  11:39  11:34 
Two private systems     
Liquidity   1,799  3,272  4,745 
Delay 0.058  0.007  0.000 
Average time  11:34  11:18  11:16 
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
Note: Level (1) endows participants with sufficient liquidity only to settle their 
multilateral net debit, Level (2) with liquidity that is halfway between the level 
sufficient to settle payments without delay and the level of the multilateral net 




                                          
7 Specific definitions of these indicators are described in Appendix 1.  
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It is an interesting feature of the system that the current BOJ-NET 
requires less liquidity than the new system to process its payments 
without delay, but requires almost the same level of liquidity as the 
new system to settle its payments on a multilateral net basis. This 
suggests that as some of FXYCS and large-value Zengin payments 
arrive later in the day, they offset with some current BOJ-NET 
payments that arrive earlier in the day but still remain in the queue. As 
the current BOJ-NET payments are settled with a slight delay, they 
settle with less liquidity when combined with payment streams from 
the other two systems. Again, this indicates particularly strong 
liquidity complementarities among the systems. It should also be 
noted that while the combined payments settle without delay using 
more liquidity, a close examination of Table 5.2 shows that the new 
system settles at an earlier hour of the day than the current BOJ-NET 
where participants are endowed with sufficient liquidity to settle 
payments without delay. 
 
 
5.4  Optimising funding levels 
The funding levels in the new accounts will be determined by a choice 
of participants. In general, the higher the funding levels, the greater a 
proportion of those payments that are submitted to the new accounts 
can be settled. In addition, the higher the funding levels, the more 
quickly settlements will occur. 
  A feature of the new system is that funding for the new accounts 
can be supplied from the standard accounts at any time of the day. To 
some degree, this option simplifies the problem for participants 
regarding the amount of funding to transfer to the new accounts at the 
start of the processing day as any shortfalls or overages in funding can 
be corrected during the day. 
  When designing a payment system that uses a liquidity-saving 
mode of operations as well as a pure RTGS mode of operations, one 
question designers face is whether to create another account, as in the 
BOJ-NET’s new accounts. One choice is simply to rely on a single 
account and have participants decide on the priority of the payment, in 
other words, decide whether to send the payment instruction in a pure 
RTGS or in a liquidity-saving mode. The liquidity-saving mode then 
relies on incoming funds over a period of time as well as offsetting. 
Such a choice is described by Johnson, McAndrews, and Soramäki 
(2004). In the case of the new system, the computational requirements  
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of BOJ-NET are reduced considerably with the introduction of the 
new accounts. 
  The efficiency of the new system could potentially be negatively 
affected if participants were to transfer funds into and out of their new 
accounts often during the day. The multilateral offsetting algorithm, 
for example, might not find many payments that can be settled if some 
participants had withdrawn funds immediately prior to operations of 
the algorithm. Because of this potential negative effect of rapid 
changes in funding levels, it may be useful to conduct the following 
thought experiment. Suppose, contrary to the design of the new 
system, that participants could only fund their new accounts twice 
during the day, at the opening of the processing day and for settlement 
of their unsettled queued payment instructions at 16:00. Under that 
counterfactual assumption, what would be efficient levels of initial 
funding? 
  Higher levels of initial funding will be associated with a faster rate 
of intraday settlement and a higher proportion of payments settled 
prior to 16:00. There is, however, no clear answer to the question of 
how to value an increased rate of intraday settlement as there is no 
easily observable intraday rate of interest that would provide a 
benchmark level of benefits from a faster rate of intraday settlement 
and a benchmark level of costs of intraday funds. Similarly, there is no 
clear measure of increases in credit and liquidity risks caused by 
leaving more payments unsettled until 16:00. 
  In the following exercises we investigate levels of initial funding 
that are sufficiently high so as to quicken the overall settlement of 
large-value payments in Japan. In addition, we investigate funding 
levels high enough to assure that a level of unsettled payments at 
16:00 is no greater than it is in today’s large-value payment systems. 
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It seeks to minimise the sum of initial balances of each participant i in 
the new account (bi), under the constraints that a set of payments that 
day is fixed and given by Pij, that the balances are non-negative and 
that settlement (in a value term) under the new system procedures 
over a given time interval during processing is at least as high as a rate  
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of settlement S, where S is some yen-rate of settlement per h minutes 
of the day. 
  By examining the structure of the problem, we can infer that the 
optimal levels of initial balances satisfy the following ‘equalisation of 
marginal benefit condition’. An extra yen added to any participant’s 
initial balance has the same incremental effect on the total settlement 
as an extra yen added to any other participant’s initial balance. We can 
infer that because the variables of initial balances enter the objective 
function in an additively separable way, there cannot be any way, at 
the optimal level of balances, to shift balances among accounts 
(holding fixed the sum of balances) and increase a rate of settlement. 
Otherwise we could reduce the sum of balances from the minimum 
level, which contradicts that the level is at a minimum. From that, it 
must then be the case that an extra yen of initial balances increases a 
rate of settlement by the same amount regardless of into whose 
account that yen is added. 
  The problem outlined above is not fully specified as it does not 
contain full richness and complexity of the settlement algorithms used 
by the new system. Nonetheless, an examination of the problem 
clarifies the heuristic strategy we employ in seeking the efficient 
levels of initial funding for the new accounts. First, notice that a rate 
of settlement is specified as the sum of all payments settled. The goal 
is therefore not to increase a particular participant’s rate of settlement 
but to increase a rate of settlement for the whole system. Second, the 
problem seeks to minimise the sum of initial balances, not any 
participant’s initial balance. Thus the efficient levels of funding we 
discuss are characterised by the following three factors: the total level 
of funding, the distribution of balances across participants, and the 
timing of funding. 
 
 
5.5  Simulations and results 
To find a locally optimum distribution of balances using simulations 
on historical data would require a large number of simulations. It is 
rational that we rely on that feature of the optimum levels of initial 
balances to guide the following heuristic strategy to characterise the 
efficient levels of balances. We first simulate the working of the new 
system starting with various levels of initial balances. After each 
simulation we examine the performance of the system in terms of the 
value of payments settled prior to 16:00, the value of the remaining 
unsettled payments at that time, the value of additional amounts that  
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need to be paid in to settle all the remaining unsettled payments, and 
the value-weighted average time of settlement. We also examine the 
effects of alternative levels of balances on the system as a whole, and 
on a separate basis, for the five largest banks and all the other 
participants. We then investigate the intertemporal distribution of 
balances as we seek a local optimum distribution of balances. 
  The results of these simulations give participants and planners a 




5.5.1  Four baseline simulations 
We perform simulations using the ten days of historical data in 
September 2003. We conduct four sets of baseline simulations. The 
first scenario is to simulate the performance of the current situation in 
which BOJ-NET, FXYCS and the large-value Zengin independently 
operate as they operate now. The scenario endows participants with 
sufficient liquidity to settle their payments without delay (although it 
treats FXYCS and Zengin as simple DNS systems) and uses the time 
of entry of payments. As a result, these baseline simulations provide a 
measure of current liquidity usage in the systems. These simulations 
are referred to as current baseline simulations. 
  Another baseline simulation is to endow participants with the exact 
amount of funds (in the new accounts) equal to that day’s multilateral 
net debit of each participant, given that day’s payments history. A 
participant’s multilateral net debit is the amount it would owe to settle 
its payments if the system were a DNS system. In general, participants 
do not necessarily know their own multilateral net debits in advance. 
This scenario can be thought of approximating the case in which 
participants make pay-ins throughout the day as they gradually learn 
the exact size of their multilateral net debit. The multilateral offsetting 
operations may be one way participants do learn the amount of their 
multilateral net debits, and this scenario approximates the learning 
process by assuming that they know the amounts with certainty in 
advance. These simulations are referred to as exact multilateral net 
debit (MND) funding simulations or progress-payment approximation 
simulations. 
  The third baseline simulation endows participants with their 
average multilateral net debit funding, where the average is taken over 
the ten days of the sample period. This scenario is first to assume that 
participants fund their new accounts in the morning and then make 
another pay-ins to the new accounts after 16:00 to settle the payments  
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that remain unsettled at that time. The average multilateral net debit is, 
of course, quite close in size to the exact multilateral net debit amount 
used in the exact MND funding simulations. However, because it is an 
average, some payments on some days will remain unsettled at 16:00. 
These simulations are referred as average multilateral net debit 
(MND) funding simulations. 
  The fourth baseline simulation endows participants with half the 
amount of funding as in the average MND funding simulations. These 
simulations are referred as half average multilateral net debit (MND) 
funding simulations. 
 
Figure 5.2  Overview of the performance 
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Source: Authors’ calculation. 
 
 
Figure 5.2 summarises the performance of the new system described 
in Section 5.3 and of these four baseline simulations. Points in the 
lower-left corner of the figure are more desirable combinations of total 
balances and settlement time. It can be found that conducting these 
baseline simulations attempts to search the local optimum level 
around the point at which participants are endowed with sufficient 
liquidity only to settle their multilateral net debits.  
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  Table 5.3 shows the performance of these four baseline 
simulations on average across the ten days of the sample period with 
regard to the amounts of initial balances used in the simulations, the 
additional amounts of pay-ins to the new accounts that would be 
required after 16:00 to settle those payments that still remain unsettled 
at that time, the cumulative amounts settled by 16:00, the gross 
amounts unsettled at 16:00, and the value-weighted average time of 
settlement. Because the analysis of only ten days yields a small 
sample, we simply examine averages without considering the 
statistical significance. 
 
Table 5.3  Averages from the baseline simulations 
 




















Current baseline  13,780  3,460  0  56,673  12,625  13:11 
 (-)  (-)  (-)  (-)  (-)   
Exact MND  3,975  492  0  61,106  8,192  12:22 
 (0.288)  (0.142)  (-)  (1,078)  (0.649)   
Average MND  3,964  492  3,224  55,954  13,344  12:33 
 (0.288)  (0.142)  (-)  (0.987)  (1.057)   
1,982 246 3,712 48,119 21,180 13:09  Half average 
MND (0.144)  (0.071)  (-)  (0.849)  (1.678)   
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
Note: Figures in brackets are ratios of each item to that of the current baseline simulations. ‘Five 
LBs’ stands for five largest banks. 
 
 
The exact MND funding simulation clearly settles more payments by 
16:00 with the initial balances as small as one-third of those the 
current baseline simulation requires. The average MND funding 
simulation also has the same qualitative results relative to the current 
baseline simulation, using fewer initial balances than the current 
baseline simulation. The average MND funding simulation results that 
payments unsettled at 16:00 reach up about 20% of that day’s total 
payments. These payments would be settled with an additional pay-in 
of JPY 3.2 trillion, so that the total liquidity used in these simulations 
is about twice as high as in the exact MND funding simulation. The 
amounts settled by 16:00 in the half average MND funding simulation 
are far below those in the three other scenarios, though economising 
too much of initial balances. The half average MND funding 
simulation settles on average only slightly more quickly than the 
current baseline simulation, using much less liquidity than the current 
baseline simulation. Because of its larger pay-in after 16:00, the half  
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average MND funding simulation uses almost as much liquidity in 
total as the average MND funding simulation. 
  Figure 5.3 shows the value-weighted average time of settlement 
and the cumulative settlement by 16:00 for the various cases. The 
settlement performance improves as the outcome plotted on the figure 
moves toward the bottom right, meaning a larger value settled in a 
quicker manner and vice versa. The four scenarios can be roughly 
arranged in the desirable order as the exact MND funding simulation, 
the average MND funding simulation, the current baseline simulation 
and the half average MND funding simulation.
8 
 
Figure 5.3  Value-weighted average time of settlement 
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Source: Authors’ calculation. 
 
 
Overall, the exact MND funding simulation settles payments most 
quickly and extensively and uses less liquidity than the average MND 
funding simulation. This suggests that if participants were to make 
pay-ins during the day in line with their multilateral net debit 
                                          
8 The current baseline simulation may be better than the average MND funding 
simulation, depending on the shape of indifference curves assumed. For example, the 
former improves if a high preference is given to settlement completion by 16:00.  
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positions, they might be able to have fewer payments unsettled after 
16:00. In comparing the performance of the average MND funding 
simulation and the half average MND funding simulation, the latter 
settles fewer payments by 16:00 and has a later average time of 
settlement (although it also settles payments more quickly than the 
current baseline simulation on average). It has approximately 25% of 
the payments unsettled at 16:00. Settlement of these payments 
requires an additional pay-in of JPY 3.7 trillion. The half average 
MND funding simulation, after all, uses about 80% of liquidity used in 
the average MND funding simulation, after taking into account the 
large pay-ins at the end of the day. This result reminds one that as one 
limits the initial amount of liquidity available to the system, larger 
pay-ins will be required later in the day. 
  The results of these four baseline simulations suggest that the new 
system may perform quite satisfactorily with levels of liquidity that 
are significantly lower than those currently used in settlement of the 
three systems. In addition, the behaviour of a rough approximation to 
the progress payments suggests that participants may be better able to 
conserve funding by making pay-ins to the system during the day as 




5.5.2 Distributional  funding simulations 
As the results of the exact MND funding and average MND funding 
simulations have suggested, the different distribution of initial 
balances across participants leads to the different performance of 
intraday settlement even when the total balances in the system are the 
same. 
  It is well known that there are a few hub-like participants in 
Japan’s interbank payment network.
9 They play a significant role in 
the redistribution of liquidity in the system by making outgoing 
payments and receiving incoming payments continuously during the 
day. Therefore the malfunctioning of these hub-like participants 
potentially has negative effects on the performance of the system as a 
whole. 
  In this section, in addition to the baseline simulations, we perform 
some additional simulations that show the effects of small changes in 
                                          
9 For the structure of Japan’s payment network, see Inaoka et al (2004) and Bank of Japan 
(2006a).  
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the funding provided by the five largest banks, which are known to 
work as hub-like participants in BOJ-NET. These simulations are 
conducted with the other participants in the system being endowed 
first with the exact multilateral net debit funding and, for the second 
set of these simulations, with half that level of funding. Because those 
participants are endowed with the exact amount of their multilateral 
net debit, these simulations are probably best compared with the exact 
MND funding simulation. The amounts that the five largest banks are 
endowed with are quite small amounts equal to the 90th percentile of 
the size of the payments they each send and receive on the current 
BOJ-NET alone. So these simulations are indicative of a situation in 
which all but the five largest banks make regular progress payments in 
the amounts of their multilateral net debits, and the five largest banks 
supply very little in the initial funding amounts. These simulations are 
not meant to model the actual behaviour of participants but rather to 
investigate the possible behaviour of the new system as we vary the 
funding of some particular participants in different ways. 
  These simulations are quite illustrative of the effects of small 
changes in particular participants’ funding levels. To investigate these 
effects for individual participants would be quite time-consuming and 
require many simulations. Because of those resource requirements, we 
forego such an investigation in the paper. 
  The first set of simulations shows that reducing the five largest 
banks’ total funding from JPY 492 billion, as in the exact MND 
funding simulation, to JPY 18 billion does not substantially reduce the 
speed of settlement in the system (see Table 5.4). The value-weighted 
average time of settlement changes from 12:22 to 12:34. Nor is the 
total amount settled by 16:00 reduced appreciably, even though the 
largest five banks had multilateral net debits of approximately JPY 
500 billion on the sample days. These results show that individual 
participants, or even groups of participants, may significantly reduce 
their initial level of funding without necessarily causing proportional 
changes in the amounts settled. Note that these results come at the cost 
of large amount of end-of-day pay-ins. Further research could 
determine the local optimum in the initial funding amounts. 
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Table 5.4  Averages from the simulations 
      with the 90th percentile funding 
 



















(1) Exact MND  3,975 492  0  61,106 8,192 12:22 
 (-)  (-)  (-)  (-)  (-)  (-) 
+90 percentile  3,500  18 1,527  58,170  11,129  12:34 
 (-475)  (-474)  (+1,527)  (-2,936)  (+2,937)  (+0:12) 
+90 percentile*2  3,518 35 1,452  58,495  10,803  12:34 
 (-457)  (-457)  (+1,452)  (-2,611)  (+2,611)  (+0:12) 
+90 percentile*3  3,535 53 1,405  59,025  10,274  12:33 
 (-440)  (-439)  (+1,405)  (-2,081)  (+2,082)  (+0:11) 
(2) Average MND  3,964 492 3,224 55,954  13,344  12:33 
 (-)  (-)  (-)  (-)  (-)  (-) 
+90 percentile  3,490  18 3,398  54,172  15,128  12:43 
 (-474)  (-474)  (+174)  (-1,782)  (+1,784)  (+0:10) 
+90 percentile*2  3,507 35 3,371  54,056  15,243  12:42 
 (-457)  (-457)  (+147)  (-1,898)  (+1,899)  (+0:09) 
+90 percentile*3  3,525 53 3,366  54,621  14,678  12:41 
 (-439)  (-439)  (+142)  (-1,333)  (+1,334)  (+0:08) 
(3) Half average  1,982 246 3,712 48,119  21,180  13:09 
MND  (-) (-) (-)  (-)  (-)  (-) 
+90 percentile  1,754  18 3,756  46,017  23,282  13:19 
 (-228)  (-228)  (+44)  (-2,102)  (+2,102)  (+0:10) 
+90 percentile*2  1,772 35 3,724  46,350  22,948  13:18 
 (-210)  (-211)  (+12)  (-1,769)  (+1,768)  (+0:09) 
+90 percentile*3  1,789 53 3,720  46,494  22,804  13:17 
 (-193)  (-193)  (+8)  (-1,625)  (+1,624)  (+0:08) 
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
Note: ‘Five LBs’ stands for five largest banks. Figures in brackets are differences from the 
benchmark level of each sub-scenario.   
 
 
The second set of simulations endows all but the largest five banks 
with their average multilateral net debit amounts, as in the average 
MND funding simulations (see Table 5.4). The largest five banks are 
again endowed with an amount that is equal to the size of the payment 
that is at the 90th percentile of their payment size distribution on the 
current BOJ-NET alone. In this simulation, which is best compared 
with the average MND funding simulations, we see that the 
performance of the system remains quite good even though the largest 
five banks’ funding levels are reduced substantially. The amounts 
settled by 16:00 falls by only 3%, and the value-weighted average 
time of settlement occurs 10 minutes later. 
  A final set of these simulations, in which participants other than 
the largest five banks have their initial funding levels set at half of the 
day’s multilateral net debit, confirms the result that dramatically  
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reducing the funding levels of the largest five banks does not reduce 
settlement by that proportion (see Table 5.4). 
  In each set of the simulations just discussed, we vary the funding 
levels of the five largest banks by endowing them with multiples of 
JPY 18 billion, namely 35 (doubled) and 53 (tripled) for their initial 
balances. These increases in the levels of initial balances do not 
appreciably change the outcome. One reason is that liquidity-saving 
features effectively reduce some distortions from optimal balances by 
running offsetting mechanisms continuously during the course of the 
day. Offsetting mechanisms can relax conditions for gross settlement 
in comparison with a pure RTGS mode and then achieve relatively 
smoother flow of payments despite the distortions of initial 
distribution of balances. 
  In general, there tends to be a greater amount settled as the initial 
funding levels of the largest five banks increases, but this is not 
always true. For example, raising the largest five banks’ initial 
funding from JPY 18 billion to 35 slightly reduces the amounts settled 
by 16:00 in the second set of simulations. This result implies that the 
amount settled by 16:00 is not a monotone increasing function of 
some particular participants’ initial balances. 
 
 
5.5.3 Progress-payment  simulations 
The exact MND funding simulation has endowed participants with the 
exact amounts of the multilateral net debit at the beginning of the 
processing day. This simulation can also approximate the case in 
which participants make pay-ins continuously during the day as they 
learn the size of their multilateral net debit in that day. The question is 
how the performance in the system can be affected if the timing of 
intraday pay-ins is changed. 
  It has been already described that the half average MND funding 
simulation substantially underperforms the exact MND funding 
simulation because of the severe liquidity constraints in the system. In 
the progress-payment simulations, starting with the half average 
multilateral net debits and then making intraday pay-ins at 10:00 or 
12:00, both the value settled by 16:00 and average time of settlement 
can approach those of the exact MND funding simulation (see Table 
5.5). The high performance of the progress-payment simulations with 
intraday pay-ins comes at the cost of twice as large amount of the total 
liquidity in the exact MND funding simulation. 
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Table 5.5  Averages from the progress-payment 
     approximation simulations 
 



















(1) Half average  1,982 0 3,712  48,119  21,180  13:09 
MND  (-) (-) (-)  (-)  (-)  (-) 
+ Exact MND at  1,982  6,095  2,780  61,621  7,678  11:51 
10:00 (0)  (+6,095)  (-932)  (+13,502)  (-13,502)  (-1:18) 
+ Exact MND at  1,982  5,571  2,302  62,681  6,617  12:10 
12:00 (0)  (+5,571)  (-1.410)  (+14,562)  (-14,563)  (-0:59) 
(2) Half average  1,982 0 3,712  48,119  21,180  13:09 
MND  (-) (-) (-)  (-)  (-)  (-) 
+ Half exact MND  1,982  3,047  3,202  59,152  10,146  12:15 
at 10:00  (0)  (+3,047)  (-510)  (+11,033)  (-11,034)  (-0:54) 
+ Half exact MND  1,982  2,785  3,094  59,076  10,223  12:30 
at 12:00  (0)  (+2,785)  (-618)  (+10,957)  (-10,957)  (-0:39) 
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
Note: Figures in brackets are differences from the benchmark level of each sub-scenario. 
 
 
In comparing the scenarios with additional pay-ins at 10:00 and at 
12:00, both of them can achieve almost the same level of the value 
settled by 16:00. The average time of settlement, however, is further 
improved with the additional pay-ins at 10:00 rather than with the 
additional pay-ins at 12:00. The earlier arrangement reduces the 
duration of the payments unsettled and then leads to the earlier 
average time of settlement. In comparing the performance of the 
intraday pay-ins with the exact multilateral net debit and the half of 
that, the latter settles fewer payments by 16:00 and has a later average 
time of settlement. 
  Participants are required to add intraday pay-ins at the appropriate 
timing to secure the sufficient funding. With such a careful 
management of liquidity and payment flows, smoother flow of 
payments can be achieved in the system. However, participants can 
learn the optimum timing of funding only ex post. The second-best 
solution to the optimum funding problem subject to a certain rate of 
settlement is, therefore, to endow participants with the exact amount 




5.6 Concluding  remarks 
The new system with liquidity-saving features will require a level of 
liquidity below that necessary for intraday settlement in the current 
BOJ-NET. In the paper we have explored characteristics of the 
optimum funding level in the new system using simulation analysis. 
More specifically, we have analysed how quickly intraday settlement 
could occur if the level of initial funding were subject to some 
liquidity constraints. Our findings are summarised as follows. 
 
(1) To minimise the total balances in the system subject to a certain 
level of the progress rate of intraday settlement, participants need 
to secure timely funding and to appropriately distribute the total 
balances across them in the system. In fact, the timing of funding 
may actually be less controllable because participants could hardly 
learn the optimum timing of funding ex ante. The simulation 
results suggest that it is one of the second-best arrangements for 
the local optimum of balances to endow participants with the 
multilateral net debit amounts at the beginning of the processing 
day. 
 
(2)  Offsetting mechanisms search for a set of payment instructions 
that can be settled when taking into account incoming payments as 
sources of liquidity as well as actual balances in accounts at that 
point. These mechanisms have side effects on the cross-sectional 
and intertemporal distribution problem of balances in the system. 
Through relaxing conditions for gross settlement, these 
mechanisms are expected to conduct some fine-tuning during the 
course of the day to reduce a certain level of distortion from 
optimum balances. 
 
(3) The simulation analysis also indicates strong economies of scale in 
liquidity use in Japan’s large-value payments. It suggests that 
participants enjoy liquidity efficiencies in combining the different 
payment streams rather than in operating individual payment 
systems separately. 
 
Solving the optimisation problem for funding by using simulation 
analysis would require a large number of simulations. Although this 
work is supposed to be quite time-consuming, it gives participants and 
planners a sense of how alternative levels of funding would affect the 
system’s performance.  
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Offsetting algorithms in the new system 
 
Offsetting mechanisms search for a set of payment instructions that 
can be settled when taking into account incoming payments as sources 
of liquidity and settle the selected instructions simultaneously. In the 
new system, a bilateral offsetting algorithm will run continuously 
throughout the day, with a multilateral offsetting algorithm running a 
few times a day to complement the bilateral offsetting algorithm. 
  The bilateral offsetting algorithm will search for a pair of 
bilaterally offsetting payment instructions or a single instruction that 
can be settled on a gross basis. It will run when one of the following 
events occurs: (i) a new payment instruction entering the system; (ii) 
an increase in balances of the new account; (iii) a change in the 
payment instruction at the top of the queue due to settlement, 
reordering, or cancellation. The target payment instruction for bilateral 
offsetting is the newly submitted payment instruction when (i) occurs 
and the top-queued payment instruction when (ii) or (iii) occurs. 
  For example, where the target payment instruction is a newly-
submitted payment from Bank A to Bank B, the system searches from 
the top of the queue for a payment instruction from Bank B to Bank A 
that can be settled simultaneously using available balances. 
  The multilateral offsetting algorithm will run at fixed times. It will 
attempt to find the largest set of queued payment instructions that can 
be settled using available balances by first testing to settle all queued 
payment instructions at once and successively removing the largest 
queued payment instruction from the participant with the largest 
funding shortfall until a set of payment instructions that causes no 
funding shortfalls can be found. 
 
 
Profile of the simulator 
 
We use the BOJ-NET simulator developed by the Yajima Laboratory 
of the Tokyo Institute of Technology, whose research interests are 
focused on mathematical programming and operations research. Its 
basic functions are almost the same as those of the Bank of Finland 
Payment and Settlement Simulator.
10 Highly complicated offsetting 
algorithms with a settlement-value maximisation or time-weighted 
                                          
10 See Leinonen and Soramäki (1999) for the Bank of Finland Simulator.  
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average settlement-value maximisation mode are available on the 
BOJ-NET simulator as well as standard offsetting algorithms based on 





The simulations were performed using Japan’s actual data of ten 
consecutive business days in September 2003. The data includes the 
following transactions: money-market transactions (excluding those 
with the Bank of Japan); foreign exchange yen transactions (excluding 
CLS related transactions), which are handled either on a DNS mode or 
an RTGS mode in FXYCS; and large-value retail credit transfers, 
which are JPY 100 million and over per transaction. See Table 5.6 for 
a summary of the basic statistics. 
 
Table 5.6  Basic statistics on the simulation data 
 
     JPY  billion 




Average value  SD of value 
Total transaction  61,709  69,979  1.134  7.851 
MM  transactions  7,558 37,487 4.960 20.134 
FXY transactions  40,368 23,010  0.570  3.801 
LV Zengin transactions  13,783  9,483  0.688  1.483 




Measurement of simulation results 
 
A settlement delay of a payment instruction can be calculated as the 
time difference between the payment submission to the system and the 
completion of the payment. We use two types of statistics to measure 
a settlement delay in the system: the value-weighted average time of 
settlement and the indicator of settlement delay. 
  The value-weighted average time of settlement (VWATS), which 
is the average time (measured from the opening of the processing day) 
weighted by the value of payments settled, is defined as follows: 
 




i i v v t VWATS  
 
where ti and vi represent respectively the settlement time (minutes) 
and the value of a payment i. If all payments are settled at the opening  
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of the processing day (9:00), then VWATS has a minimum value of 
zero minutes because ti = 0 for all i. If no payments are settled during 
the day, and if all the payments are settled at the end of the processing 
day (16:30), then VWATS takes a maximum value of 450 minutes 
because ti = 450 for all i. 
  In the meanwhile, the indicator of settlement delay (ISD) is 
defined as follows 
 
( ) ( ) ∑ ∑ − − =
i
i i , 1 end
i
i i , 1 i , 2 v t t v t t ISD  
 
where t1,i and t2,i are respectively the submission time and the 
settlement time of a payment i, and tend is the time for the end of the 
processing day (16:30). ISD runs from zero, which means no delay in 
the system, through one, which means no settlement during the day. 
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6  Risks and efficiency gains of a 
tiered structure in large-value 
payments: a simulation approach 
Abstract 
The large-value payment system in the United Kingdom (CHAPS) is 
highly tiered: a few settlement banks make payments on behalf of 
many customer banks. This paper makes use of a simulation approach 
to quantify by how much tiering affects, on the one hand, node and 
credit risk and, on the other, the liquidity needs of CHAPS. We do so 
by creating scenarios where current settlement banks become 
customer banks and thus we increase the degree of tiering. The results 
show that node risk would rise substantially in what is already a 
highly concentrated system. As for credit risk, the size of intraday 
exposures compared with settlement banks’ capital is very small and 
therefore the likelihood of contagion remote. More importantly, the 
increase in credit risk brought to the system by settlement banks 
leaving CHAPS bears little relationship to the values settled by each 
individual bank. We find that increasing the degree of tiering in 
CHAPS leads to substantial liquidity savings – although the liquidity 
saved is only a fraction of the spare liquidity currently posted in the 
system. Most of the savings are due to liquidity pooling rather than to 
internalisation of payments. There is a strong relationship between 
changes in values settled and liquidity needs. This relationship can be 
used to forecast the impact on liquidity needs if more banks were to 
join CHAPS. The quantification of the trade-off between risk and 
efficiency in different scenarios provides policy makers with a useful 




Only a few banks are direct members of the UK large-value payment 
system. The vast majority of banks access the system indirectly, 
through any of the few direct members. We describe a system in 
which a very small proportion of banks are direct members as a highly 
tiered system. The degree of tiering affects both how risky and how 
efficient the UK system is. Recent research has classified the various  
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risks and benefits of tiering in large-value payments, but much less 
progress has been made in quantifying these risks and benefits. This 
paper seeks to fill this gap. 
  In order to gauge how the degree of tiering in CHAPS affects risks 
and benefits, we need to be able to vary it while holding other factors 
constant. A simulation approach allows us to do so. We create 
artificial versions of CHAPS where we increase the degree of tiering 
by reducing the number of direct members even further. We then use 
the simulation results to quantify the impact of tiering on 
concentration and credit risk and on how much liquidity the system 
needs to operate. 
  The results show that, in a more tiered system, concentration risk 
would rise substantially. As for credit risk, our figures have confirmed 
previous analysis at the Bank that, under normal circumstances, the 
likelihood of direct members failing due to the credit they extend to 
their customer banks for their payments business is very small and 
therefore the likelihood of contagion remote. But, more importantly, 
our analysis has shown that the increase in credit risk brought to the 
system by settlement banks leaving CHAPS bears little relationship to 
the values settled by each individual bank. The key determining factor 
of the size of intraday credit exposures is the pattern of intraday flows 
of second-tier banks – a variable that central banks do not observe. 
  Increasing the degree of tiering in CHAPS leads to substantial 
liquidity savings. The vast majority of the savings are due to liquidity 
pooling rather than to internalisation of payments.  Moreover, the 
clear relationship between changes in values settled and liquidity 
needs shown by our simulations make it possible to project what 
would happen if current customer banks joined CHAPS as direct 
members. We estimate that the liquidity needs could increase by GBP 
8 billion in aggregate if as many as five large banks (in terms of 
values of payments processed) joined CHAPS. While this figure is 
significant, it is only a fraction of the GBP 17 billion spare liquidity 
posted on average in the system as a whole during the same time 
period. On an individual bank basis however, given the different cost 
liquidity has for different banks, this might not be true. Some banks 




Only a few banks are direct members of the UK large-value payment 
system. The vast majority of banks access the system indirectly,  
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through any of the few direct members. We describe a system in 
which a very small proportion of banks are direct members as a highly 
tiered system. Tiering is therefore defined as the proportion of banks 
that are direct members of the payment system. In this context, higher 
tiering means fewer direct members. The degree of tiering affects both 
how risky and how efficient the UK system is. Whilst recent 
theoretical research and central bank analysis
1 has classified the 
various risks and benefits of tiering in large-value payments, much 
less progress has been made in quantifying these risks and benefits. 
This paper seeks to fill this gap. 
 CHAPS
2 is the large-value payment system in the United 
Kingdom. It is a real-time gross settlement (RTGS) system employed 
since April 1996, processing an average of GBP 200 billion and over 
100,000 payments each day. Member banks hold settlement accounts 
with the Bank of England and they can run fully-collateralised 
intraday overdrafts. Only 14 commercial settlement banks and the 
Bank of England are direct CHAPS members.
3 We refer to these 
banks are direct members, first-tier banks or settlement banks. All 
other banks (the second-tier banks) have to access CHAPS through 
these direct or first-tier members. They are called indirect members, 
second-tier banks or customer banks. A similar degree of tiering is 
found in the embedded payment system of CREST, the UK securities 
settlement system. 
  In order to gauge how the degree of tiering in CHAPS Sterling 
affects measures of risks, we need to be able to vary it while holding 
other factors constant. This is not possible with cross-country 
comparisons, where many factors other than the degree of tiering vary. 
A simulation approach, by contrast, is particularly useful in creating 
artificial versions of one payment system with different degrees of 
tiering. This paper makes use of a simulation approach to quantify by 
how much tiering affects, on the one hand, node and credit risk and, 
on the other, the liquidity needs of the UK large-value payment 
                                          
1 See Kahn and Roberds (2005), Jackson and Manning (2006), Harrison, Lasaosa and 
Tudela (2005) and Bank of England Payment Systems Oversight Report (2005) 
(http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/psor/psor2005). 
2 There are in fact two different large-value payment systems, CHAPS Sterling and 
CHAPS Euro. Since the values settled in CHAPS Sterling are twenty times higher than 
those settled in CHAPS Euro, our analysis will be restricted to CHAPS Sterling. All 
references to CHAPS in the paper refer to CHAPS Sterling. 
3 CLS Bank and Abbey joined at the end 2005. We count RBS and Natwest as a single 
member even though they actually have two separate accounts. A complete membership 
list can be found in 
http://www.apacs.org.uk/uk_payment_schemes/chaps_clearing_1.html.  
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system. Quantifying the trade-off between risks and efficiency enables 
us to provide policy-makers with a framework in which to discuss the 
effects of alternative models. Liquidity cost/risk and efficiency 
benefits of not in and of themselves make a tiered system optional 
from a welfare perspective. The paper then goes on to analyse how 
much of the liquidity gains are due to pooling and how much to 
internalisation of payments. 
  The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section 
outlines how tiering may affect risks and liquidity efficiency in the 
UK large-value payment system. Section 6.3 introduces the 
methodology used in our analysis. Section 6.4 goes on to describe the 




6.2  Tiering, risks and efficiency 
In their 2003 Financial System Stability Assessment of the United 
Kingdom,
4 the International Monetary Fund (IMF) highlighted the 
potential risks arising from the highly-tiered structure of the UK large-
value payment systems. Table 6.1 shows how the degree of tiering in 
CHAPS – defined as the proportion of banks accessing the system 
directly – is high compared with other countries.
5 When looking at 
Table A we should bear in mind that systems with a large proportion 
of eligible banks as direct members can in reality be more tiered if 
some of those direct members still choose to send their payments 
through other settlement banks.
6 We know that in the United Kingdom 
more than half of the value of payments sent to CHAPS by settlement 
banks are on behalf of second-tier banks. Unfortunately, we do not 
have comparable data at our disposal for the rest of the countries in 
our table. 
  The IMF drew attention to the exposures arising between the first-
tier and second-tier institutions and the potential for contagion risk, 
that is, the risk that credit problems in a second-tier bank might spill 
over to first-tier banks. Since the IMF assessment was published, the 
                                          
4 Available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2003/cr0346.pdf. 
5 Tiering defined in this way is obviously correlated with the general degree of 
concentration in the banking system: if only a few banks account for a large share of the 
banking market (the UK case), access to payment systems is likely to be tiered due to 
economies of scale. 
6 This appears to be the case in Fedwire.  
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Table 6.1  Settlement banks in large-value payment 
     systems 
 
Country  System name  No. of settlement 
banks
(a) 
No. of credit 
institutions 
Share of 









Belgium ELLIPS  16  109  15% 







Germany RTGS  Plus  93  2,370  4% 
Italy BIREL  204  821 25% 
Japan BOJ-NET  371  506  73% 







Switzerland SIC  307  327  94% 





European Union  TARGET 
Euro1 
1,579 Not  applicable   
Source: Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS) Statistics on payment and 
settlement systems in selected countries (2005) and OECD’s Bank Profitability, 2003. 
(a)Includes central banks. Data for 2003. As for 2006, CHAPS Sterling has 15 members, including 
the Bank of England. 
 
 
A tiered payment system can give rise to several types of risk relative 
to a system in which all banks are direct participants:  
 
Credit risk: Credit exposures arise when settlement banks offer their 
customer banks overdraft facilities when making outward payments 
on their behalf. Conversely, when customer banks hold positive 
intraday balances at their settlement bank, the customer bank is 
exposed to the settlement bank. As Flannery (1996) points out, a 
tiered system that relies heavily on private credit may not function so 
well in times of crises. 
 
                                          
7 ‘Strengthening financial infrastructure’ article of the December 2004 Financial Stability 
Review, available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/fsr/2004/fsr17art4; 




Node risk (also referred to as ‘concentration risk’): Tiering increases 
the concentration of payments in each settlement bank. The system is 
therefore more sensitive to temporary outages experienced by 
individual settlement banks. The consequences of a temporary 
disruption can be either merely operational (other banks’ inability to 
make and receive payments) or also liquidity-related. A stricken bank 
able to receive but unable to send payments may become a ‘liquidity 
sink’, draining the rest of the system of the liquidity needed to 
continue making payments. The larger the proportion of the liquidity 
in the system controlled at any one time by an individual bank, the 
greater the risk that operational problems lead to liquidity difficulties. 
 
Legal risk: The finality of payments made or received on behalf of 
indirect participants is not as well-defined as in systems designated 
under the European Union’s Settlement Finality Directive such as 
CHAPS. In addition, a tiered system makes internalisation of 
payments possible. Internalised payments are payments made between 
customer banks of the same settlement bank and settled internally 
across the settlement bank’s books without being forwarded to the 
payment system. For a given degree of tiering, a greater degree of 
internalisation may increase the legal risk of payments being 
unwound. 
 
Liquidity dependency: Second-tier banks may view their settlement 
banks as lenders of last resort. First-tier banks, conversely, may 
depend on the incoming transactions of their customer banks for their 
own liquidity needs. 
 
So far, the Bank’s analysis of the risks involved in tiering has focused 
on credit risk to settlement banks. Based on evidence that first-tier 
banks extend unsecured intraday credit to second-tier banks, Harrison, 
Lasaosa and Tudela (2005) analysed the credit risk exposure of 
settlement banks using a standard credit risk model. They examined 
the change in the distribution of credit losses incurred by a bank that 
moves from only processing payments on behalf of its own customers 
to carrying out correspondent business on behalf of second-tier banks. 
The model was calibrated to UK financial infrastructures. It concluded 
that, in normal market conditions, the credit risk to first-tier banks 
appeared to be low. Even under stressed circumstances, the 
assumptions had to be extreme to lead to a significant increase in the 
credit risk faced by the settlement bank. 
  As for node risk, research carried out by the Bank has found that 
operational problems at individual CHAPS settlement members would  
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not in general prevent the remaining banks from making payments to 
each other due to liquidity shortages – providing that banks quickly 
stopped making payments to the stricken bank.
8 Bedford, Millard and 
Yang (2004) use a simulation approach and find that the system 
exhibits a high level of resilience. Nonetheless, the operational failure 
of a key node bank would still disrupt all of its own customers and 
those to whom they were making payments. 
  Jackson and Manning (2006) construct a model that examines the 
key factors affecting banks’ decisions whether to become direct 
members of a particular system or not, and the central bank’s decision 
to require collateralisation of intraday credit or not. Their findings 
suggest the existence of economies of scale in correspondent banking, 
which make concentration likely. 
  A tiered payment system has benefits too. It can reduce systemic 
risk
9 in two different ways. First, a tiered payment system depends 
less on the central infrastructure because some payments are 
‘internalised’. In the case of an operational failure of the central 
system, payments across the books of settlement banks can still take 
place. A second, potential, risk-related benefit from tiering is the 
increase in monitoring by first-tier banks of the financial position of 
second-tier banks. Kahn and Roberds (2005)
10 argue that tiering 
increases the level of monitoring by first-tier banks and reduces the 
incentive to default by second-tier banks. If a second-tier bank proves 
itself to be unreliable, it will be required to collateralise fully its 
payment activity at an additional cost. If it is reliable, it only needs to 
be monitored. Hence, the first-tier bank has an incentive to monitor 
efficiently and the second-tier bank has an incentive to behave 
reliably. 
  So far we have compared the systemic risks involved in a tiered 
and non-tiered payment system. But a tiered system can also be more 
efficient than one where all banks are direct members of the payment 
system. In a competitive market, the banks that have a competitive 
advantage when offering correspondent banking services become 
settlement banks. Larger banks are normally better placed to do so due 
to existing economies of scale in several areas: 
                                          
8 Whether banks do so in practice is an interesting subject for further research. If they do 
not, the results of Bedford et al (2004) may no longer hold. 
9 We define systemic risk as a risk to the financial system that is not adequately 
internalised by system participants and that imposes material costs to the banking system 
should it materialise. 
10 Available at http://www.bankoengland.co.uk/financialstability/futureofpayments/ 
kahnroberdsBOE.pdf  
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•  Infrastructure: IT, contingency arrangements, administration. 
•  Fee structure: this tends to fall more heavily on banks with small 
volumes of payments, due to the existence of both fixed fees and a 
sliding scale for per-transaction (volume-based) fees. 
•  Dedicated staff: a well-staffed liquidity management team. 
•  Liquidity requirements of RTGS systems: RTGS systems, such as 
CHAPS, are liquidity-intensive because they require payments to 
be made on a gross basis and to be fully pre-funded. Liquidity 
needs might decrease with the degree of tiering due to two effects, 
liquidity pooling and internalisation of payments – Section 6.4.5 
explores which of the two effects is more important in CHAPS. 
 
This paper focuses on the risks to and efficiency gains from tiering 
that we can quantify with the data at our disposal: node risk, credit 




We do not have access to actual data of CHAPS under different 
degrees of tiering that would allow us to study the implications of a 
more, or less, tiered structure. We can turn, though, to simulation 
techniques to analyse different tiering scenarios and their implications 
for liquidity needs and system risks. Specifically, we use the Bank of 
Finland payment and settlement system simulator (BoF-PSS2) 
initially developed in the mid-1990s by the Bank of Finland to study 
the effects of the introduction of European Monetary Union (EMU) on 
the Finnish payment systems. Since then the simulator has been 
developed for and used by several central banks.
11 
  The BoF-PSS2 models settlement processes according to a set of 
rules defined for a payment system environment, giving as outputs 
account balances and payments settled and received that can easily be 
analysed within the simulator or exported to other programs. These 
outputs allow us to draw conclusions about how system characteristics 
such as credit risk, liquidity consumption, settlement speed or gridlock 
resolution vary under the different scenarios. 
  The first step in a simulation process is to establish a ‘benchmark’ 
against which other simulations (or scenarios) are compared. Our 
benchmark involves a simple replication of real-life CHAPS Sterling 
using actual transactions for June 2005. This means replicating a total 
                                          
11 See Leinonen (2005) for a more technical and precise description of the BoF-PSS2.  
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of 2.5 million payments accounting for GBP 4.2 trillion of total value 
transferred. We then construct different scenarios in which we vary 
the level of tiering in CHAPS Sterling. 
  For each transaction we have information on the settlement banks 
sending and receiving the payment, the payment amount and the exact 
time at which it was sent. We do not have information on end payer or 
payee, or an indication of whether the payment is sent on behalf of the 
settlement bank itself or one of its customer banks. And, obviously, 
internalised transactions are not included in the data since they do not 
go through CHAPS.
12 
  Our simulations involve an increase in the degree of tiering and, 
therefore, a reduction in the number of direct CHAPS members. 
Decreasing rather than increasing the number of direct members 
allows us to observe the payments sent and received by the banks that 
we will turn into customer banks in the data. We can then assign them 
to a settlement bank once they become customer banks and conduct 
the simulations. Since our data does not identify the transactions in 
which customer banks are involved, we could not construct a scenario 
where customer banks become direct CHAPS members. 
  If we assume that the effects of increasing and decreasing the 
number of CHAPS direct members are similar, it is easy to extend the 
conclusions of this experiment to a situation where tiering decreased.  
We use the estimated relationship between changes in values settled 
and the changes in liquidity needs to predict what would happen if 
tiering decreased. 
  It is hard to predict in which direction the degree of tiering in 
CHAPS will move in the near future. Market intelligence suggests that 
involvement in new systems requires large expenditures on IT, 
implying that economies of scale will become even more important. If 
that turns out to be the case, there will be a movement towards 
specialisation in the provision of customer banking services and 
CHAPS will become more tiered. On the other hand, the new way in 
which the Bank is now carrying out is open market operations 
(introduced in May 2006) gives CHAPS settlement banks the 
opportunity to use reserves as an additional source of intraday 
liquidity in addition to collateralised intraday overdrafts. This 
essentially makes it cheaper for banks to become direct CHAPS 
members. 
  We increase the degree of tiering in the system by turning the 
seven smallest banks by value into customer banks of the three major 
                                          
12 See Section 6.4.3 below for a detailed explanation of internalisation.  
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settlement banks in turn. All together the seven smallest banks 
account for 17% of CHAPS transactions by value and 19% by 
volume. We start off by assigning (or converting into customer) the 
smallest bank (accounting for less than 1% of CHAPS values) to one 
of the three major settlement banks (let us call it major settlement 
bank 1); we then assign this same bank to another of the three major 
settlement banks (major settlement bank 2); in another step we assign 
it to a third major settlement bank (major settlement bank 3). We 
continue assigning the smallest and second smallest banks to major 
settlement bank 1, then to major settlement bank 2 and finally to 
major settlement bank 3. We go on with the three smallest banks in a 
similar way and continue this process up to the seven smallest banks. 
This gives us 21 different tiering scenarios. 
  We construct two additional scenarios in the following way. We 
take the seven smallest banks as before and we assign some of them to 
settlement bank 1, some of them to settlement bank 2 and the rest to 
settlement bank 3. The choice of which of the smallest banks to assign 
to which of the major settlement banks is based on the relative 
proportion of bilateral payments between the two types of banks and 
involves two ways, first considering payments by volume and second 
by value. New customer banks are likely to choose as their settlement 
banks those banks with whom they have a large proportion of 
payments by virtue of their business, since internalised payments are 
usually charged at a lower rate than those going through CHAPS. We 
call the first scenario ‘assign by volume’, and the second one ‘assign 
by value’. We have 23 different scenarios in total. 
  There are two main assumptions embedded in this experimental 
design. First, we assume that the timing of payments does not change 
when a settlement bank becomes a customer bank. Settlement banks 
have more discretion than customer banks about when to send 
payments to CHAPS –discretion constrained by intraday deadlines 
prevalent in financial markets and by throughput guidelines. But, with 
the information at our disposal, any changes to the timing of payments 
in our simulations would be completely arbitrary. The second 
assumption is that settlement banks that become customer banks take 
their own customer banks with them because there is no immediate 






In what follows we analyse how our measures of node risk, credit risk 
and liquidity efficiency change in the different scenarios. 
 
 
6.4.1 Node  risk 
Following James (2003), we gauge the increase in node risk by 
looking at individual banks’ share of all payments going through 
CHAPS. This measure shows the proportion of payments in the 
system that would be affected by an operational outage in that 
particular bank. This measure of node risk does not take into account 
the interconnectedness of the node. Node risk defined in this way does 
not encompass the impact of payments going through other settlement 
banks that could be affected through liquidity sink channels in such an 
operational crisis. We calculate the share of payments based on the 
value of all incoming and outgoing payments for each bank. Node risk 
for bank j is defined as value settled in CHAPS by bank j plus value 
received through CHAPS by bank j over the totals sent and received in 
CHAPS by all settlement banks. 
 
ceived Re and Sent Totals CHAPS







Current concentration figures are 26% for the largest settlement bank, 
25% for the second largest and 17% for the third largest.  
  Table 6.2 shows how concentration in CHAPS increases when the 
same seven customer banks are assigned to a combination of the three 
major settlement banks. As described in the previous section, we 
decide which customer bank to assign to each settlement bank 
according to the most common interbank payment flows that we 
observe in our data. 
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Table 6.2  Increase in CHAPS Sterling payments 
      share when new customer banks are 
      assigned to several settlement banks 
 






Current share  26.0  24.5  17.1 
Assign by value
(a)  31.7 23.3 29.3 
Assign by volume
(a) 30.4  23.9  30.4 
Source: Payments database and Bank calculations, average over business days, June 
2005. 
(a)For a definition of these terms or scenarios see page 11. 
 
 
Figure 6.1 shows the increase in the share of payments of each major 
settlement bank when all the new customer banks are assigned to it. 
Each line shows the results of a different simulation: when all new 
customer banks are assigned to major settlement banks number one, 
two and three. Each dot represents the average over the business days 
in June 2005. The unfilled shapes correspond to our benchmark case 
of current node risk figures. The degree of tiering moves up as we 
move towards the right of the firuge, with each point on the horizontal 
axis representing one more small settlement bank that becomes a 
customer bank. Each differently coloured line shows how the node 
risk increases when the new customer banks are assigned to each of 
the three major settlement banks. Finally, the two single brown dots 
show the share of payments for major settlement bank 1 in scenarios 
‘assign by value’ and ‘assign by volume’. 
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Major settlement bank 1
Major settlement bank 2
Major settlement bank 3
Percent
Increase in tiering: no of banks 
bi b k  
 
Source: Payments database and Bank calculations. 
 
 
We can see that the increase in node risk is greatest when the new 
customer banks are assigned to the major settlement bank that 
currently has the smallest payment share of the three. This is not 
surprising. Ceteris paribus, the bigger a settlement bank is, the larger 
the proportion of its payments that can be internalised. Internalised 
payments are not sent through CHAPS, so internalisation decreases 
both the numerator and the denominator in our measure of node risk – 
but the decrease is stronger in the denominator. As a result, the more 
internalised payments a bank has, the smaller the impact of making 
other settlement banks their customer banks on node risk. The 
increase when either major settlement bank 1 or 2 capture the new 
customer banks is practically identical.
13 There is little day-to-day 
variation in concentration risk within our sample. The coefficient of 
variation is low, ranging between 0.02 and 0.03 in all our scenarios. 
 
                                          
13 The change in our node risk measure as settlement banks become customer banks is 
made up of an increase in the numerator and a decrease in the denominator (total values 
settled) due to internalised transactions. This change in the denominator makes potential 
statistical relationships between overall values settled in CHAPS and node risk hard to 
interpret, despite obvious correlation coefficients. For this reason, we do not figure the 
relationship between values settled and node risk.  
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6.4.2 Credit  risk 
We measure the increase in credit risk in the different scenarios by 
taking the maximum intraday liquidity that banks currently need as 
direct CHAPS members to be able to settle all transactions on a gross 
basis in real time. CHAPS settlement banks have to post collateral to 
access intraday credit from the Bank of England. We know that it is 
common practice in the United Kingdom to grant customer banks 
unsecured intraday overdraft facilities – especially to large customers. 
Thus, the maximum intraday liquidity currently used by settlement 
banks is likely to be a reasonable measure of the maximum unsecured 
intraday credit that each individual bank would need to obtain from 
their settlement banks if they became indirect CHAPS members. It is 
worth stressing that this would be an upper bound measure: it is 
reasonable to assume that settlement banks would have some degree 
of discretion of when to process their customers’ payments and try to 
avoid building unnecessary credit exposures. Table 6.3 shows the 
monthly average of maximum intraday liquidity for each settlement 
bank that becomes a customer bank. 
  The first point to emerge from this table is that the magnitude of 
the risk is insignificant with respect to the amounts of Tier 1 capital 
held by the three large settlement banks: between GBP 19 and GBP 43 
billion. This finding is consistent with Harrison et al (2005) who 
conclude that in normal market conditions the risk to settlement banks 
from their intraday credit exposures to second-tier banks appears to be 
low. Interpreting these results, one should bear in mind that these 
figures are monthly averages of intraday maxima – the exposures on 
which the averages are calculated may have lasted for only a few 
seconds each day. And the fact that the mean is in all cases higher 
than the median implies that the distribution is asymmetric, skewed 
towards a relatively small number of high exposures. The coefficients 
of variation displayed in Table 6.3 range between 0.46 and 0.78, 




Table 6.3  Maximum intraday credit that would have 





Maximum intraday credit 
(GBP million) 
























volume   
1 253  (135)  0.53  248  0.5%  1.2%  9.7  31.7  0.23 
2 385  (177)  0.46  367  0.8%  0.9%  9.0  9.0  0.23 
3 770  (421)  0.55  615  0.8%  2.2%  0.0  0.3  0.45 
4 718  (557)  0.78  653  1.9%  7.5%  2.2  1.5  0.18 
5 438  (320)  0.73  341  2.6%  0.7%  0.0  0.0  0.08 
6 1,042  (673)  0.65  860  3.9% 1.8% 12.0  41.3  0.13 
7 735  (486)  0.66  587  6.6%  5.1%  59.9  54.3  0.05 




It is also apparent from Table 6.3 that the size of the exposures is not 
proportional to the share of total CHAPS payment values made up by 
each bank.
14 Bank 3, with 0.8% of CHAPS payments, has similar 
mean peak liquidity usage as bank 7, with 6.6% of CHAPS payments. 
The correlation coefficient between the two series is only 0.52, with 
the ratio varying from 0.05 for bank 7 to 0.45 for bank 3. Economies 
of scale in liquidity usage (described in the next section) could explain 
why credit risk increases less than proportionally with the value of 
CHAPS payments. But they do not explain why two banks with a 
similar share of CHAPS values have different maximum liquidity 
needs. The relative size of each bank’s correspondent business 
(column 5 of Table 6.3) does not emerge as a factor, either. Banks 3 
and 5 have virtually no correspondent business and very different peak 
liquidity usage. The most plausible explanation is that these observed 
variations in liquidity usage may stem from differences in their 
customer base affecting the timing of incoming and outgoing 
payments – if a settlement bank needs to make a large number of 
payments before receiving many payments it has higher peak intraday 
funding needs. 
  The implication of the above analysis is that, unlike in the case of 
node risk, policy-makers interested in reducing credit risk by 
encouraging more second-tier banks to join the payment systems 
cannot rely on the value of sterling payments processed as a reliable 
                                          
14 The correlation coefficient between the median maximum liquidity needed and the 
share of CHAPS payment values is 0.5.  
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measure of potential intraday credit exposure. The key factor 
determining the size of intraday exposures is the intraday pattern of 
payments. Unfortunately, precise data on the intraday pattern of 
payments of customer banks is not usually available to policy-makers, 
making their task hard. 
 
 
6.4.3 Efficiency  gains 
Compared with Deferred Net Settlement (DNS) systems, RTGS 
systems reduce credit risk at the expense of increasing liquidity 
costs.
15 Not being able to net off payments increases the liquidity 
needed by each settlement bank and, therefore, the overall liquidity 
needs of the system. In the case of CHAPS, banks obtain liquidity in 
central bank money by posting eligible collateral with the Bank of 
England. 
  As discussed above, tiered payment systems are more 
concentrated. Concentration in payment systems leads to liquidity 
savings due to two effects that go in the same direction: liquidity 
pooling and internalisation of payments. 
 
•  Liquidity pooling: despite the fact that payments cannot be netted 
off in an RTGS system, the larger the number of payments 
received and sent by a given settlement bank, the higher the 
probability that incoming payments fund (totally or partially) 
outgoing payments.
16 This results, on average, in smaller peaks of 
both liquidity needs (when the balance is negative) and liquidity 
surpluses (when the balance is positive). Since we are concerned 
with the average of maximum intraday liquidity needed, we expect 
our scenarios involving fewer but larger settlement banks to show 
a fall in liquidity needed with respect to current CHAPS figures. 
This saving involves no change in the payment values settled 
through CHAPS. 
•  Internalisation: when a settlement bank becomes a customer bank 
of another settlement bank, all transactions between the two (either 
on their own behalf or on that of their customers) that used to go 
through CHAPS are internalised. Since they are no longer sent to 
                                          
15 Selgin (2004) argues that the drive to replace DNS with RTGS systems on credit risk 
grounds in misguided. He claims that the only credit risks arising in DNS systems are 
those granted by the receiving banks to their customers. He also argues that regulators’ 
guarantees distort the market. 
16 Except in very asymmetrical distributions for incoming and outgoing payments.  
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the payment system, the settlement bank does not need to obtain 
intraday credit from the Bank of England to fund them. The 
internalisation effect leads to a decrease in liquidity needed as a 
result of the decrease in values settled through CHAPS. 
 
An estimation of the relative size of each effect is presented in Section 
6.4.5. 
  Figure 6.2 shows the savings in liquidity needs as tiering increases; 
similarly Figure 6.3 shows the savings in liquidity needs relative to the 
decrease in overall values settled in CHAPS for each of our 
simulations. The figures are percentage change relative to current 
values. Different colours represent different scenarios. The three 
scenarios where all new customer banks are assigned to one large 
settlement bank have seven points each, with two extra data points 
(brown in the figure) for the simulations where all seven customer 
banks are assigned to a combination of settlement banks. The data 
points for the ‘assign by value’ and ’assign by volume’ scenarios in 
Figure 6.2 overlap and therefore only one is visible. The liquidity 
needs of the system are defined as the sum of each individual 
settlement bank’s intraday maximum liquidity requirements. As 
tiering increases and the number of CHAPS settlement banks falls, the 
values settled in the system go down. 
 
























































Major settlement bank 1
Major settlement bank 2
Major settlement bank 3
3 major settlement banks (a)
3 major settlement banks (b)
increase in tiering: no. of banks 
 
Source: Payments database and Bank calculations. 
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Figure 6.3  Percentage changes in liquidity needs in 
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Source: Payments database and Bank calculations. 
 
 
The figure shows that there are substantial liquidity savings associated 
with a reduction in the number of settlement banks (an increase in 
tiering). Moreover, the savings are similar across the different 
scenarios: dots of different colours in the figure are relatively close 
together. The maximum saving is 36% of current liquidity needs when 
all new customer banks are assigned to settlement bank 2. This is 
equivalent to GBP 5.9 billion liquidity. It is apparent from figure that 
there is a close relationship between changes in overall values settled 
in CHAPS and changes in liquidity needs. For a given percentage 
reduction in values settled, the reduction in liquidity needs is 
approximately three times as big. 
  The variation in liquidity savings across the month is higher than 
in the case of node risk but much lower than for credit risk. The 
coefficients of variation in all 23 scenarios range between 0.12 and 




6.4.4  Decrease in tiering: liquidity costs 
The close relationship between values settled and liquidity needs 
found across all scenarios allows us to attempt a forecasting exercise. 
Our interest is to try and gauge how much liquidity would CHAPS  
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need if some large (in terms of values of payments processed) 
customer banks became settlement banks. This boils down to fitting a 
line to the points shown in 3 and projecting it to the positive quadrant 
of the horizontal axis. This will give the increase in liquidity needs 
expected when the degree of tiering in the system decreases and the 
values settled in CHAPS increase. 
  Since no data points from our simulations lie in the positive 
quadrant of the horizontal axis we need to make strong assumptions 
about the functional form of the relationship between positive 
increases in values settled and positive increases in liquidity needs. 
The only information we have at our disposal is the relationship found 
in the negative quadrant. We try three regression specifications: linear, 
quadratic and cubic. The criteria for choosing a particular forecasting 
specification is twofold: goodness of fit to the observed data points 
and plausibility of the predicted values in the positive quadrant. 
  The three regressions fitted the data well, with adjusted R
2 of 0.95 
for the linear equation, 0.99 for the quadratic and 0.99 for the cubic. 
But a quadratic form extended into the positive quadrant resulted in 
implausibly high values of liquidity needs: 100% extra for an increase 
in values settled of 7%. Our chosen functional forms for forecasting 
purposes, therefore, are a linear equation and a cubic equation. The 
cubic equation is used to create a concave mirror image of the convex 
line on the negative quadrant on the positive quadrant. We believe this 
is a plausible functional specification: extra liquidity needs become 
smaller as new banks join CHAPS, just as extra savings become 
smaller as more banks leave the system. 
  The points chosen for the forecast are not arbitrary. They 
correspond to the values that would settle in CHAPS if the largest, 
second largest and up to five largest customer banks joined CHAPS. 
We know the values from the 2003 CHAPS Traffic Survey, a dataset 
that includes the values of transactions settled by current settlement 
banks on behalf of their (anonymised) customer banks.
17 Transactions 
originated by the largest customer bank makes up 4.2% of current 
CHAPS values, and those originated by the five largest customer 
banks make up 15.7%. 
  Figures 6.4 and 6.5 depict the linear and cubic equations 
respectively. In the linear specification, the 95% confidence interval 
                                          
17 The values used are likely to be downward bias. It is plausible to assume that customer 
banks have to make payments to their settlement banks and vice versa – these payments 
will, by definition, be internalised. This internalisation would disappear once the 
customer banks became settlement banks, so the overall values settled through CHAPS 
are likely to be higher.  
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for the coefficient is between 2.7 and 3.3 (with no constant). That 
implies that for any given percentage increase in values settled, the 
percentage of extra liquidity needed is three times as high. This 
assumption becomes less plausible as we predict larger increases – 
one would expect to find some deceleration in the rate of liquidity 
needed as tiering tends towards zero. The cubic specification accounts 
for this deceleration. The linear coefficient lies in a 95% confidence 
interval between 3.74 and 4.43, and the cubic one between -0.012 and 
-0.007. In fact, the deceleration captured by the latter negative 
coefficient is so strong that there is s a slight percentage decrease in 
liquidity needs for the last two points in our forecast. Figure 6.6 
depicts the 95% confidence intervals around the forecast, while Table 
6.4 gives the values of extra liquidity needs that an increase in the 
number of settlement banks would bring about. 
 
Figure 6.4  Predicted changes in liquidity needs based 
      on changes in value settled – linear 
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Figure 6.5  Predicted changes in liquidity needs based 
      on changes in value settled – cubic 
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Source: Payments database and Bank calculations. 
 
 
Figure 6.6  Forecast changes in liquidity needs and 
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Table 6.4  Changes in value settled and changes in 
     liquidity  needs 
 
  Change in values 
settled, per cent ( in 
GBP billion) 
Change in liquidity needs, 
per cent (in GBP billion) 
No. of customer 
banks joining 
CHAPS 
 Linear  Cubic 
1  4.2  (GBP 8.2 bn)  12.6 (GBP 2.1 bn)  16.5 (GBP 2.7 bn) 
2  8.0 (GBP 5.6 bn)  23.9 (GBP 4.0 bn)  27.8 (GBP 4.6 bn) 
3  11.1 (GBP 21.4 bn)  32.9 (GBP 5.4 bn)   32.0 (GBP 5.3 bn) 
4  13.4 (GBP 26.1 bn)  40.0 (GBP 6.6 bn)   31.2 (GBP 5.2 bn) 
5  15.7 (GBP 30.5 bn)  46.7 (GBP 7.7 bn)   26.2 (GBP 4.3 bn) 
Source: Payments database and Bank calculations. 
 
 
How valuable these liquidity savings are depends on how scarce 
liquidity is. Data show that there is a lot of spare liquidity (defined as 
the difference between the maximum liquidity posted intraday and the 
maximum liquidity used intraday) in the system (see Figure 6.7). 
Banks posting more liquidity than needed is an indication that 
liquidity in the system is cheap. This may well be the case, especially 
for UK-owned banks subject to the Sterling Stock Liquidity Regime 
(SLR) by the regulator. Under the SLR, banks must hold a stock of 
eligible liquid assets overnight. The list of eligible assets broadly 
coincides with assets that can be used as collateral to obtain intraday 
credit with the Bank of England. If there is practically no opportunity 
cost in using the eligible assets intraday, then banks may decide to 
post more liquidity than needed. Foreign banks operating in the 
United Kingdom, on the other hand, are subject to a maturity 
mismatch approach, which simply requires that they have incoming 
liquidity to fund known outflows. Intraday liquidity may be more 
expensive for them. 
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June 2005  
Source: Payments database and Bank calculations. 
 
 
In June 2005, the average spare liquidity was GBP 17 billion (GBP 18 
billion median). The standard deviation over the month was GBP 5 
billion. The differences across banks are marked. The settlement bank 
with most spare liquidity had an average of GBP 5 billion, that with 
the least just GBP 10 million. Given these figures, the increase in 
liquidity needs of up to GBP 8 billion suggested by our forecasts do 
not appear, at first glance, a disproportionate price to pay for the 
potential reductions in node and credit risk that a decrease in tiering in 
CHAPS would bring at the system level. On an individual bank basis, 
and given the different price liquidity has for different banks, this 
might not be true. Especially if the joining banks have higher liquidity 
costs that the current members, this would certainly be the case for 
non-UK banks, not subject to SLR requirements. Those banks would 
not be ready to trade off credit risk for liquidity costs and some policy 
action (such as extensions of eligible collateral, use of cross-border 




6.4.5  Liquidity pooling vs internalisation 
The liquidity gains observed in a more tiered system can stem from 
either an increase in the pooling of liquidity of from internalisation of 
payments. To our knowledge, no paper in the literature has estimated 
which of these two effects drives the savings. 
  We cannot disentangle the proportion of liquidity gains due to 
pooling and to internalisation with absolute precision. The reason for 
this ambiguity is that the amount saved at each transaction will depend 
crucially on the liquidity position of the settlement bank at the precise 
point in time when the payment takes place. But we can calculate the 
upper and lower bound for the proportion of savings due to each 
effect. This information will give a clear indication of each factor’s 
relative size. The appendix gives a detailed explanation of how the 
intervals are calculated and why they are the closest we can get to 
quantifying the relative savings due to pooling and to internalisation. 
  Our results show that the vast majority of liquidity savings are 
caused by pooling. Table 6.5 displays the estimated intervals for the 
proportion of liquidity savings in CHAPS that are due to each factor. 
The average is calculated as the daily mean over our sample period 
and across all scenarios. Pooling is, on average, eight times bigger 
than internalisation. Table 6.5 also presents the upper and lower bound 
for the minimum (maximum) daily savings for the scenario with the 
minimum (maximum) savings. The lower bound of the minimum 
savings due to pooling (63%) is clearly higher than the upper bound of 
the maximum savings due to internalisation (37%). We can therefore 
be certain that liquidity pooling accounts for most of the savings 
observed. 
 
Table 6.5  Estimated range of savings due to 
      internalisation and to liquidity pooling 
 
 Internalisation  Liquidity  pooling 
Average 1%–22%  78%–99% 
Minimum 0%–2%  63%–96% 
Maximum 4%–37%  98%–100% 
Source: Payments database and Bank calculations. 
 
 
Finally, Figures 6.8 and 6.9 show that the proportion of savings due to 
internalisation increases with the number of new customer banks 
assigned to each major settlement bank. 
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Figure 6.8  Liquidity savings due to pooling (%) when 
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Source: Payments database and Bank calculations. 
 
 
Figure 6.9  Liquidity savings due to pooling (%) when 













One Two Three Four Five Six Seven  
Source: Payments database and Bank calculations.  
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6.5 Conclusions 
This paper uses a simulation approach to quantify the impact of a 
change in the degree of tiering in the structure of  the United Kingdom 
large-value payment system on node risk, credit risk and liquidity 
efficiency. It does so by creating artificial scenarios where the number 
of direct participants in CHAPS Sterling is reduced one by one, thus 
increasing the degree of tiering. The new customer banks are assigned 
to either one or a combination of the large (by value of payments 
processed) settlement banks. 
  The results show that node risk would rise substantially in what is 
already a highly concentrated system. The increase in risk is slightly 
smaller than the share of payments accounted for by the settlement 
banks becoming customer banks because of internalisation effects. As 
for credit risk, our figures have confirmed previous analysis at the 
Bank that, under normal circumstances, the size of intraday exposures 
compared with the settlement bank’s capital is very small and 
therefore the likelihood of contagion remote. But, more importantly, 
our analysis has shown that the increase in credit risk brought to the 
system by settlement banks leaving CHAPS bears little relationship to 
the values settled by each individual bank. The key determining factor 
of the size of intraday credit exposures is the pattern of intraday flows 
of second-tier banks – a variable that central banks do not observe. 
  Increasing the degree of tiering in CHAPS leads to substantial 
liquidity savings. Our analysis has shown that the vast majority of the 
savings are due to liquidity pooling rather than internalisation. 
Moreover, the clear relationship between changes in values settled and 
liquidity needs shown by our simulations make it possible to project 
what would happen if current customer banks joined CHAPS as 
settlement banks. We estimate that liquidity needs could increase by 
GBP 8 billion in aggregate if as many as five large banks (in terms of 
values of payments processed) joined CHAPS. While this figure is 
significant, it is only a fraction of the GBP 17 billion spare liquidity 
posted on average in the system as a whole during the same time 
period. On an individual bank basis however, given the different cost 
liquidity has for different banks, this might not be true. Some banks 
would not be ready to trade-off credit risk for liquidity costs. Liquidity 
cost/risk and efficiency benefits of not in and of themselves make a 
tiered system optional from a welfare perspective. 
  Two possible extensions of this paper stand out as promising. One 
involves simulating operational outages of individual banks in the 
more concentrated scenarios in order to analyse how robust CHAPS  
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would be in terms of liquidity compared with the current situation. 
This exercise will complement the direct effects of an individual 
bank’s operational outage (share of payments usually settled by that 
bank that are disrupted) by adding second-order disruptions through 
potential liquidity shortages in the system. A second possible avenue 
for further work is to model the relationship between settlement banks 
and the new customer banks as an ancillary system. Such an exercise 
would provide us with a more detailed picture of the sources of 




Bedford, P – Millard, S – Yang, J (2004) Assessing operational risk 
in CHAPS Sterling: a simulation approach. Bank of England 
Financial Stability Review, December, 135–143. 
 
Flannery, M J. (1996) Financial Crises, Payment System Problems, 
and Discount Window Lending. In Controlling Risks on Large-
Value Transfer Systems. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 
Vol. 28, No. 4, Part 2: Payment Systems Research and Public 
Policy Risk, Efficiency, and Innovation, November, 804–824. 
 
Harrison, S – Lasaosa, A – Tudela, M (2005) Tiering in UK payment 
systems. Bank of England Financial Stability Review, June, 63–
72. 
 
Jackson, J – Manning, M (2006) Central bank intra-day collateral 
policy and implications for tiering in RTGS payment systems. 
mimeo. 
 
James, K (2003) A statistical overview of CHAPS Sterling. Bank of 
England Financial Stability Review, June, 115–121. 
 
Kahn, C M – Roberds, M (2005) Payments settlement: tiering in 
private and public systems. University of Illinois and Federal 
Reserve Bank of Atlanta, mimeo. 
 
Leinonen, H (2005) Liquidity, risks and speed in payment and 
settlement systems – a simulation approach. Bank of Finland 
Studies E:31, 49–57. 
 
Selgin, G (2004) Wholesale Payments: Questioning the market-





Liquidity pooling vs internalisation 
As stated in the main body of the paper, concentration in payment 
systems leads to liquidity savings because of two effects: 
internalisation of payments and liquidity pooling. When more 
payments are internalised, the settlement bank does not need to find 
the liquidity to fund them and the liquidity needs of the system 
decrease. And a settlement bank with a larger number of transactions 
is likelier to have incoming payments funding its outgoing 
transactions. As a result, the maximum liquidity need intraday is likely 
to be lower. 
  In practice, though, it is very difficult to disentangle both effects 
since the origin of the precise liquidity savings at any point in time 
during a day depends crucially on the liquidity position of the 
settlement bank at that point in time. A payment sent, say, from 
settlement bank A to settlement bank B will be internalised if 
settlement bank A becomes a customer of settlement bank B. This, in 
theory, could reduce the liquidity needs of settlement bank B. But it 
will not do so if bank B was already in liquidity surplus when the 
saving took place. We need to bear in mind that liquidity needs are 
defined as the intraday maximum, not average. Conversely, a potential 
saving caused by liquidity pooling may not affect the maximum 
intraday liquidity needs if the settlement bank was already in surplus. 
In what follows we run through a stylised example that attempts to 
disentangle these two effects. 
  Table A6.1 lists the payment structure in a very simple system 
with four settlement banks and eight transactions at different times 
within the day. We call this ‘the benchmark model’. We are interested 
in comparing the liquidity needs in the benchmark model with the 
liquidity needs in a situation when bank AA becomes a customer bank 
of bank MM and all payments between them are internalised. We have 
set up the transactions in such a way that we only need to compare the 
liquidity needs of bank MM before and after AA becomes its 
customer bank to see how the liquidity needs of the system changes. 
AA starts receiving money before having to send any payments AA 
always has surplus liquidity, thus not affecting the maximum intraday 
liquidity needs of the system. The comparison is not affected by the 
liquidity needs of BB and CC, either – they are the same before and 
after AA becomes MM’s customer bank. 
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Table A6.1  Payments structure – benchmark model 
 
Time Payer Payee  Amount 
1 MM  AA  90 
2 MM  CC  10 
3 BB  AA  50 
4 MM  AA  25 
5 CC  AA  100 
6 AA  BB  10 
7 AA  MM  10 
8 MM  BB  100 
 
 
Table A6.2 calculates the liquidity needs under different calculations. 
As explained we can just focus of MM‘s liquidity needs for 
comparison purposes. 
 
Table A6.2  Liquidity needs 
 
Benchmark 




As benchmark but 
excluding payments 
between AA and MM 
[A] [B]  [C] 
Time  Net debit  Time  Net debit  Time  Net debit 
1 90  1  0  1 0 
2 100  2  10  2 10 
3 100  3  -40  3 10 
4 125  4  -40  4 10 
5 125  5  -140  5 10 
6 125  6  -130  6 10 
7 115  7  -130  7 10 
8 215  8  -30  8  110 
          
Maximum liquidity needs to be able to settle all transactions in RTGS 
 215   10   110 
 
 
The first two columns in Table A6.2 refer to the benchmark situation 
(when AA is a direct CHAPS member). Each row gives, after each 
transaction, the net debit position of bank MM. For example, after 
transaction 1, MM bank is in a net debit position of 90 (since it has to 
pay to AA 90 without having received any payment yet). At time 2, 
MM has to make a further payment of 10, increasing its net debit 
position to 100. No modifications occur after transaction 3 since it 
does not involve bank MM. After transaction 4, MM has to make  
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another payment of 25 further increasing its net debit position to 125. 
Transactions 5 and 6 do not affect MM’s net debit position, whereas 
transaction 7 decreases it to 115 due to the payment of 10 received 
from AA. There is a further increase in MM’s net debit position of 
100 to 215 after transaction 8. The maximum liquidity need is 
therefore 215. 
  It is plausible to think that the difference between calculations [A] 
and [C] would give us the liquidity savings due to internalised 
payments. The only difference between those two calculations is the 
payments between the settlement bank and the bank to become 
customer of the settlement bank; this gives a saving in liquidity of 105 
(215–110). Likewise, the difference in liquidity needs between 
calculations [B] and [C] would show the savings in liquidity due to 
liquidity pooling. The difference between that pair of calculations 
corresponds to the transactions between any other settlement bank and 
the new customer bank. This gives a savings in liquidity of 100 (110–
10). The total savings in liquidity are thus 205 (215–10), that is, the 
sum of liquidity savings due to internalisation and the liquidity 
savings due to liquidity pooling. 
  Let us consider now one more calculation [D], as in Table A6.3 as 
shown below: the liquidity needs of the system when AA becomes a 
customer bank of MM but the payments between them continue to be 
sent to RTGS. We could assume now that the difference between 
calculations [D] and [A] would give us the liquidity savings due to 
liquidity pooling, since in calculations [D] we do not allow for 
internalisation. Liquidity savings are now 125 (215–90). 
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Table A6.3  – extra column: Liquidity needs 
 
AA customer of MM, payments between 
them sent to RTGS 
[D] 













Maximum liquidity needs to be able to settle 




The difference in liquidity needs between calculations [D] and [B] 
could be interpreted as savings in liquidity due to internalisation only. 
This yields a value of 80 (90–10). Adding the savings due to liquidity 
pooling and internalisation savings gives again total liquidity savings. 
  As we can see, these two methods of disentangling the liquidity 
savings yield different results. The reason for the difference is that 
when using columns [A], [B] and [C], we are assigning all savings 
whose cause we cannot identify to internalisation. When we use 
columns [A], [B] and [D], by contrast, we assigned them to liquidity 
pooling. We therefore conclude then that we cannot disentangle the 
liquidity savings due to internalisation and to liquidity pooling with 
absolute precision. We are able, though, to calculate upper and lower 
bounds for the estimates of the savings due to either internalisation or 
pooling in each of our scenarios. In the example presented above, the 
lower bound for internalisation savings is given by D–B (80), and 
upper bound by A–C (105). The lower bound for savings due to 
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7 Risk  concentration,  network 
structure and contagion in the 
Austrian Real Time Interbank 
Settlement System 
Abstract 
The objectives of this paper are twofold: First, we present a statistical 
analysis of liquidity, risk concentration and network structure in the 
Austrian Real Time Interbank Settlement system (ARTIS). Second, 
we quantify the contagion effect of an operational incident at one of 
the participants’ sites on the other participants of ARTIS by use of 
simulations. The main result of the statistical analysis is that in general 
the value and number of payments received and submitted were quite 
concentrated among the top three banks and the top transfer account in 
the ARTIS system during the sample period. With respect to the 
second objective of the paper, the simulation analysis focuses on 
operational problems occurring in the realm of one of the participants. 
The main finding of the simulations was that the contagion effect on 
the smooth functioning of the payment system was substantial in all 
three scenarios. In contrast to the literature, we operate with actual 
rather than simulated liquidity data and study the contagion effect 
based on the individual bank level in addition to the aggregate level of 
unsettled payments. Moreover, the paper provides results on features 
of large value payment systems that have hitherto gone unstudied in 
the literature: the stop sending rule and debit authorisation. 
 
 
7.1  Motivation and objectives 
The first objective of this paper is to present descriptive statistics on 
ARTIS and a statistical analysis of liquidity and risk concentration as 
well as of the network structure in ARTIS. Despite the growing 
research literature on payment systems, very little statistical analysis 
of large value payment systems is available internationally.
1 This 
                                          
1 Notable exceptions are James (2003) and the papers published in Leinonen (2005).  
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paper helps to fill this gap. Furthermore, data on the concentration of 
risk is an important input in payment system oversight. As such it 
forms the basis for the assessment of operational risk in ARTIS – the 
second objective of this paper. Aggregate liquidity in the system is 
comparatively high, so operational incidents might not have a severe 
contagious impact. The purpose of this paper is to take this conjecture 
to the data and quantify contagion in ARTIS. The simulations 
employed have to focus on operational risk at institutions with most 
payment activity and liquidity. The analysis of operational risk is a 
basic task of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) as well as 
of the Oesterreichische Nationalbank (OeNB), namely the promotion 
of the smooth operation of the payment system (Maastricht Treaty 
Article 105 (2) and ESCB Statute Article 3 (1)). The OeNB is in 
charge of payment system oversight in Austria. The mandate includes 
oversight over ARTIS, which is also the Austrian component of the 
Trans-European Automated Real-time Gross Settlement Express 
Transfer System (TARGET). The analysis is based on transactions 
and collateral data for November 2004.
2 
  The second objective of this paper is to quantify the impact of an 
operational incident at one of the participants in ARTIS on the ability 
of other participants to settle transactions by use of simulations. In this 
project we do not simulate an operational failure of the ARTIS 
platform itself. Operational risk is defined as ’the risk that operational 
factors such as technical malfunctions or operational mistakes will 
cause or exacerbate credit or liquidity risk’; CPSS (2001). The 
simulations utilise real data for the sample period November 2004 and 
map the basic functionalities of ARTIS onto the simulation tool as 
closely as possible. The scenarios are designed according to the 
estimation of potential risk concentrations based on actual data for the 
sample period. Nevertheless, one must bear in mind that the results 
reported are the output of simulation experiments based on stylised 
operational failures rather than historical events. Operational incidents 
where disruptions exceeded a few hours among ARTIS participants 
have occurred too rarely and with too little impact on payment activity 
to provide a reliable data basis for an empirical assessment of 
operational risk based on the system’s and the participants’ data 
history. 
  The paper is structured along the following lines. In Section 7.2 we 
present the data on participation, transactions and liquidity in ARTIS; 
                                          
2 November 2004 was chosen as typical month of ARTIS activity; the results reported are 
not time sensitive.  
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in Section 7.3 we analyse concentration risk and the network structure 
in ARTIS; Section 7.4 describes the scenarios, presents the respective 
results and compares these across scenarios; Section 7.5 discusses 
their implications and Section 7.6 summarises the results and 
concludes the paper. 
 
 
7.2  Participation, transactions and liquidity in 
ARTIS 
This section provides basic statistical data for ARTIS for the sample 
period to lay the foundations for the simulation analysis in Section 
7.3. More detailed statistical data for ARTIS can be found in Schmitz 




In November 2004 the system had a total of 575 accounts, which were 
held by banks, the federal government, non-financial companies and 
the OeNB itself. A large number of accounts were offset accounts (eg 
accounts of Geld Service Austria (GSA), a partial OeNB subsidiary in 
charge of cash distribution in Austria) and transfer accounts (eg 
transfer accounts that link ARTIS to the other national components of 
TARGET).
3 Austrian and international banks held 234 transaction 
accounts (excluding international institutions like the Bank for 
International Settlement, the International Monetary Fund and non-EU 




Throughout November 2004 the average daily value of payments 
submitted in ARTIS amounted to EUR 32.6 billion.
4 The value was 
quite volatile, with a standard deviation of EUR 7.7 billion, which can 
be partly explained by three days significantly below the mean: 1 
                                          
3 Transfer accounts are ARTIS accounts held by other ESCB central banks at OeNB. All 
national TARGET components are directly linked by transfer accounts. All transactions 
to and from the respective country and Austria are routed via these transfer accounts. 
4 Throughout the paper all values are rounded to one decimal place, which may lead to 
rounding errors at some points.  
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November (All Saints’ Day, a public holiday in Austria), 11 
November (US Bank Holiday, Veterans’ Day) and 25 November (US 
Bank Holiday, Thanksgiving). The total amount of transactions 
submitted in the period was EUR 717.4 billion, which amounted to 
roughly three times nominal GDP in 2004. 
 
 
7.2.3 Aggregate  liquidity 
The aggregate liquidity in the system exceeded actual use of liquidity, 
which could lead to the conclusion that it was sufficient, especially as 
all transactions submitted were settled and no accounts experienced 
liquidity shortages that would have led to unsettled transactions at 
closing time (06:00:00 pm). The average daily aggregate liquidity in 
the system – defined as beginning of day balances plus collateral 
available – equalled EUR 16.8 billion (Figure 7.1). 
 
Figure 7.1  Daily values for aggregate liquidity and its 
      components – collateral, daily balance at 
      the beginning of the day and value of 
      transactions – in November 2004 
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Total liquidity was the sum of two components: daily beginning-of-
day balances with a mean of EUR 6 billion and available collateral 
with a mean of EUR 10.4 billion. We interpret available collateral as a  
188 
component of total liquidity in the system, although system 
participants must apply for daylight overdraft limits to liquidise it. 
However, pecuniary transaction costs of this procedure are zero and in 
terms of non-pecuniary transaction costs (ie time delay) they are 
effectively zero. In order to assess the aggregate liquidity stance of the 
system, we calculated indicators of liquidity usage. Firstly, aggregate 
collateral usage is defined as the share of available collateral that was 
liquidised by applying for daylight overdraft limits. With an average 
daylight overdraft limit of EUR 3.5 billion actually liquidised, average 
aggregate collateral usage amounted to 33.7%. 
  Secondly, the liquidity usage indicator measures the share of 
submitted transactions, which were settled by running down available 
liquidity rather than by received payments.
5 This ranges from 0 to 1, 
as its numerator is the difference between the beginning-of-day 
balance and the minimum balance during the day, and its denominator 
is the sum of all payments settled (see appendix). In our sample the 
indicator had a mean of 30% and a standard deviation of 3%. On 
average (across participants and across days), about one third of all 
settled transactions were covered by available liquidity and about two 
thirds by liquidity from received payments. 
 
 
7.2.4 Disaggregate  liquidity 
Despite sufficient aggregate liquidity, individual accounts were 
occasionally illiquid and payment delays occurred frequently.
6 
Throughout an average day payments with a total value of EUR 1.4 
billion were queued (standard deviation EUR 0.6 billion or about 40% 
of the mean). They could not be settled immediately due to liquidity 
shortages of the submitting accounts. The settlement delay indicator 
averaged 0.16 across days, so that on average a submitted payment 
was queued for 16% of its potential queuing time. 
  The disaggregated analysis of liquidity usage revealed that 
liquidity usage was highly heterogeneous across participants. Only 18 
banks (out of 234) made active use of daylight overdraft limits on at 
least one day in November 2004 (Figure 7.2). 
 
                                          
5 The calculations of the liquidity usage indicator were conducted by using the Bank of 
Finland’s Payment System Simulator BoF-PSS2. 
6 These results are based on the simulation of normal payment activity with real 
transactions and liquidity data for the sample period as reported queuing times were not 
available.  
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Figure 7.2  Disaggregated analysis of daily usage of 
      collateral by individual banks in ARTIS in 
     November  2004 
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NB Values in excess of 100% are due to additional short-term collateral supply by 
individual banks, which are not included in the daily averages of collateral posted 
on which the analysis is based. All daylight overdrafts must be fully collateralised 
at all times. The bank codes have been changed for this figure to make inference 
from the data on extent of collateral usage by individual banks impossible. 
 
 
On average, 14.4 banks applied for daylight overdrafts per day. While 
the average overdraft limit across days and across the 18 banks 
corresponded to 26.3% of available collateral, the standard deviation 
was 31.2%. Eleven banks applied for daylight overdraft limits of up to 
20% of their available liquidity on average, four banks of 20% to 50% 
and only three for more than 50% of their available collateral. 
  As liquidity is usually held as a buffer in case of unexpected large 
outflows of payments, the maximum daylight overdraft limits by 
individual banks throughout the month provide a better indication of 
individual collateral usage. Indeed, the average maximum daylight 
overdraft limit across banks amounted to 65.9% of individual 
available collateral (standard deviation 35.6%). Only one participant 
had a maximum value of below 20%, six had values between 20% and 
50% and the remaining eleven values above 50%. Two participants  
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even had maximum values of above 100%.
7 To sum up, the 
disaggregated analysis of collateral usage suggests that some banks 
actually used their individual liquidity reserves intensively. These 
results demonstrate that conclusions drawn from aggregate liquidity 
data do not necessarily apply to the individual participant level. 
 
 
7.3  Risk concentration and network structure in 
ARTIS 
An analysis of risk concentration and network structure lays the 
foundation for the scenario design in Section 7.4. To identify the 
accounts that carried most risk, we first looked at measures of risk 
concentration: the value of liquidity concentrated at these nodes 
(liquidity concentration channel), the number and value of payments 
submitted and received (payment concentration channel) and the 
Herfindahl index of concentration of payment flows (both based on 
the number of payments and the value of payments received and 
submitted). Second, we analysed the network topology of the system. 
We did so for the monthly network as well as the daily networks. 
  Aggregate liquidity was highly concentrated in ARTIS. The 
liquidity concentration risk focuses on the share of liquidity 
(beginning-of-day balances plus collateral) a participant holds at the 
beginning of the day. The top three banks held almost half of the 
liquidity in the system, with individual values ranging from 11.1 to 
22.5% of total liquidity (Figure 7.3). 
 
                                          
7 Despite the strict principle of full collateralisation of daylight overdraft limits, this is 
possible for the following reason: while we do have data on maximum daylight 
overdrafts, we do not have data on maximum daily available collateral. Data on the latter 
is available for the stock at 00:00:00 am for each day. Changes during the day in 
collateral that are reversed on the same day are therefore not reflected in the data; changes 
that carry over to the next day are measured ex-post. In order to capture these at least 
partly on the day they occur, we use daily averages for available collateral over two 
consecutive days. In the very few cases of large relative changes in available collateral, 
this leads to daylight overdrafts that seemingly exceed available collateral, although this 
in fact cannot take place.  
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Figure 7.3  Liquidity concentration risk for the top 































Top 3 combined Account Bank A Account Bank B Account Bank C  
 
 
In general, payments were quite concentrated in the ARTIS system in 
the sample period. Payment concentration risk (’node risk’) can be 
measured by reference to the value or to the number of transactions.
8 
The share of the top three accounts of the total value of payments 
amounts to 49.4% and the share of the top five to 61.3%. In terms of 
the number of payments, concentration was much lower. The top three 
submitted and received 31.9% of the number of all payments and the 
top five 45.1%. While the values for the share of an individual bank in 
the total value of payments for the top three banks ranged from 13.9% 
to 18.8%, the corresponding individual node risks based on the total 
number of payments were only 8.4% to 13.8%. This indicates that the 
payments submitted and received by the most active accounts were 
also larger than those submitted and received by the less active 
accounts. 
  The Herfindahl Index (see appendix) for the value of payments for 
all 575 accounts was 0.0955. If the values of payments had been 
distributed uniformly, the index value would have been 0.0017 (or 
1/575). The index was 56 times as large, whereby the conclusion of a 
non-uniform distribution and a concentration of payments was 
supported (Figure 7.4). 
                                          
8 James (2003).  
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Figure 7.4  Node risk and Herfindahl coefficient based 































































Node Risk in % Herfindahl Coefficient (RHS)
 
NB Only the top 20 accounts are included in the graphs. 
 
 
The Herfindahl Index for the number of payments was 0.0530 and 31 
times as large as the value compatible with a uniform distribution. The 
number of payments was therefore not uniformly distributed among 
accounts either (Figure 7.5). Additionally, the lower value of the 
Herfindahl Index for the number of payments is another indication for 




Figure 7.5  Node risk and Herfindahl coefficient based 






























































Node Risk in % Herfindahl Coefficient (RHS)
 
NB: Only the top 20 accounts are included in the graphs. 
 
 
The finding of a high concentration of payment activity is supported 
by the analysis of the network structure among the top 32 participating 
banks.
9 Only the three most active accounts (Banks A, B and C) 
received payments from any of the other 31 banks among the top 32 
on at least one day throughout the month, while the other top 32 banks 
received payments from an average of 17.9 other banks (Figure 7.6). 
The top three also received payments in excess of EUR 10 million 
from 16 to 18 other banks in the subsample on average (across days), 
while the average for the other banks was roughly 3.3. 
 
                                          
9 Only the most active 32 banks (with a Herfindahl index exceeding 0.000049) were 
included in this analysis.  
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Figure 7.6  Network structure of payments received 
      within the network of the 32 most active 
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A similar picture was presented by the network analysis of the 
payments submitted. Bank B submitted payments to any of the other 
31 banks among the top 32 on at least one day throughout the month 
and Banks A and C to 30. The average of the remaining banks in the 
subsample was 18 (Figure 7.7). The top three also submitted payments 
in excess of EUR 10 million to 14 to 19 other banks in the subsample 
on average (across days), the other banks only to 3.3 on average. 
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Figure 7.7  Network structure of payments submitted 
      within the network of the 32 most active 
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The analysis revealed that the most active banks, A, B and C, formed 
the core of the network structure among banks in the ARTIS system in 
terms of the value and number of payments received and submitted as 
well as connections to other banks throughout the month. A similar 
analysis of a subsample of the 51 most active accounts (including 
offset/transfer accounts) revealed that the most active transfer account 
(Transfer Account 1) also held a special position within the network 
structure.
10 In terms of other accounts it transacted with as well as 
large value payments (in excess of EUR 10 million) it was far less 
central to the network than the top three banks but still a cut above the 
rest. 
  The network structure throughout the month is a good first 
indication for scenario design. However, as the scenarios apply to 
individual days, we take a closer look at daily network topology.
11 
Table 7.1 summarises the results for the entire network at the network 
level. 
 
                                          
10 Only the most active 51 accounts (with a Herfindahl index exceeding 0.000049) were 
included in this analysis. 
11 In the following analyses, we use the set of indicators of network topology and the 
notation of Soramäki et al (2006) in order to facilitate the comparison of the results.  
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Table 7.1  Network Topology in ARTIS 
      (across days for the entire network) 
 
 Mean  Median  Minimum  Maximum Standard 
Deviation 
Payments         
Volume of transactions  15,246.1  15,654  5,532  19,800  2,646.6 
Value of transactions 
(EUR million) 
32,608.6 34,376.5  15,354  43,403  8,701.4 













Size         
Nodes  575 – 575 575  – 
Active nodes n  193.5  192  172  218  9.3 
Links m  1,421.6  1,447  700  1,556  167 
Connectivity p (in %)  3.8%  3.9%  2.4%  4.2%  0.4% 
Reciprocity r (in %)  21.2%  21.4%  18%  22.6%  1.1% 
Distance  measures         
Average path length l  2.2  2.2  1.8  2.3  0.1 
Average eccentricity ε  3.0 3.0 2.3  3.8  0.3 
Diameter  D  5.7 6.0 5.0  7.0  0.6 
Degrees         
Average degree k  7.3  7.5  4.1  7.8  0.8 
Max out-degree  78.1  78.5  63  87  5.5 
Max in-degree  77.8  74.5  71  130  12.1 
NB Mathematical definitions of the indicators are provided in the appendix. 
 
 
The average volume of transactions per day was 15,246 (standard 
deviation 2,647). The average value of transactions per day came to 
EUR 32,609 million (standard deviation of EUR 7,701 million). The 
average transaction size was EUR 2.2 million (standard deviation 
EUR 0.4 million). The size of the network is defined by the number of 
nodes n. There were 575 accounts in ARTIS in November 2004, but 
the average number of active nodes was only 193.5 (standard 
deviation 9.3). The active nodes were linked by an average of 1,422 
links (m). The connectivity p of the network is captured by the 
number of actual links relative to the number of possible links. 
Connectivity p averaged 3.8% (of all possible links). It ranged from 
2.4% to 4.2%, and its standard deviation was 0.4. Reciprocity r 
captures the extent to which existing links are bidirectional rather than 
unidirectional. In ARTIS about one-fifth of the existing links were 
bidirectional, the rest were active in one direction only. 
  An indicator of the distance between nodes is the lowest possible 
number of links that connect each (active) node with each other 
(active) node in the network. It is referred to as shortest path length. 
We calculated the average path length for each (active) originating  
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node by averaging across terminating nodes and then averaged across 
originating nodes to derive the average path length l of the entire 
network. Across days this value equals 2.2. This means it only takes 
slightly more than two links to reach any terminating node in the 
network from any originating node in the network. The network is 
compact, mostly because almost all active nodes are linked to the 
largest banks. This network structure is quite stable across days as the 
standard deviation is low at 0.1. This conjecture is supported by the 
average eccentricity ε which is defined as the maximum path length 
averaged across nodes. In our system it is 3, hereby – it takes – at 
most – three links from the average originating node to reach any 
terminating node in the network (standard deviation 0.3). As to 
maximum eccentricity across nodes, defined as diameter D, picking an 
originating node at the very fringe of the network and counting the 
lowest possible number of links to the terminating node that is furthest 
away from it yields 5.7 links (standard deviation 0.6). 
  How well are the nodes connected to each other in the network? 
This is captured by the average degree k of the network which is 
calculated by summing across all (active) links originating from each 
node and then averaging across nodes.
12 This results in the measure 
m/n. Averaged also across days, it amounts to 7.3 in the ARTIS 
system (standard deviation 0.8). Pick an active node on a random day 
in November 2004 and it can be expected to have 7.3 links originating 
(or terminating) at it. However, the most active nodes have a much 
larger number of links originating and terminating at them. The 
maximum out-degree averages 78.1 across days, so that the most 
active node on each day has about 11 times as many links originating 
from it than the average node. The maximum in-degree (77.8) is 
correspondingly much higher than the average degree.
13 
  In Figures 7.6 and 7.7 we presented the number of active links 
between banks within the network of the most active 32 banks across 
the whole month, ie the link was active on at least one day during the 
month. How does the picture change when we consider the average 
number of active links across days? For the subsample, the average 
degree k increases to 9.8. The maximum out-degree is 25.3 and the 
maximum in-degree 26.1. Thus on an average day the most active 
                                          
12 The out-degree refers to the number of links originating at the node while the in-degree 
is based on the number of links terminating at the node. Across the network the average 
out- and in-degree are equal to m/n. 
13 The large standard deviation of the in-degree is due to All Saints Day which is a public 
holiday in Austria but not all federal states of Germany where some markets and banks 
remain open.  
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bank submits payments to 81% of the other banks in the subsample 
and receives payments from 84% of them. 
  Which are the most active accounts in the network based on daily 
indicators of network topology for individual nodes? In order to 
design the scenarios for the simulations in section four, we calculated 
a number of indicators of network topology for individual accounts. 
The three most active banks in Figures 7.6 and 7.7 also had the 
highest daily average of links originating (out-degree 
out
i k ) and 
terminating at them (in-degree 
in
i k ). They submitted payments to 
between 64 and 76 other banks in the entire network on an average 
day, while the next largest submitted to only 41. Furthermore, they 
received payments from between 63 and 72 other banks, while the 
fourth largest bank only linked to 50. Even more significant the out-
/in-degrees of the most active bank were about 10 times the average 
for all banks (7.3). The most active transfer account showed lower 
values than the top three banks but was still a cut above the other 
accounts (out-degree 69, in-degree 45). The four most active accounts 
featured average path lengths in the entire system across days of 
below 1.7, while the next lowest value was 1.9. The average path 
length for the whole network was 2.2. 
  To sum up, on the basis of the various measures of activity – the 
value of liquidity concentrated at these nodes (liquidity concentration 
channel), the number and value of payments submitted and received 
(payment concentration channel), and the Herfindahl index of 
concentration of payment flows (both based on the number of 
payments and the value of payments received and submitted) as well 
as network topology – the most active accounts were the same three 
banks and the most active transfer account.
14 This assessment holds 
true for the entire month as well as for each individual day. 
 
 
7.4 The  simulations 
Potential contagion within payment systems is one of the reasons for 
the liquidity regulation of banks and for the lender-of-last-resort role 
of central banks. It is argued that the illiquidity of an individual bank 
can lead to liquidity problems at other banks. Illiquidity causes a non-
individually attributable negative externality, a kind of market failure. 
Section 7.2 provided evidence that aggregate liquidity is quite high in 
                                          
14 See Schmitz and Ittner (2007).  
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ARTIS, which might lead to the hypothesis that the contagious impact 
of operational problems would be quite low. The purpose of the 
simulations is to investigate the empirical relevance of contagion in 
ARTIS and to quantify it in terms of value and volume of payments 
unsettled and in terms of the number of banks affected. 
  What does the data reveal about the contagion risk within the 
system with respect to the operational failure of one of the 
participants? Two channels via which operational incidents at one of 
the participants can have contagious effects on other participants can 
be distinguished: the payment concentration channel and the liquidity 
concentration channel.
15 The former focuses on the number of 
payments a participant is involved in as either submitter or receiver, 
the latter on the share of liquidity (beginning-of-day balances plus 
collateral) a participant holds at the beginning of the day. 
  To quantify either risk and its adverse effects, we conducted a 
large number of simulations based on three different scenarios for all 
transaction days in November 2004 with the Bank of Finland Payment 
System Simulator (BoF-PSS2). The simulator thereby recalculates 
each day’s transactions by adding incoming payments to and 
subtracting outgoing payments from the participants’ respective 
accounts. As transactions in the input data set provide time stamps, the 
simulator recalculates the balances of all participants to the system 
throughout the day, depending on the institutional features of the 
system (eg settlement algorithm, queue release mechanism). We could 
implement many of these directly by the parameterisation of the BoF-
PSS2. However, some of the institutional features of the system could 
not be accounted for in the simulator and had to be mapped into the 
input data set. In addition, the simulator cannot take into account the 
behavioural reactions of system participants. Consequently, all 
relevant behavioural reactions of system participants must be 
determined exogenously by mapping them into the input data set. 
Nevertheless, this tool is widely used in studies of operational risk. 
For example, Bedford, Millard and Yang (2004) present findings in 
which the contagion effect of operational shocks that hit participants 
in CHAPS-Sterling is quite low. Most of the comparable studies are 
based on simulated aggregate liquidity levels, while ours utilises 
                                          
15 An operational incident at a participant who transacts with many other participants is 
expected to have a larger contagious impact as it is likely to lead to a larger withdrawal of 
liquidity from the system. For the same reason, an operational incident at a participant 
who holds a large share of aggregate liquidity is likely to have a larger contagious impact. 
Bedford, Millard and Yang (2004).  
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actual liquidity data and analyses the impact of operational risk on the 
system as well as individual banks. 
 
 
7.4.1 The  scenarios 
The scenarios were designed on the basis of analysis of actual 
payment flows in ARTIS in the previous sections, with the objective 
of estimating the contagion effect within the system. That is, the 
extent to which those accounts not experiencing operational problems 
become subject to liquidity shortages and the extent to which risk 
could be systemic. We designed the scenarios along the following four 
dimensions. 
  First, we determined the nature and impact of operational failure. 
The impact of an operational incident was assumed to be the 
incapacitation of the participant from processing outgoing payments, 
ie the inability to submit transactions.
16 
  Second, we selected the node(s) of the network of payment flows 
affected by the operational failure, ie the account(s) experiencing 
operational problems. We selected the most active nodes in the 
network based on the value of liquidity concentrated at these nodes 
(liquidity concentration channel), the number and value of payments 
submitted and received (payment concentration channel), the 
Herfindahl index of concentration of payment flows (both based on 
the number of payments and the value of payments received and 
submitted) as well as network topology. Here we built on the results 
of the previous section. 
  Third, we determined the duration of the operational failure of a 
participant, that is, for how many hours the participant is incapacitated 
by the incident. We conducted the simulations on the assumption of a 
one-day failure
17 to submit payments. Scenario design was guided by 
the principle that the shocks to the system should be exceptional but 
plausible. Anecdotal evidence in ARTIS suggests the shocks 
simulated are indeed exceptional but nevertheless plausible. 
Additionally, ARTIS provides business continuity arrangements for 
participants: in the case of operational failure they can submit 
                                          
16 It is assumed that the resulting illiquidity of the participant is not interpreted as 
potential insolvency by other participants in the payment system and the financial system 
at large. 
17 See also Bedford, Millard and Yang (2004).  
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payments by phone, fax, courier service or eKonto
18 if their internal 
systems remain fully functional.
19 As these methods are more costly, 
they are only employed for critical and/or large-value payments. In 
order to assess the impact of such back-up options, we re-ran 
simulations under the assumption that back-up options would be 
employed before the close of the system, ie after 10 hours of 
operational failure. The re-runs are based on the (rather restrictive) 
assumption that even very large numbers of payments can be 
processed via back-up options in a timely manner, ie before closing 
and on the assumption that the stricken bank’s internal systems are 
fully functional.
20 
  Fourth, since the simulator does not simulate the behavioural 
reaction of other system participants or the system operator to an 
operational incident, behavioural reactions must be assumed to be 
exogenous in two areas. First, other participants might want to stop 
submitting payments to the participant experiencing operational 
problems. In TARGET a stop sending rule applies if a transfer account 
of a central bank in the system experiences an operational problem. In 
such a case no further payments are transferred to the stricken transfer 
account. ARTIS operators, however, provided evidence that in all 
other cases participants continue to submit payments to participants 
experiencing operational problems – even if the latter cannot submit 
payments themselves for many hours. Although this is a restrictive 
assumption, it is well-supported by anecdotal evidence. According to 
ARTIS operators, banks explicitly state that they prefer to submit 
payments to stricken banks because they want to fulfil their (and their 
customers’) obligations with respect to the stricken bank (or its 
customers) in a timely manner, irrespective of operational problems at 
the stricken bank. We are not aware of any evidence suggesting that 
banks impose bilateral sending limits. Consequently, we adopt the 
corresponding assumption for the scenarios concerning banks, even 
though this limits the plausible duration of an operational incident in 
the simulations to one day. For any longer operational failure, 
participants are more likely to react by discontinuing payment 
submittance to the participants with operational problems. Second, 
                                          
18 The eKonto is an alternative access mode to the ARTIS operating desk available to 
some but not all participants via an online account. Payments are submitted manually via 
the eKonto by the participant and must be further processed manually by the ARTIS 
operating desk. 
19 Otherwise the stricken participants would lack information on their respective payment 
obligations. 
20 A delayed closing is, in principle, possible on ECB approval.  
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participants could react to operational incidents by increasing 
available collateral. Anecdotal evidence suggests that participants 
already hold large shares of their assets that qualify as collateral at the 
OeNB. Depositing eligible assets with the OeNB is no more costly for 
system participants than depositing them with the Austrian central 
securities depository and can be even cheaper than depositing 
international assets with the respective foreign central securities 
depository. Provision of additional eligible collateral is likely to 
involve portfolio readjustment by participants and is therefore likely 
to be costly. Consequently, we assume that system participants do not 
increase collateral for durations of operational incidents of up to one 
day. This also limits the plausible duration of operational failure. 
  Finally, we defined three scenarios with the highest expected 
impact and the highest expected contagion effects according to step 2: 
(1) the first scenario assumes that the most active transfer account 
cannot submit payments to the system, (2) the second scenario 
assumes that the most active bank cannot submit payments to the 
system and (3) the third scenario assumes that the three most active 
banks experience operational failure simultaneously (eg due to a 
communication infrastructure breakdown) and cannot submit 
payments to the system. In all three scenarios we assumed that the 
operational incident would last from 1 day or 10 hours, respectively, 
according to step 3. We assume that the participants who are still fully 
operative continue to submit payments to the participants hit by 
operational problems, with the exception of the first scenario where 
payments continue to be submitted but the stop sending rule would be 
applied in accordance with the basic functionalities of 
ARTIS/TARGET. The simulations are based on actual liquidity data 




7.4.2  Scenario 1 – top transfer account failure 
The national TARGET operator in charge of the most active transfer 
account experiences an operational incident at 07:15:00 am. It cannot 
submit or settle payments for the rest of the day until the system 
closes at 06:00:00 pm. In response, ARTIS imposes a stop sending at  
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The impact of the scenario on aggregate liquidity and on the 
smooth functioning of the payment system 
 
Aggregate liquidity in the first scenario was equal to actual aggregate 
liquidity at the beginning of the day as the transfer account did not 
hold a beginning-of-day balance or collateral. Consequently, the 
operational problems at this account did not lead to a liquidity drain 
effect, defined as a reduction of aggregate liquidity due to the liquidity 
reserves of the failed participant not being available for circulation in 
the system. But, the account’s central position in the network structure 
of payments in ARTIS could lead to a liquidity sink effect (also 
referred to as a liquidity trap). This is defined as a reduction of 
aggregate liquidity available for circulation in the system that results 
from ongoing transfers of liquidity to the stricken account, where it 
discontinues circulating due to the account’s operational problems. 
The more value is submitted to the stricken account, the higher the 
liquidity sink effect. The stop sending rule can therefore reduce the 
liquidity sink effect in this scenario. Ongoing transactions before the 
imposition of the stop sending rule (but after operational problems 
occurred) reduced aggregate liquidity available by an average of 1.2% 
of aggregate daily liquidity (Figure 7.8). The impact of the scenario on 
aggregate liquidity was quite volatile as the standard deviation of the 
impact was about 240% of the mean. The source of volatility is the 
liquidity sink effect, which differed substantially from day to day. As 
the analysis suggested that the stop sending rule would substantially 
reduce the contagion effect within the system to operational risk 
outside the system, we re-ran the simulations for all 22 days in the 
sample period without the stop sending rule. The results are presented 
after the results for the scenario with the stop sending rule. 
 
                                          
21 After about 30 minutes, national TARGET operators exchange information on the 
operational incident at the stricken central bank in a conference call and decide whether 
to impose the stop sending rule. So, it is a sensible estimate that it takes about 45 minutes 
in total to actually apply the stop sending rule.  
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Figure 7.8  Actual and stressed liquidity with and 
      without the stop sending rule 
      (based on Scenario 1) 
 


















































Liquidity Sink Effect without stop sending
Liquidity Sink Effect with stop sending


















































Liquidity Sink Effect without stop sending
Liquidity Sink Effect with stop sending  
 
 
The value of payments submitted to the system amounted to an 
average of EUR 22.4 billion – with a standard deviation of EUR 5.8 
billion. This corresponded to a decrease of 31.5% relative to the 
unstressed system. This value can be attributed to two sources: (1) the 
node risk (defined as the share of an individual bank of the total value 
of transactions) of the stricken account (18.8% of total value of 
payments submitted or received) as it cannot submit payments and (2) 
the stop sending rule (12.7%). The average daily value settled was 
EUR 21.6 billion. Relative to the unstressed scenario this 
corresponded to a reduction of 33.8%. The number of payments 
submitted averaged 12,832 per day during the sample period, 
corresponding to a reduction of 16.3%. This reduction is substantially 
larger than the node risk of the transfer account in terms of the number 
of payments (9.7% of total number of payments submitted or 
received), which can be attributed to the impact of the stop sending 
rule that kept banks from transferring money to a stricken account. 
  The contagion effect of the scenario on the other participants of the 
payment system was substantial in terms of aggregate value unsettled. 
The value unsettled was EUR 0.8 billion on average, or 3.5% of the 
average value submitted in the stressed system (Figure 7.9). In the 
unstressed system all payments submitted were settled. The value 
unsettled only refers to the payments submitted by the other  
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participants (including those to the stricken transfer account). Thus, it 
does not include the payments from the stricken transfer account 
which could not be submitted. With a standard deviation of EUR 0.7 
billion, it was rather volatile. The minimum value unsettled was EUR 
0.2 billion and the maximum EUR 2.9 billion. The number of 
payments submitted but unsettled amounted to 64 per day on average 
(within a range of 14 to 159) (Figure 7.10). The large variations in 
value unsettled demonstrate that the same operational incident can 
impact the system in different ways on various days. 
 









































Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Actual data
 












































Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Actual data  
NB Actual refers to real data in November 2004. 
 
 
How much additional liquidity would be required to settle all 
transactions on each day? The value of transactions unsettled provides 
a first indication. However, it overstates the need for liquidity 
assistance as it fails to take into account the circulation of liquidity 
once injected into the system. The continuous liquidity usage indicator 
provides another estimate for the ratio of payments submitted that was 
covered by reserves. In Scenario 1 the indicator had an average value 
of 0.37 (compared to a value of 0.30 in the unstressed system), so that 
on average across days and across participants 37% of the total value 
submitted was paid for out of individual participants’ liquidity 
reserves and 63% from payments received. Multiplying daily 
continuous liquidity usage with daily value unsettled provides an 
estimate of liquidity assistance required throughout the sample period 
that takes into account the circulation of liquidity. On average an 
injection of EUR 0.3 billion would indicate a lower bound of 
additional aggregate liquidity that enabled all accounts to settle.
22 This 
corresponded to 1.8% of liquidity available during the sample period. 
Across the sample period the necessary minimum liquidity assistance 
ranged from 0.1 (0.4% of actual aggregate liquidity available on that 
                                          
22 For the lower bound to suffice for settlement of all transactions, additional liquidity 
must be provided to those participants in the system that experience settlement failure, ie 
that actually need additional liquidity. Furthermore, the circulation of additional liquidity 
must equal the circulation of aggregate liquidity.  
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day) to EUR 1.1 billion (7.5% of actual aggregate liquidity available 
on that day). The average value of unsettled payments (EUR 0.8 
billion or 4.7% of average aggregate liquidity in the unstressed 
system) provides an indication of an upper bound – the maximum 
amount – of additional liquidity required to prevent a contagion effect. 
 
 
The impact of the scenario on individual banks 
 
The contagion effect was substantial in terms of the number of 
individual banks with values unsettled. The number of banks subject 
to contagion averaged 12.1 per day and ranged from 8 to 18 per day of 
a total of 234 banks among the 575 accounts (Table 7.2). The total 
number of banks that failed to settle payments submitted on at least 
one day totalled 36, of which 2 could not settle on all 22 days and 10 
on 50% of all days or more. Seven accounts failed on one day only. 
The impact of the scenario on individual banks therefore varies widely 
between days and among banks.  
 
Table 7.2  Number of banks with value unsettled 
 
Number of banks with 
unsettled payments  Actual  Scenario 1  Scenario 2  Scenario 3 
Daily average  0  12.1  8.7  22.8 
Minimum 0  8.0  0.0  1.0 
Maximum 0  18.0  12.0  30.0 
Standard deviation  0  2.4  2.8  5.9 
Total 0  36.0  38.0  56.0 
 
 
The impact of business continuity arrangements 
 
In order to assess the impact of the employment of back-up options we 
re-ran the simulations assuming the duration of the operational failure 
to last until 04:00:00 pm rather than the rest of the day. This implies 
that the available back-up options are employed in a timely manner 
such that all payments can be processed before the closing of the 
system (06:00:00 pm). Furthermore, it must be assumed that the 
participant’s internal systems are fully operational, so that it knows 
which payments to process. Under these assumptions all payments 
submitted were actually settled and no adverse effects in terms of 
payments unsettled were recorded for the stricken account or any 
other participant. However, the payments from the stricken account  
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were delayed by up to 10 hours, which could increase the queuing 
times of other participants’ payments. We did not further investigate 
this potential effect at this stage. 
 
 
The impact of the stop sending rule 
 
The stop sending rule substantially reduced the adverse impact of the 
operational shock and increased the resilience of the system. In order 
to assess the relative impact and thereby the efficacy of the stop 
sending rule, we replicated Scenario 1 without the stop sending rule 
while keeping all other features identical. Without the stop sending 
rule, the liquidity sink effect would increase from 1.2% to 26.9% of 
unstressed aggregate liquidity and the mean of the value submitted by 
EUR 4.2 billion (or 19.3%) (Table 7.3). This implies that the value of 
payments to the transfer account after 08:00:00 am (when the stop 
sending rule was imposed) must have equalled EUR 4.2 billion on 
average. Without the stop sending rule, the average value unsettled 
would increase from EUR 0.8 billion to EUR 1.3 billion. The average 




Table 7.3  Selected indicators in Scenario 1 with and 
      without stop sending rule (daily values/ 
      averages across November 2004) 
 
Indicator 
Scenario 1 with 









(in EUR billion)  16.3  12.1  4.2 (26%)* 
Liquidity reduction 
(in % of aggregate 
liquidity) 1.2  26.9  -25.7* 
Value submitted 
(in EUR billion)**  22.4  26.7  -4.3 (-18.9%) 
Value unsettled 
(in EUR billion)***  0.8  1.3  -0.5 (-71.8%) 
* Differences in percentage of value with stop sending rule. ** Value submitted 
refers to the value of the payments submitted by participants not affected by 
operational problems. It excludes payments not submitted by the stricken bank 
due to operational problems. If the stop rule applies (column 1), the payments 
redirected in the queue due to the stop sending rule are not included in the value 
of payments submitted: the respective liquidity is still available to the banks, who 
can cancel submissions as long as they are queued. *** Value unsettled refers to 
the payments submitted by participants not affected by operational problems. 
 
 
7.4.3  Scenario 2 – top bank account failure 
The second scenario assumes that the most active bank cannot submit 
or settle payments from 06:00:00 am until 06:00:00 pm due to an 
operational incident. The mapping of the scenario included debit 
authorisation by the bank for a number of other participants in 
ARTIS.
23 Consequently, many payments from the stricken bank could 
be submitted (from the stricken bank’s account via the participants to 
whom debit authorisation was granted) and settled despite operational 
problems at the stricken bank. Thus, debit authorisation can reduce the 
liquidity drain effect. To assess the impact of debit authorisation on 
                                          
23 Participant A can grant participant B a debit authorisation according to the Terms and 
Conditions Governing the OeNB’s ARTIS system (Section 9). Debit authorisation is 
defined as the right of participant B to initiate (certain pre-agreed) payments from the 
account of participant A. Debit authorisations are granted to a small number of 
participants for prearranged purposes (very frequent recurring standard operations) and 
cannot be interpreted as a crisis mitigation instrument available at short notice in the case 
of an operational incident.  
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the contagion effect within the system, we re-ran the simulations 
based on a replicated scenario without debit authorisation. 
 
 
The impact of the scenario on aggregate liquidity and on the 
smooth functioning of the payment system 
 
The operational incident at the most active bank decreased aggregate 
liquidity available for circulation in the system (ie excluding the 
liquidity accumulating at the stricken bank) by an average of 54.6% to 
a daily average of EUR 7.5 billion – of which 21.6 percentage points 
were due to the liquidity drain effect and 33.16 percentage points due 
to the liquidity sink effect (Figure 7.11). The average daily value of 
payments submitted amounted to EUR 27.4 billion (standard deviation 
EUR 6.4 billion), a reduction of EUR 5.2 billion of the actual value in 
November 2004. The decrease of 16% corresponds to the stricken 
bank’s usual share of payments submitted (as these cannot be 
submitted due to the operational incident) minus the value of 
payments submitted by debit authorisation – which can still be 
submitted as long as the accounts hold positive balances. The average 
value settled was EUR 26.6 billion, with a standard deviation of EUR 
6.1 billion. 
 
Figure 7.11  Actual and stressed liquidity with and 
      without debit authorisation 















































Stressed liquidity (after liquidity drain effect without debit authorization)
Stressed liquidity (after liquidity drain effect with debit authorisation)
Stressed liquidity (after liquidity sink and liquidity drain effect with debit authorisation)
 
Source: OeNB and own calculations.  
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The operational incident had a substantial negative contagion effect on 
aggregate payment activity as the value unsettled amounted to EUR 
0.8 billion or 2.9% of the value submitted (Figure 7.9).
24 However, the 
impact of operational risk varied markedly from day to day as the 
value unsettled ranged from EUR 0.0 billion to EUR 2.3 billion. The 
number of payments unsettled rose to 63.3 on average and accounted 
for an average of 0.4% of payments submitted (Figure 7.10). A 
substantial value of payments could not be settled by participants that 
were not subject to operational problems, ie the contagion effect was 
substantial. Taking into account the circulation of liquidity, we 
estimate the lower bound of average liquidity injection required to 
settle all payments submitted to be in the order of EUR 0.3 billion or 
1.9% of average aggregate liquidity in the unstressed system. The 
upper bound would correspond to EUR 0.8 billion or 4.9% of average 
aggregate liquidity in the sample period. 
  The mean of the continuous liquidity usage corresponded to 40%, 
so that under stress 40% of the payments submitted were settled from 
liquidity reserves. Compared to the unstressed scenario this implied an 
increase of about 10 percentage points. Despite a substantial contagion 
effect, the circulation of liquidity did not come to a complete halt. 
 
 
The impact of the scenario on individual banks 
 
The scenario had a substantial impact – that varied substantially from 
day to day – on other banks’ ability to settle payments submitted. A 
total of 38 banks were affected by contagion throughout the month in 
this scenario (Table 7.2). This corresponded to 16.2% of the total 
number of banks in the system. On average 8.7 banks were unable to 
settle payments submitted each day, with a minimum of 0 and a 
maximum of 12. Four banks could not settle on 21 days, and seven on 
50% of all days or more. Fourteen banks were affected on one day 
only. The scenario affected different banks in a different manner. 
 
 
The impact of business continuity arrangements 
 
We re-ran the simulations under the assumption that business 
continuity arrangements were invoked by 04:00:00 pm and all 
                                          
24 The value unsettled refers only to the payments submitted by the participants not hit by 
the operational incident and does not include the payments of the stricken bank (as these 
are not submitted). But it can include payments by other participants to the stricken bank.  
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payments of the stricken bank were settled before the close of the 
system. Under these assumptions all payments were settled and no 
contagion effect materialised in terms of unsettled payments at the end 
of the day. However, the resilience of the system rests on the 
assumption that the participant’s internal systems are fully 
operational, so that the bank knows which payments to process, and 
that between 534 and 1,655 payments submitted via phone, fax, 





The impact of debit authorisation 
 
In addition to Scenario 2 with debit authorisation as reported above, 
we re-ran the scenario without debit authorisation. Relative to the 
latter, debit authorisation slightly attenuated the contagion effects 
within the system to operational shocks. Debit authorisation enabled 
payments to be settled that would otherwise not have been because of 
the operational problem at the stricken bank (as long as its account is 
sufficiently liquid, which is usually the case as the bank is unable to 
submit payments). Consequently, the average liquidity drain was 
lower than in a system without this feature. Without debit 
authorisation, the liquidity drain in Scenario 2 would have 
corresponded to the liquidity concentration at the stricken bank 
(22.5% of aggregate liquidity). Debit authorisation reduced the 
liquidity drain to 21.4%. As a result the value unsettled decreased 
from an average of EUR 1 billion to EUR 0.8 billion, which 
corresponds to a reduction of 15.6% of value unsettled (without debit 
authorisation). The number of unsettled payments was reduced from 
137.3 to 63.3 on average per day. The average number of banks with 
value unsettled decreased from 10.3 to 8.7. The total number of banks 
affected by contagion was reduced from 42 to 38. Compared to its 
impact on the system, debit authorisation had a stronger impact on 
individual participants who had the right to access the account of the 
stricken bank. They were effectively shielded from direct effects of 
the operational incident. 
 
 
                                          
25 As noted above, a delayed closing is possible with ECB approval.  
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7.4.4  Scenario 3 – simultaneous failure of the three most 
active bank accounts 
This scenario assumes that the three most active banks cannot submit 
payments from 06:00:00 am until 06:00:00 pm due to an operational 
incident. All three stricken banks granted debit authorisation to a 
number of other participants in ARTIS. To gauge its impact on the 
smooth functioning of the system, we re-ran the simulations based on 
a replicated scenario without debit authorisation. 
 
 
The impact of the scenario on aggregate liquidity and on the 
smooth functioning of the payment system 
 
Aggregate liquidity available for circulation in the system (ie 
excluding the liquidity accumulating at the stricken banks) decreased 
by (a theoretical) 121.5% of the unstressed level. Liquidity drain 
accounted for 47.4 and liquidity sink for 74.1 percentage points 
(Figure 7.12). In the case of all payments to the three stricken banks 
being settled, liquidity would have turned negative. In reality, 
aggregate liquidity available for circulation in the system (ie 
excluding the liquidity accumulating at the stricken banks) is bound 
below by zero. In Scenario 3 the liquidity sink basically withdrew all 
remaining liquidity from circulation and the adverse impact on the 




Figure 7.12  Actual and stressed liquidity with and 
      without debit authorisation 
































Stressed liquidity (after liquidity drain effect without debit authorization)
Stressed liquidity (after liquidity drain effect with debit authorisation)











































Stressed liquidity (after liquidity drain effect without debit authorization)
Stressed liquidity (after liquidity drain effect with debit authorisation)














Source: OeNB and own calculations. 
 
 
The average value submitted was EUR 20.7 billion, which 
corresponded to a reduction of 36.43% relative to the unstressed 
system. This reduction equalled the share of the three stricken banks 
in the value submitted in the unstressed system (as their payments 
were not submitted due to operational incidents) minus the share of 
the value of payments submitted under debit authorisation. On 
average, value settled amounted to EUR 19.1 billion, which 
constituted a reduction of 41.6% from the unstressed value. Daily 
value unsettled was EUR 1.7 billion on average and ranged from EUR 
0.2 billion to EUR 4.7 billion (Figure 7.9). On average, 175 payments 
could not be settled (with a range from 3 to 488) (Figure 7.10). Value 
and payments unsettled refer only to payments submitted by other 
participants (ie excluding the stricken banks’ payments as these were 
not even submitted but including payments of the other participants to 
them). Taking into account the circulation of liquidity, we estimated 
the lower bound of additional liquidity necessary to settle all payments 
submitted to be EUR 1.1 billion on an average day (ranging from 
EUR 0.1 billion to EUR 3.2 billion). That amounted to 6.8% of 
aggregate liquidity in the unstressed system. These results also 
indicated that the impact of the scenario varied substantially across 
days. The upper bound of additional liquidity would correspond to 
EUR 1.7 billion (10% of aggregate liquidity in the unstressed system).  
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The participants in the system had to rely much more on their liquidity 
reserves rather than on incoming payments to settle outgoing 
payments. The continuous liquidity usage indicator increased from 
29.9% in the unstressed scenario to 67.8%. Participants covered two-
thirds of the value of payments submitted and settled by their liquidity 
reserves and only one-third by liquidity from incoming payments. 
 
 
The impact of the scenario on individual banks 
 
On average 22.8 banks failed to settle all payments submitted per day 
(Table 7.2). The minimum number of banks that experienced serious 
liquidity shortages was 1 and the maximum 30. The total number of 
banks that were unable to settle all payments on at least one day was 
56. In the sample period, 1 bank could not settle on all 22 days and 24 
banks on 50% or more. Ten failed to settle on a single day only. The 
effect of the scenario on individual banks varied markedly between 
days and banks. 
 
 
The impact of business continuity arrangements 
 
In order to assess the impact of alternative submission channels we re-
ran the scenario under the assumptions introduced in Scenario 2. Here 
all payments were settled and the scenario had no negative effects in 
terms of unsettled payments at the end of the day. Under these 
assumptions the system proved to be resilient even to a very strong 
negative shock. For the business continuity arrangements in place this 
implied that between 1,440 and 4,022 payments would have to be 




The impact of debit authorisation 
 
In addition to the scenario with debit authorisation reported above, we 
re-ran Scenario 3 without debit authorisation. Compared to the latter, 
debit authorisation reduced the liquidity drain effect on aggregate 
liquidity by an average of EUR 0.3 billion or 1.5% of aggregate 
liquidity per day. Value unsettled decreased from EUR 1.9 billion to 
EUR 1.7 billion. The number of unsettled payments on average went 
                                          
26 As noted above, a delayed closing is possible on ECB approval.  
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down from 267 to 175. The average number of banks affected by 
contagion was reduced to 22.8 (down from 24.6). The number of 
banks with value unsettled on at least one day in the sample period 
decreased from 60 (without debit authorisation) to 56 (with debit 
authorisation). Debit authorisation slightly decreased the impact of the 
scenario on the system under stress. The impact on the liquidity 
position of the participants with the right to access the accounts of the 
stricken banks was more substantial. Debit authorisation insulated 
them effectively from any direct impact of the operational incident (as 
long as the stricken bank’s account was sufficiently liquid). 
 
 
7.4.5  Comparison across scenarios 
Taking into account the business continuity arrangements, no scenario 
had an adverse impact on the smooth functioning of the payment 
system (all payments were settled at the end of the day, even if 
queuing times might have increased). Given the very restrictive 
assumptions underlying the efficacy of the business continuity 
arrangements, we compared the impact of the scenarios without 
business continuity arrangements. Among the three scenarios, 
Scenario 3 had the strongest impact on aggregate liquidity, on value 
unsettled and on the number of banks with unsettled payments as well 
as on the frequency of settlement failure (Table 7.4). However, one 
must bear in mind that Scenario 3 was designed as a worst-case 
scenario. Scenarios 1 and 2 featured very similar values unsettled, 
numbers of unsettled payments and total numbers of banks with 
unsettled payments. This similarity of impacts is quite surprising, 
taking into account the large differences in liquidity reduction 
(Scenario 1 with 1.2% and Scenario 2 with 54.8% of aggregate 




Table 7.4  Selected indicators in all three scenarios 
      and in the actual data (daily values/ 
      averages across November 2004) 
 
Indicator  Actual  Scenario 1  Scenario 2  Scenario 3 
Aggregate liquidity 
(in EUR billiom)  16.5  16.3  7.3  -3.8 
Liquidity reduction 
(in % of aggregate liquidity)  0.0 1.2  54.8  121.5 
Liquidity drain 
(in % points)  0.0 0.0 21.6 47.4  of which  Liquidity sink 
(in % points)  0.0 1.2* 33.2 74.1 
Value submitted 
(in EUR billion)  32.6  22.4  27.4  20.7 
Without business continuity arrangements 
Value unsettled 
(in EUR billion)  0.0  0.8  0.80  1.66 
Value unsettled 
(in % of value submitted)  0.0  3.3  2.7  7.7 
Number of payments unsettled 0.0  64.1  63.3  175 
With business continuity arrangements** 
Value unsettled 
(in EUR billion)  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Value unsettled 
(in % of value submitted)  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Number of payments unsettled 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
* With stop sending rule – without stop sending rule the respective value would be 
26.91%. ** One has to bear in mind that the assumption that all payments can be 
submitted by the stricken bank via back-up options and can further be processed by 




The implications of the results for payment system design and 
payment system oversight need to take into account the issue of 
practicability and efficiency, as stipulated in Core Principle VIII.
27 
The marginal costs of implementing additional security features and 
business continuity arrangements must not outweigh the marginal 
(pecuniary and non-pecuniary) return from increased reliability. 
  The simulations take into account the available business continuity 
arrangements by reopening the submission channel for the stricken 
                                          
27 ‘Core Principle VIII – The system should provide a means of making payments which 
is practical for its users and efficient for the economy.’ (CPSS 2001).  
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bank(s) at 04:00:00 pm. In the simulations many transactions were 
queued until that point of time and the system settled all these 
transactions between 04:00:00 pm and 06:00:00 pm. However, this 
implied that for business continuity measures to be effective and for 
service levels to be met even under stress, some 1,500 to 3,400 
payments (depending on the scenario) would have to be processed 
manually. On peak days in the worst case scenario this rises to about 
4,000 payments. This assumption is very restrictive. The time 
available to complete the task crucially depends on the point in time 
when the stricken bank switches to alternative submission procedures 
and on the processing capacities available at the central platform. 
Assuming that about 30 payments per hour can be processed manually 
by one staff member, business continuity would require substantial 
additional human resources and equipment to reach the required 
payment throughput before closing (06:00:00 pm) while maintaining a 
high level of processing quality.
28 
  In order to reduce contagion within the system even under stress, 
existing contingency procedures could be complemented by a stop 
sending function, comparable to the one employed in Scenario 1. This 
rule would consist of informing other participants that a particular 
account cannot submit payments and the option for them to redirect 
their payments to the stricken bank to a queue. In principle, the 
queued payments remain available to the sending bank in ARTIS. 
Once the stricken bank has resolved its operational problems, all 
payments in the queue are released and settled. A stop sending 
function would substantially reduce the liquidity sink effect. 
Additionally, it would be simple and practical, as suggested by the 
interpretations of Core Principle VII; CPSS (2001). Nevertheless, in 
order to assess the exact impact of a stop sending function, further 




The first objective of this paper was to analyse the liquidity stance, the 
risk concentration and the network structure in ARTIS. The aggregate 
liquidity in the system exceeded actual use of liquidity, whereby it 
seemed sufficient. All transactions submitted were settled and no 
accounts experienced liquidity shortages that would have led to 
                                          
28 In Basel Committee of Banking Supervision (2005) Principle 6 calls for tests of 
business continuity plans and for the evaluation of their effectiveness.  
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unsettled transactions at closing time (06:00:00 pm). Despite 
sufficient aggregate liquidity, individual accounts were occasionally 
illiquid and payment delays occurred frequently. The disaggregated 
analysis of liquidity usage revealed that liquidity usage was highly 
heterogeneous across participants. Furthermore, it suggested that some 
banks actually used their individual liquidity reserves extensively. 
These results demonstrate that conclusions drawn from aggregate 
liquidity data do not necessarily apply to the individual participant 
level. In general, the value and the number of payments received and 
submitted were quite concentrated among the top three banks and the 
top transfer account in the ARTIS system during the sample period. In 
addition, the most active accounts also received and submitted larger 
payments than the less active accounts. This conclusion is supported 
by the analysis of the network structure of the entire network, the 
subsample of the top 32 participating banks and that of the most active 
51 accounts: the four most active accounts (Banks A, B and C as well 
as Transfer Account 1) formed the core of the network structure. In 
addition to payments, liquidity was rather concentrated among the top 
three banks in the system too, as these held about 50% of available 
liquidity. An analysis of operational risk in the system should focus on 
operational problems at the institutions with high payment 
concentration risk and high liquidity concentration risk to test for 
high-impact scenarios. It would, therefore, have to focus on the top 
three banks and the top transfer account. 
  The second objective of this study was to quantify the contagion 
effect of an operational incident outside the system on the ability of 
other participants not hit by an operational problem to settle payments. 
The methods applied were model simulations of operational shocks 
for the sample period November 2004. 
  In the unstressed scenario sufficient aggregate liquidity guaranteed 
the smooth functioning of the system. All transactions submitted were 
settled and no account experienced liquidity shortages that would have 
led to unsettled transactions at closing time (06:00:00 pm) on any day 
in the sample period. 
  We conducted simulations based on three different scenarios 
which we derived from the risk concentration and network analysis in 
this paper. These scenarios were designed to take into account the two 
main sources of contagion risk in payment systems: the payment 
concentration channel and the liquidity concentration channel. The 
shocks were exceptional but plausible operational incidents. The main 
findings of the simulations were as follows: 
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1. ARTIS is highly reliable, as long as the existing business 
continuity arrangements prove effective. Under the restrictive 
assumptions that (1) the stricken bank(s) had information 
concerning their payment obligations and (2) all payments 
submitted by the stricken bank(s) via phone, fax, courier service or 
eKonto could be settled in time, no adverse effects on its own 
payments or any other participant’s payments were recorded. The 
system functioned smoothly even under severe stress.  
 
2.  The simulations provide a quantification of the high demands on 
the business continuity arrangements in times of distress. The 
numbers suggest it would be unlikely they would be fully 
effective. So we demonstrated how the results of the simulations 
could be used also to test the efficacy of the business continuity 
arrangements.  
 
3.  Without the use of business continuity arrangements, or in a case 
where they do not prove fully effective, the contagion effect on the 
smooth functioning of the payment system was substantial in all 
three scenarios. Contagion can occur despite the high level of 
aggregate liquidity in the system. A non-negligible number of 
banks failed to settle payments. We also provided estimates of the 
amount of Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) needed to 
support the smooth functioning of the payment system. In these 
estimates we took account of the estimates of the flow of liquidity 
even under stress, which substantially lower the amount of ELA 
required. 
 
4.  The simulations revealed that the same operational incident had 
very different impacts on the system on various days. They also 
affected individual banks to a very different extent. In addition, 
each scenario’s impact on individual banks differed from day to 
day. More research is called for to better understand the 
determinants of the impact of shocks on the system, on its 
participants and across days. 
 
5. Furthermore, we investigated the impact of two noteworthy 
features of ARTIS on the contagion effect – the stop sending rule 
and debit authorisation: The stop sending rule substantially 
reduced the contagion effect of the operational shock and 
increased the resilience of the system. Currently, the stop sending 
rule applies only to operational problems at another TARGET 
central bank. Our research indicates that a similar rule for  
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operational incidents at commercial banks would strongly increase 
the resilience of the system. Further research is needed to put this 
hypothesis to test. Debit authorisation is not a risk mitigation tool 
per se as it is granted for special purposes and not available at 
short notice. Nonetheless, it has an impact on contagion. Debit 
authorisation attenuated the reaction of the system to operational 
shocks much less than the stop sending rule but still to a non-
negligible extent. More importantly, it proved effective in 
insulating the participants who had access to the stricken bank’s 
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The lower bound of liquidity is defined as the theoretical minimum of 
the aggregate amount of liquidity in the system that enables all 
participants to settle all payments submitted in end-of-day partial or 
multilateral netting. It is below the corresponding value for pure 
RTGS systems without queuing as the latter are less liquidity efficient. 
However, it is identical to the corresponding minimum liquidity in a 
RTGS with queuing. The theoretical minimum assumes that all 
liquidity in the system is allocated in perfect accordance with 
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where ai,k is the value of the payment. The first summation is the value 
of all payments submitted and the second one that of all payments 
received. If the participant experiences a net inflow of liquidity during 
the day, its lower bound is zero. If he experiences a net outflow of 
liquidity, this amount defines the lower bound. The corresponding 
lower bound at the system level is calculated as the sum of individual 
values. 
 The  turn over ratio indicates how often each euro of the aggregate 
stock of liquidity is spent during one day. It is calculated according to 
















where Si and Li denote the sum of settled payments submitted by 
participants i during the day and the available liquidity of participant i, 
respectively. 
 The  liquidity usage indicator measures the share of submitted 
transactions, which were settled by running down available liquidity 

























i b  denotes the beginning of day balance of participant i 
min
i b  
denotes the minimum balance of participant i during the day and Si the 
sum of settled payments submitted by participants i during the day. Its 
range is from 0 to 1. Unsettled transactions are not included in the 
calculation.
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 The  individual  node risk is defined as the share of an individual 
bank in the total value of transactions (or in the total number of 
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The Herfindahl Index measures the concentration of the number of 
payments (or similarly of their value or of the liquidity of participants) 
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If payments are uniformly distributed across all participants, the index 
value is 1/n, which is also its minimum value. Its maximum value is 





                                          
29 Koponen and Soramäki (2005). 
30 Bank of Finland (2005). 
31 James (2003) and Bedford, Millard and Yang (2004).  
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The network topology indicators
32 
 
An indicator of the distance dij between nodes is the lowest possible 
number of links that connects each (active) node i with each other 
(active) node j in the network. It is referred to as shortest path length. 
  We calculated the average path length for each (active) originating 
node li by averaging across terminating nodes j and than averaged 





















Average eccentricity  ε is defined as the maximum path length 
(eccentricity εi which in turn equals the maximum distance between 












Considering the maximum eccentricity across nodes defines the 
diameter D 
 
i i max D ε =  
 
The average degree k of the network is calculated by summing across 
all (active) links originating from each node (out-degree 
out
i k ) or 
terminating at each node (in-degree 
in
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8  How can banks control their 
exposure to a failing participant? 
Abstract 
This paper assesses the effect of counterparties’ reaction to an 
operational failure at one of the biggest participants in the Dutch 
interbank payment system. Counterparties react according to two 
basic rules: they stop sending payments to the stricken bank either 
after some pre-determined time or after their exposure to the stricken 
bank reaches a certain level. The simulations are based on historical 
liquidity levels. The impact of the disruption is quantified in terms of 
the additional liquidity needed to settle all payments that can settle 
given the banks’ intraday reserves and collateral facilities. Assuming 
the disruption lasts for the remainder of the day, banks are faced with 
costs as they need to borrow this additional liquidity overnight from 
the market or from the central bank. From a cost perspective, response 
seems to be more effective when determined by the individual 
exposure of the stricken banks’ counterparties than when triggered by 
the elapsed time after the disruption. However, even an immediate 
reaction does not prevent banks from running losses following the 
failure of a major participant. How much each payment system 
participant can control its exposure to the stricken bank partly depends 




The Payment and Settlement Simulator (‘the simulator’) developed by 
the Bank of Finland has proven to be a useful tool to gain insight in 
risks and efficiency in payment systems. It has been used to estimate 
the trade-off between the liquidity needs of different types of systems 
and their level of risk (Koponen and Soramäki, 1998, or Leinonen and 
Soramäki, 2005, among others) and to assess the systemic impact of 
an operational disruption, either at a major market participant or at the 
system itself (McVanel, 2005, among others). These latter studies rely 
on historical data, adapted in order to create various scenarios for the 
disruption, implicitly assuming that, were a disruption to occur, 
(other) payment system participants would not adapt their behaviour  
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to the new environment – an exercise that could be subject to a form 
of Lucas critique. 
  Behavioural aspects have received less attention. This can be 
explained by a lack of knowledge about participants’ reactions in the 
face of a disruption or about the factors affecting participants’ reaction 
patterns. There is some historical evidence with regard to wide-scale 
disasters like September 11, but one should be cautious when 
generalising findings from such exceptional events. There are also 
some observations by payment system operators, mainly about 
participants’ reactions to failures to pay by other participants. For 
example, work by Bedford et al (2005) is based on the assumption that 
participants in the United Kingdom’s payment system would react to 
such a failure within ten minutes. Empirically, one study in particular 
– Conover (2005) – researched occurrences of disruptions and 
estimated the strength of other participants’ reactions. Theoretically, 
the reaction of payment system participants to (the absence) of 
incoming payments was expressed in the form of a reaction function 
(McAndrews, 2002), which assumes that part of participants’ outgoing 
payments is triggered by payment receipts and that payment orders 
exhibit a certain degree of synchronicity.
1 
  If one of the major participants in the Dutch interbank payment 
system failed to send payments, how would other participants’ 
reaction influence the impact of that disruption? How can payment 
system participants mitigate their vulnerability to such an event? 
Insight in the influence of payment system participants’ behaviour on 
the system would allow central banks to identify and encourage 
stabilising behaviours, with a view to lowering the potential systemic 
impact of operational disruptions. 
  This paper assesses the impact of an operational failure
2 and the 
effect of different possible counterparty reactions. Counterparties react 
according to two basic rules: they stop sending payments to the 
stricken bank either after some pre-determined time or after their 
                                          
1 McAndrews empirically estimated the slope of that function, both under ‘normal 
circumstances’ and for the days following September 11, and found it to be generally 
quite steep (indicating a high level of coordination) and significantly less so in the days 
following the attacks (coordination broke down). 
2 The terms ‘operational failure’, ‘failure’, ‘disruption’ etc refer to the bank’s inability to 
send payment messages. They do not in any case refer to the institution’s possible 
insolvency. An insolvency of a major bank would indeed not come as a surprise, and its 
counterparties would have taken measures in advance of the default. The aim of this 
exercise it to assess the impact of an unexpected failure to send payments, and to see 
whether counterparties can control their intraday exposures to a major participant. This 
bank is called ’failing’ or ’stricken’ (as in Bedford et al, 2005).  
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exposure to that bank reaches a certain level. On the contrary to other 
work, the liquidity available to banks is considered as fixed. The 
impact of the disruption is explicitly quantified in terms of the 
additional liquidity needs faced by payment system participants and in 
terms of the costs of additional overnight lending. Indeed, when a 
participant fails to pay, other participants bear the burden of that 
failure by having to rely on intraday credit from the central bank. If 
banks have not received the expected payments at the end of the day, 




8.2  Payment system participants’ reaction to a 
disruption 
8.2.1  How do counterparties react? 
To my knowledge there are no thorough empirical analyses of 
payment system participants’ reactions following an operational 
disruption at one of their counterparties. Part of this stems from the 
fact that banks’ reaction is related to the intraday counterparty credit 
limits that they have built into their internal systems. These limits are 
not communicated to central banks. Payment system operators’ 
interactions with market participants and their observations of day-to-
day payment activity yield some valuable information on participants’ 
behaviour. Some central banks even keep an ‘operational events 
database’ (eg the Bank of Canada), including information on 
participants’ reactions. But it is difficult to generalise banks’ 
behaviour, because disruptions have different causes and effects and 
behaviour can change over time. 
  One of the most interesting empirical studies of payment system 
participants’ behaviour following a disruption, by Conover and 
Amanuel (2005), was presented at the Bank of Finland’s simulator 
seminar in 2005. In that work, the authors analysed real failures in the 
US interbank payment system Fedwire, defined as abnormally long 
periods of time between payments from individual participants. It 
seems that, during such an event,
 3 the value of payments received by 
the outage bank is down by 15.3%, while the number of payments is 
                                          
3 This excludes the period between 11 to 14 September 2001, ie an exogenous event 
clearly not related to operational disruptions at specific participants.  
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not significantly affected. Payments also seem to stay longer in the 
queue as the average delay of payments to the outage bank increases 
by 3 minutes.
4 These findings would indicate that the counterparties of 
the failing institution tend to retain their payments to that bank, while 
payments to other banks are not voluntarily affected. Such conclusions 
are in line with the reaction function proposed by McAndrews (2002), 
which implies that banks send part of their payments in reaction to 
payment receipts.
5 In case of a disruption, counterparties would 
behave strategically and retain their payments to the failing bank. 
Reaction functions will be further discussed in 8.2.3. 
 
 
8.2.2 Determinants  of  counterparties’ reaction 
When considering whether to send or retain payments, banks can be 
expected to take into account the trade-off between settlement delay 
and intraday liquidity costs. This trade-off has been used to explain 
the choice participants face when deciding to send their payments 
relatively early or relatively lately during the day (Bech and Garratt, 
2003). When choosing to pay early during the day (ie before having 
received any payments themselves), system participants incur liquidity 
costs related to the funding of these payments. When choosing to 
delay their outgoing payments, they incur reputation risk. However, 
when determining the course of action vis-à-vis a failing participant, 
liquidity costs can be expected to carry more weight than reputational 
considerations. Therefore, in the simulations and in the subsequent 
calculations of the costs related to an operational failure, I have 
assumed the costs of delaying payments to the stricken bank to be 
negligible. 
  How rapidly banks will react and stop sending payments to the 
stricken bank is likely to be determined by the rapidity with which 
they can identify a disruption at one of their counterparties. This will 
be influenced by the structure of the domestic banking market (eg the 
overall number of banks and the relationships between banks) and by 
factors related to payment system activity (eg the structure and 
regularity of payment flows and the modes of participation in the 
system). Some factors might have conflicting effects. For example, 
                                          
4 In addition to that, it would be very interesting to know how long participants tend to 
wait before delaying their payments to the outage bank and how this reaction changes for 
longer disruptions. 
5 Received payments make up for an important part of banks’ funding liquidity in 
payment systems, in addition to reserves and intraday credit.  
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with direct participation, a more complete diffusion of information on 
a disruption could be achieved more rapidly as more banks would be 
directly exposed to the failing participant. However, an increase in the 
number of direct participants could lead to increased informational 
’noise’. In a tiered payment system, all direct participants can be 
expected to be informed more rapidly of a disruption at one of their 
peers, while in a direct participation model the most active 
counterparties (possibly, but not necessarily, the same group of banks) 
would be up-to-date first. 
 
 
8.2.3 Direct  and  indirect consequences 
The analysis of reaction curves can be used to illustrate the effect of 
counterparties’ responses to a single bank failure on that bank and on 
other institutions. 
  Figure 8.1 shows how reaction functions can move in response to a 
disruption at a payment system participant. The left-hand side of the 
figure is borrowed from McAndrews (2002).
6 It contains two sets of 
reaction functions. The dashed set shows the reaction functions of 
banks A and B under normal conditions. For bank A, this function can 




t bR a P ε + + = , where bank A’s payments in time t 
equal bank A’s autonomous willingness to send payments (a), its 
aggregate receipts and an error term. b is the slope of the reaction 
function. The autonomous willingness to pay is related to each bank’s 
reserves at the central bank. Under normal conditions, the slopes are 
positive, and payments are coordinated. When bank B proves unable 
to send payments, the slope of its reaction function takes value zero, 
receipts are not followed by payments. Bank A’s reserves decline as a 
consequence, as does its autonomous willingness to pay and the slope 
of its reaction function. This is shown by the solid lines. A similar fate 
would await other counterparties of bank B. 
  The right-hand side of Figure 8.1 introduces another participant, 
bank C, which has been affected by bank B’s failure in a similar way 
to bank A. These two healthy banks now have lower available 
reserves at the central bank, leading to an overall decline in their 
autonomous willingness to pay and in the slope of their reaction 
curves. 
 
                                          
6 See McAndrews (2002), p. 71. Here the figure is inverted as this paper refers to the 
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In practice, if we assume that payment system participants react by 
delaying or cancelling all payments to bank B, the autonomous 
willingness to pay needs not be affected. Banks that are net debtors to 
bank B could control their exposures and prevent their balances at the 
central bank from declining by cancelling payments to B. 
Nonetheless, banks that would be net creditors would miss out on 
expected funds; their expected reserves would always be affected by 
B’s failure. Such banks would therefore likely retain non-urgent 
payments to other participants in order to prevent important payments 
from remaining unsettled. Some important payments might indeed 
involve not only reputational costs but also costs caused by the de 
facto roll-over of the underlying deals. 
  Such third-round effects have not been included in the simulations. 
This paper only presents the results of simulations of first-order 
reactions to a counterparty’s failure to pay. As it also works with 
historical data – be it adapted to fit various response scenarios – it can 
also be subject to a form of Lucas critique as not all behaviours in the 
reaction chain are modelled. This paper did not assess the implications 
of certain behavioural rules (mainly the use of exposure limits) under 
normal conditions either. Internal limits applied by banks would 
indeed have the potential to prevent some payments from being sent to 
the system at all, although we might expect banks to adjust their limits  
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or change their payment flows in this situation.
7 As to centralised 
limits in the payment system, provided they are indeed used by banks, 
they might delay settlements. If such delays happen regularly, they 
might be harmful for banks’ reputation and, by increasing the overall 
settlement delay of the payment system, they might negatively affect 
its resilience to operational events. Centralised limits will not be 
discussed further in this paper. 
 
 
8.3  Methodology for the simulations 
8.3.1  Replicating the Dutch large-value payment system 
TOP 
Analysing the effects of a disruption on a payment system with the 
help of the simulator necessitates, first, to replicate the functioning of 
the given payment system under normal conditions. This is done by 
calibrating the algorithms and parameters defining payment system 
design in the simulator, with a view to obtaining the best possible fit 
between the pattern of payment flows in the resulting benchmark 
simulation and in the historical settlement data. 
  TOP, the Dutch payment system, is relatively easy to approximate 
with the simulator: it is a simple RTGS system, with queues and 
priorities, but no liquidity-saving mechanisms. TOP is part of the pan-
European payment system TARGET and settled over EUR 30 trillion 
in 2005. The system has 100 participants, with most banks located in 
the Netherlands participating directly in the system. The banking 
sector in the Netherlands is quite concentrated, with four major banks 
accounting for most of the traffic in TOP. The large bank failing to 
send payments in the simulations accounts for about one fifth of 
TOP’s volume and value. These large banks tend to have branches in 
most if not all other EU countries and therefore participate in 
TARGET via numerous channels. These bank branches also make 
liquidity transfers between each other. 
                                          
7 A quick glance at TOP participants’ historical net debit positions in June 2004 vis-à-vis 
the stricken bank shows that, on average, 1.7 participants saw their net debit position at 
the end of the day exceed 25% of their capital; nearly 3 saw it exceed 10%; and 3.5 saw it 
exceed 5%. As explained in chapter 2.3, these are the levels of limits used for the 
simulation exercises. This means that, under normal conditions, such limits would have 
led these banks to retain some of their payments to that bank.  
235 
  Simulations with historical payments data serve as a benchmark 
against which to assess the impact of disruptions and the effectiveness 
of counterparties’ reaction.
8 However, this could only be done for 
banks located in the Netherlands as the level of reserves and collateral 
facilities available to banks located in other countries and participating 
in TOP via TARGET were not known. Furthermore, at the time at 
which data was gathered and simulations carried out, the only 
information available concerned the country from which or to which 
payments were made. The European counterparties that were branches 
of the failing bank could not be identified. This could be of 
importance for simulating a reaction from the stricken bank’s 
counterparties, as counterparties belonging to the same group are 
likely to have more rapid and more thorough information on the event 
and therefore exhibit different reaction patterns than other banks. They 
are also less likely to retain payments from a perspective of exposure 
control. The failing institution in our simulations does have many 
branches in other EU countries. 
 
 
8.3.2  Data used for the simulations 
The data used for the simulations is from the month of June 2004 (22 
days). That month displayed a volume and value of transactions that 
were close to the daily average for that year, with a slightly higher 
number of transactions (24.4 thousand a day, compared to an average 
of 23.5 thousand) and a slightly lower value (EUR 160 billion a day 
compared to 164 billion). In that year June offered the additional 
advantage of not having any special days, holidays or American bank 
holidays. Many smaller European banks are closed on holidays, which 
leads to a reduced activity in TOP. US bank holidays also tend to have 
a significant impact on payments in the Netherlands as most Dutch 




                                          
8 In other types of work, benchmark simulations have also been used to compare different 
system designs and to assess the efficiency of a system’s design compared to other 
possible designs. 
9 This impact is mainly felt on the day of the US bank holiday itself, with a decrease of 
35% and 23% in the value and number of transactions respectively. On the day after the 
US bank holidays both the value and number of transactions increase by 23% and 17% 
(van Oord and Lin, 2005).  
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8.3.3  Benchmark simulations and three scenarios 
A total of 242 simulations were carried out: 66 for the benchmark, the 
higher and lower bounds of liquidity and the worst-case failure 
scenario, with a disruption occurring at start-of-day;
10 110 for 
Scenario 2, with the non-failing participants reacting within 10, 30 
minutes, 1, 2 or 4 hours; and finally 66 for Scenario 3, with 
participants reacting when their individual exposure reach three 
different thresholds. 
  In the worst-case failure scenario (Scenario 1), payments from a 
major TOP participant to other banks are removed from the data as of 
start-of-day. The stricken bank does not recover within the day, which 
means that the disruption lasts for the remainder of the day. Although 
this would be an exceptional event, it is not totally impossible and the 
impact of such a disruption would certainly be significant. In 2003 one 
of the major European banks, accounting for slightly less than 10% of 
the overall TARGET volume, failed to send payments between 11:30 
and 19:30 on a single day. Its counterparties were expecting to receive 
EUR 40 billion on that day.
11 In comparison, the stricken bank in the 
simulations accounted for slightly more than 20% of all TOP 
transactions in volume and slightly less than 20% in value. 
  Scenarios 2 and 3 introduce a reaction from other payment system 
participants. In Scenario 2, banks cease their payments to the stricken 
bank in order to prevent its accounts from acting as a liquidity sink. 
That way they are able to reduce the impact of the operational 
disruption on the system. A reaction time of 10, 30 minutes, 1, 2 or 4 
hours is simulated. The 10-minute interval is based on work done by 
Bedford et al (2005) for the UK payment system CHAPS. Moving 
away from this reaction time allows us to assess the influence of a 
reaction delay on the impact of the disruption. In Scenario 3, 
counterparties’ reaction is individually-tailored as they stop sending 
payments once their exposure to the failing bank (the net amounts 
paid) reach a certain percentage of their regulatory capital, namely 
25%, 10% or 5%. 25% of regulatory capital corresponds to the 
maximum allowed exposure toward any individual counterparty. 
Under what is called the ‘large positions rule’ (grote postenregeling), 
                                          
10 An additional 242 simulations were carried out for the failure scenario, varying the 
time at which the disruption occurs. But as this is of little influence on the analysis of 
payment system participants’ reaction to a counterparty failure, these will not be 
discussed in this paper. For detailed information on the time-dependency of the impact of 
an operational disruption, see Ledrut (2007). 
11 As reported by a former TOP operations manager.  
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banks are not allowed to exceed this threshold. Although this rule 
applies to overnight and longer exposures, I have used it as a 
maximum benchmark for intraday exposures in this exercise.
12 Only 8 
banks send payments to the stricken bank (sometimes significantly) in 
excess of 25% of their regulatory capital. Banks are furthermore 
obliged to report any (overnight) exposure exceeding 3% of their 
regulatory capital (see Lelyveld and Liedorp, 2004). For intraday 
liquidity, I have set the lowest limit at 5%; when carrying out this 
exercise, lowering that threshold to 3% did not seem to add 
meaningful information as most payments remaining under the 5% 
threshold are already sent by a few banks with such high levels of 
regulatory capital that lowering the threshold to 3% would not 
generate different results. See Table 8.1 for a summary of these 
different scenarios. 
 
Table 8.1  Summary of the different scenarios 
 








Benchmark No      22  days 
Scenario 1  Yes  No  –  22 days  
Scenario 2  Yes, at 12:00  
 








22 days * 5 
variations = 110 
Scenario 3  Yes, at 12:00  
 
Yes, stop sending 
after exposure 





22 days * 3 
variations = 66 
 
The benchmark simulation, carried out with historical data, was also 
run with a view to assess the upper and lower bounds of liquidity that 
banks will need in order to settle all their payments (see Leinonen and 
                                          
12 When setting their intraday limits, banks do not seem to take into account any 
additional overnight lending to the institutions concerned. Such overnight lending does 
not need to be subtracted from the maximum allowed exposure in order to calculate a 
threshold for intraday lending.  
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Soramäki, 2005, for a more thorough explanation of the concept of 
liquidity bounds).
13 
  In June 2004 in TOP, the upper bound of liquidity, which would 
have been needed by all payment system participants to allow all 
payments to settle immediately, amounted to EUR 50.18 billion on 
average and to nearly EUR 74 billion at a maximum. The upper bound 
of liquidity needed by banks only amounted to slightly more than half 
these figures. The lower bound of liquidity, which would have been 
enough for all payments to settle at end-of-day, was EUR 10.78 
billion.
14 The liquidity available de facto in the system to banks
15 for 
the same month was EUR 6.7 billion in start-of-day balances and EUR 
53.85 billion in deposited collateral (minus haircuts), ie a total of more 
than EUR 60 billion. This is roughly twice the upper bound of 
liquidity for banks only, which suggests that banks’ endowment in 
liquid funds and collateral is very comfortable for the payments that 
are scheduled to be settled on the days of that month. However, the 
distribution of liquidity among banks is also important for the system 
to function well. In theory, as reserves are costly and collateral has an 
opportunity cost, banks would be tempted to reduce their liquid 
holdings at the central bank down to the level at which they would be 
able to settle all their payments within an acceptable timeframe. As we 
will see later, however, other factors play a role in the distribution of 
payment system participants’ liquidity. In the simulations, this 
distribution is important as it influences the queuing and possible 
rejection of payments. It is implicitly assumed that there is no 
interbank market where banks with excess reserves could trade with 
banks lacking some necessary funds. 
                                          
13 These bounds of liquidity can be computed by allowing banks, starting the day without 
any balances on their accounts, to draw on unlimited amounts of intraday credit. All 
payments will thus settle immediately and queues will be empty. The sum of all the 
lowest negative balances on banks’ accounts during the day is the upper bound of 
liquidity at system level. The sum of all negative net balances at the end of the day is the 
lower bound of liquidity at system level; it would be sufficient to allow participants to 
settle all their obligations in a DNS system. 
14 These are theoretical lower and higher bounds as the system is a ‘pure’ RTGS system. 
No consideration is taken of time-critical payments which absolutely need to be settled at 
certain times during the day. This includes payments not originated or received by banks, 
which may be sent from accounts that are not bound by a maximum overdraft facility, eg 
the accounts of the central bank itself. 
15 By banks is meant banks located in the Netherlands, which need to rely on either 
balances on their accounts at De Nederlandsche Bank or on collateral deposited at the 
central bank. This does not include banks located in other European countries which send 
payments to TOP through TARGET.  
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  On the contrary to a number of other papers which estimate the 
relationship between the liquidity level and the impact of a disruption 
(Bedford et al, 2005, and others), all simulations in this paper are 
based on the historical amounts of reserves and collateral at the central 
bank, so as to assess the potential effect of a disruption under the 
conditions that held in June 2004. These conditions were relatively 
comfortable, which suggests that a disruption occurring under more 
stressed liquidity conditions would undoubtedly have a stronger 
impact on the system, assuming the distribution of reserves and 
collateral is kept constant. 
 
 
8.3.4  Quantifying the impact of a disruption 
The impact of a disruption can be measured by the number of 
unsettled payments sent by healthy system participants (secondary-
round effect), by the settlement delays incurred by payments 
submitted to the system and by the cost of additional credit that 
healthy participants need to borrow overnight. These measures allow a 
comparison of the different scenarios. 
 
 
Unsettled payments / secondary-round effects 
 
The first-round effects of an operational disruption stem directly from 
the payments not sent by the failing institution while the secondary-
round effects can be measured as the number and value of payments 
that other banks will not be able to make due to a lack of funds caused 
by the fact that none of the payments from the stricken bank were 
received. They indicate the potential for the disruption to spread out 
and lead to additional unsettled payments. Such unsettled payments 





When payments cannot be settled due to a lack of funds, they remain 
queued. The longer they remain in the queue, the longer settlement is 
delayed. From a system perspective, the higher the number (and 
value) of payments that cannot be settled immediately, and the longer 
their stay in the queue, the higher the settlement delay. RTGS systems 
with ample available liquidity and no queuing will show no settlement 
delay at all. The introduction of the possibility of queuing and  
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reduction of the funds available increases settlement delay, with DNS 
systems that settle all payments at the end of the day exhibiting the 
highest settlement delay. Such an aggregate settlement delay can be 

















where, in the numerator, the value of payments in the queue is 
summed over each minute of the day and, in the denominator, the 
cumulative value of all sent payments is summed over each minute of 
the day. Settlement delay can be calculated for a portion of time (up to 
a whole day) for some or all payment system participants. It is 
between 0 and 1, with 0 indicating that all payments are settled 
immediately (as in a pure RTGS system with no queues and ample 
liquidity) and 1 that all remain delayed until the end of the period 
under consideration (this will typically be exhibited by a DNS 
system). Settlement delay means settlement risk. As long as queued 
payments have not been settled with finality, the recipient remains 
exposed to credit risk (which would materialise if the sender proves 
unable to fund its account), to liquidity risk (if the payment arrives 
later than the recipient would have expected given its own funding 
needs) and to operational risk (a disruption at either the sending 
institution or the system operator can prevent the payment from being 
settled in due time). 
 
 
The cost of an operational failure 
 
Given the high cost of delaying payments to the next day (eg due to 
the roll-over of some deals), I assumed for this exercise that payment 
system participants would fund their outgoing payments up to the 
maximum during the day with central bank intraday credit. At the end 
of the day, as the disruption would not be resolved, remaining 
negative positions would need to be funded overnight, either on the 
overnight interbank market or at the central bank, making use of what 
is called the marginal lending facility. The additional liquidity that 
banks incorporated in the Netherlands would need at the end of the 
day, compared to the benchmark simulation, is equal to the difference 
between the sum of all negative values on central bank accounts at the  
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end of the day (resulting from the simulations) and the use of the 
marginal lending facility in the month of June 2004, which averaged 
EUR 159.76 thousand. For the same month, the interest rate of the 
marginal lending facility was 3% pa, while the EONIA rate, the 
market rate, amounted to 2.03% pa. Although I have calculated the 
costs of additional liquidity in accordance with these rates, a major 
disruption could influence the market rate and push it upward as 
demand for overnight liquidity would significantly rise compared to 
the available liquidity in the market. However, such an effect would 
be dampened by the width of the euro market, as the liquidity needs of 
Dutch banks might be fulfilled by other euro area institutions. This 
effect can be expected to be stronger in a small closed market where 




8.4  Simulating the influence of banks’ reaction 
on the impact of a disruption 
8.4.1  Counterparties do not react 
Scenario 1 assumes that one of the major payment system participants 
in the Dutch interbank payment system TOP is unable to send 
payment orders as from 07:00, the opening time of the TARGET 
system. The default lasts for the rest of the day. If the operational 
inability to send payments were to be solved within a short period of 
time, the payment system would only be affected during the 
disruption; queues would arise for the duration of the disruption and 
disappear rapidly after the failing participant has resumed its 
operations. At the end of the day no unsettled payments would remain. 
In this exercise, unsettled payments will be used in order to assess the 
impact of the disruption and participants’ ability to weather a 





The simulations show that, on average over the month of June 2004, 
were a major Dutch bank to retain all its payments as from the 
opening time of the system, about 16 payments from other participants 
would remain unsettled as a consequence of liquidity shortages. This 
would represent more than EUR 1 billion. Additional simulations have  
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shown that, as expected, the secondary-round effects decrease when 
the disruption occurs later during the day (see Ledrut, 2007, for a 
discussion of the time-dependency of the impact of a disruption). The 
strength of the secondary-round effects can substantially differ from 
one day to another, varying between 3 and 45 unsettled payments, and 
a value between about EUR 40 million and slightly less than EUR 2.2 
billion (see Table 8.2). An operational disruption at a major payment 
system participant also clearly increases settlement delay from 0.08 in 
the benchmark simulation to 0.13 in the worst-case failure scenario. 
 
Table 8.2  Impact of an operational disruption 
      (excluding failing participant’s payments) 
      on unsettled payments and settlement delay 
 
Number unsettled  Value unsettled (EUR million)  Delay ind. 
Av  Min  Max  St. dev  Av  Min  Max  St. dev  Av 
16.62 3.00  45.00  11.38  1,075.18  38.95  2,196.00 520.36 0.13 
 
 
In June 2004, counterparties to the failing bank were expected to 
receive, on average, about 3.4 thousand payments and EUR 30 billion 
on each day. Following an operational failure, the value trapped on the 
stricken bank’s accounts (due to the liquidity sink effect) would reach 
about 5.5 times its normal end-of-day value. On average, the 
maximum level of intraday borrowing that would remain outstanding 
at the end of the day would be more than EUR 1.5 billion. The 
maximum cost of additional overnight funding would be about EUR 
200 thousand for the marginal lending facility and nearly EUR 140 
thousand for interbank lending. 
 
 
8.4.2 Timed  stop-sending 
There is some observed evidence that payment system participants 
would react within a certain timeframe following an operation 
disruption at one of their counterparties. A paper by Bedford et al 
(2005) is based on such evidence for CHAPS, the UK payment 
system.
16 Because their work incorporates the effect of counterparties’ 
timed reaction, the worst-case moment for a disruption to occur is not 
                                          
16 ‘Anecdotal evidence from CHAPS Sterling suggests that the time-lag between an 
individual bank experiencing an operational failure and the flow of payments to that bank 
slowing significantly is typically of the order ot ten minutes’.  
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at the beginning of the day but at a moment at when the ‘virtual credit 
balance’ (for each minute, the sum of the stricken bank’s reserves and 
its expected payments in the next ten minutes) is at its highest and a 
lot of payments still need to be made. Such a virtual credit balance 
gives an indication of the potential for the stricken bank to develop 
into a liquidity sink. At the moment when the operational disruption is 
meant to occur, the stricken bank is due to send or receive 46.000 
payments with a total value of GBP 45.7 billion. As a share of the 
total value processed by CHAPS Sterling, this is in the same order of 
magnitude as the bank considered in this paper, although the UK bank 
accounts for a much higher relative volume of payments. Ten minutes 
after the disruption, all payments to the failing participant cease. 
Varying the quantity of liquidity available, Bedford et al find that the 
secondary-round effects of a disruption are only significant at levels of 
liquidity which are much below the liquidity available in the system. 
  With regard to TOP, observations by payment system operators 
suggest that Dutch banks would be less prompt to react than UK 
banks, and that, for a disruption occuring early in the morning, they 
would probably not delay payment orders before noon. Foreign banks 
are expected to be the first to stop sending payments. In our example, 
given the reputation of the failing bank and its habit of sending 
payments early in the day, and therefore of supplying other banks with 
liquidity, domestic banks would probably not rapidly cancel 
transactions. We will see later in this paper that differentiating 
between domestic and foreign banks can be justified by the fact that 
all banks wish to limit their relative exposure to the failing institution. 
  Scenario 2 is based partly on the work by Bedford et al as I 
simulate that participants stop sending payments to the stricken bank 
some time after the start of the disruption. However, it focuses on two 
new questions: By how much can participants reduce the impact of a 
disruption? And is this a function of the reaction time? The stricken 
banks’ counterparties stop to send payments 10, 30 minutes, 1, 2 or 4 
hours after the disruption. Note that such a reaction pattern assumes 
perfect information in the market about the occurrence and timing of a 
disruption. Even if, de facto, not all banks react simultaneously, as 
some did not schedule payments to the stricken bank within the 







When participants do not react following a disruption and continue to 
send payments to the stricken bank, about 16 additional payments get 
stalled due to liquidity shortages. When participants do react, the 
secondary-round effect decreases to an average of about 7 rejected  
payments at the end of the day for a reaction time of 4 hours (a 
reaction time in concordance with payment system operators’ 
observations for TOP). It thus seems that even a relatively long 
reaction time would be effective in limiting the secondary-round 
effects of a failure. Counter-intuitively, reducing the reaction time 
from 4 to 2 hours or less has a much more limited effect. Indeed, for 
reaction times ranging between 10 minutes and 2 hours, the 
secondary-round effects are quasi-similar, with about 5 stalled 
payments. 
  Reacting also appears to be quite efficient in reducing the costs of 
additional liquidity. Where such costs reach about EUR 202 thousand 
and slightly less than EUR 140 thousand for central bank and money 
market lending respectively (for an additional EUR 1.7 billion) in the 
worst-case scenario, they can be reduced to less than half these 
amounts if banks react within ten minutes (see Table 8.3). But no 
matter how fast they react, banks appear unable to fully eliminate the 
need to rely on additional liquidity following a disruption; even when 
they stop sending payments to the failing institution within 10 minutes 
after a disruption, they still incur costs of about EUR 100 thousand or 
EUR 67 thousand for central bank and money market lending 
respectively. Between 10 and 30 minutes, the costs of additional 
liquidity increase, as expected, while the unsettled payments in the 
secondary-round effects remain constant: for these levels, banks can 
apparently continue to incur higher overdrafts; their payments are only 
rejected for a longer reaction time. But between 30 minutes and 1 hour 
the additional liquidity needed is reduced as more payments remain 
unsettled. The difference between days is relatively important (see 
Table 8.4). On the day with the lowest second-round effects, all 
payments settle as from a reaction time of 2 hours while on the day 
with the highest effects even a reaction time of ten minutes does not  
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reduce the number of unsettled payments below 12.
17 Changes in 
settlement delays will be discussed separately at the end of 8.4.3. 
 
Table 8.3  The impact of timed stop-sending on 
      secondary round effects and liquidity costs 
 
Unsettled payments  Additional liquidity 









EONIA marginal  lending 
10 min  4.86  303.37  824.49  66.95  98.94 
30 min  4.86  303.37  824.71  66.97  98.96 
1 hour  4.90  319.23  823.83  66.89  98.86 
2 hours  5.00  329.65  901.77  73.22  108.21 
4 hours  7.43  510.46  1400.30  113.70  168.04 
Unlimited  
(> 11 hours)  16.62 1075.18  1687.96 137.06  202.56 
 
 
Table 8.4  Daily variation of results for timed 
     stop-sending 
 
Number unsettled  Value unsettled (EUR millions)  Reaction 
time  Av  Min  Max  St. dev  Av  Min  Max  St. dev 
10  mn  4.86  0.00 12.00 3.55 303.37 0.00 1,264.98 322.64 
30  mn  4.86  0.00 12.00 3.55 303.37 0.00 1,264.98 322.64 
1  h  4.90  0.00 13.00 3.66 319.23 0.00 1,264.98 352.62 
2h  5.00  0.00 13.00 3.63 329.65 0.00 1,264.98 345.75 
4h 7.43  2.00  32.00  6.69  510.46  20.28  1,353.02 347.24 
 
 
In view of the described observations with regard to the behaviour of 
TOP participants, it would be interesting to differentiate between 
participants (for example, letting only a fraction of participants react 
or different types of participants react at different time intervals, with 
smaller or foreign banks reacting immediately and bigger or domestic 
banks being less rapid in their reaction). It would also be possible to 
simulate a timed stop-sending where the time lag is calculated not as 
from the occurrence of the operational disruption – which assumes 
perfect information in the market about the operational health of any 
given bank – but as from the moment at which each bank expects to 
                                          
17 On a certain day, an interesting situation can be witnessed as participants’ reaction 
leads to an increase in the number of unsettled payments compared to no reaction. On that 
day, the payments sent by the defaulting participant before disruption, but waiting in the 
queue for incoming payments, can remain unsettled as these expected incoming payments 
do not arrive.  
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receive payments from the failing institution – which assumes that 
banks are only informed about an operational failure when they miss 
payments due to them. However, instead of differentiating in terms of 
participants’ reaction time, I have worked on another scenario, where 
differentiation was a natural consequence of the assumption: 
participants react when their exposure reaches a certain threshold. 
 
 
8.4.3 Exposure  control 
The hypothesis underpinning Scenario 3 is that once the stricken 
bank’s counterparties’ liquidity is getting scarcer, they block outgoing 
payments to that bank. Doing that, they rely on their internal limits. 
Their real limits are not known. For this exercise, they have been 
approximated by setting bilateral credit limits vis-à-vis the failing 
bank at 25%, 10% and 5% of counterparties’ regulatory capital. 
  A practical difficulty related to this exercise concerned bank 
branches operating under a European passport; these branches do not 
need to maintain separate regulatory capital for their Dutch activities. 
There were 7 such branches participating in TOP in June 2004. They 
accounted for about 2.6% of all payments sent by banks in volume 
and 3.8% in value. I have assumed that their payment activity in the 
Netherlands was indicative of their strength in terms of capital in that 
country and have created a peer group for each bank, made up of 4 to 
6 Dutch banks with comparable payment patterns in TOP. I have then 
taken the average regulatory capital of the Dutch banks in the peer 
group as a proxy for the regulatory capital of the foreign banks. 
Although this may not be totally correct in theory, as the solvability of 
these banks is related to the strength of their mother institution; from a 
payment system perspective it seems reasonable to assume that a 
bank’s ability to manage its payment activities in a foreign country is 
related to its payment flows. Discussions with banking supervisors 
and payment system operators confirm that view. 
  This exercise bears resemblance to the work of Mazars and 
Woelfel (2005), who simulate the technical failure of a major 
participant in the French PNS system at start-of-day. Up to 10% of 
payments get rejected in the second round. The authors try out 
different bilateral limits – these limits are managed centrally in the 
system – and conclude that ’the consequences of a technical default 
could be greatly reduced if the participants set their bilateral sender 
limits at a lower level than that currently observed and if they reacted 
rapidly to information indicating a technical default by reducing their 
bilateral limits with the defaulting participant’. By reducing the level  
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of exposure from 25% to 10% and 5%, I have tested if this conclusion 





In TOP, compared to no threshold at all, the existence of a threshold 
makes a difference as even a threshold of 25% reduces the secondary-
round effects nearly by half to slightly more than 9 unsettled 
payments, with a value of EUR 850 million (see table 8.5). But there 
too reducing the level of that threshold to 10% and even 5% does not 
bring about the reduction of rejected payments that would be 
expected. Even when payment system participants do not allow for an 
exposure higher than 5% of their regulatory capital, the secondary-
round effects appear to be stronger than when they only stop sending 
payments four hours after the start of the disruption. But for a similar 
level of secondary-round failures, the additional liquidity needed is 
lower, with EUR 1.1 billion for the 5% threshold and about 1.5 billion 
for the 4-hour stop-sending scenario. However, the large variations 
between days (see Table 8.6,), with a minimum of 2 and a maximum 
of 20 unsettled payments and a high standard deviation at a 5% 
threshold, as well as the relatively small number of simulations carried 
out limit the statistical significance of the results. 
  This exercise shows that foreign banks (mainly subsidiaries of 
foreign banks that do need to hold capital in the Netherlands) and 
smaller banks will tend to delay payments earlier as their regulatory 
capital is relatively low. With a threshold of 5%, most of the payments 
of such foreign participants to the stricken bank remain unsent as the 
value of these payments would amount to more than 5% of their 
regulatory capital. 
 
Table 8.5  The impact of exposure control on 
      secondary round effects and liquidity costs 
 
Unsettled payments  Additional liquidity 
Costs of overnight overdraft 
(EUR thousands) 
Exposure 








million)  EONIA marginal  lending 
5% 8.71  756.96  1137.35  92.35  136.48 
10% 9.00  783.71  1286.13  104.43  154.34 
25% 9.38  850.42  1522.94  123.66  182.75 




Table 8.6  Daily variation of results 
      for exposure control 
 
Number unsettled  Value unsettled (EUR millions)  Reaction 
threshold  Av  Min  Max  St. dev  Av  Min  Max  St. dev 
5%  8.71 2.00 20.00  4.83 756.96 7.62  1,560.84  457.45 
10%  9.00 2.00 20.00  4.65 783.71 7.62  1,560.84  435.19 





Compared to the simulations carried out under Scenario 1, settlement 
delays increase when the failing bank’s counterparties stop sending 
payments to that bank under Scenarios 2 and 3. The indicator has a 
value of 0.14 for all reaction times under Scenario 2, except for the 
longest (4 hours), for which it takes the value 0.12. Counter-
intuitively, a longer reaction time reduces settlement delay. The delay 
indicators for the third scenario confirm these findings, with longer 
delays (a value of 0.16) under all sub-scenarios. As counterparties’ 
reactions are expected to limit the liquidity strains in the system, these 
results are somewhat surprising. But they may be explained by the 
way the indicator is calculated. Indeed, the number (and value) of 
payments decreases very steeply when participants react while the 
values in the queue are much less affected. For example, the value of 
queued payments declines by 21% in the 5% exposure control 
scenario, while the overall value of all sent payments is reduced by 
32% as a consequence of participants’ reaction. 
 
 
8.4.4 Limitations  of  these behavioural simulations 
The simulation of payment systems participants’ behaviour makes it 
necessary to rely on a number of debatable assumptions. Assuming all 
participants react in an identical matter is one of them. For example, 
the nationality of the counterparty would almost certainly play a role, 
as Dutch banks are more likely to continue sending payments to each 
other for a longer time after a disruption than would foreign banks. 
This is mainly due to foreign banks’ lower regulatory capital, but it 
could also find its roots in a different relationship with the failing 
institution. Such differences can also be found among Dutch banks, 
with close cooperative relationships leading to less retained payments 
and vice versa. The size of the bank could also matter.  
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  More specifically for the exercise with exposure reduction, the 
relation between regulatory capital and payments is not 
straightforward. Some banks have a high capital ratio and make few 
payments and vice versa. There are also some special banks which are 
close to single purpose institutions and make many payments of a very 
high value in spite of a relatively low capital ratio. The construction of 
the proxy for foreign banks could also be discussed as it would not 
reflect their solvability, which would depend on their mother 
institution. 
  Not only have I assumed identical behaviour among payment 
systems participants, but no differentiation has been made among 
payments sent to the stricken bank. However, the type of payment, its 
value and its originator could all influence the sending bank’s 
likeliness to retain it in the face of a disruption. Some payments need 
to be made on a given day in order to discharge an obligation incurred 
for a certain amount of time, such as the repayment of money market 
loans. These payments are not likely to be retained longer than the end 
of the day in order to avoid overnight penalties. Other payments may 
be ‘coupled’ to payments that the failing bank is about to send; these 
payments would only be released after receipt of the incoming 
payment. The value of the payment also matters as small value 
payments, which account for an important number of transactions 
settled by large-value payment systems,
18 would be most likely to pass 
in spite of limits. Very large payments would be the first to be 
delayed. Note that this does happen under Scenario 3 as limits happen 
to be often reached once a very large payment needs to be sent. With 
regard to the originator, payments for important customers are more 
likely to be sent independently of the operational health of the 
receiving bank. 
  Finally, the order of payments is only of marginal importance in 
Scenario 2 but can play a significant role in Scenario 3. Due to the 
construction of the reaction function, all payments above the threshold 
remain unsent. This means that very large value payments that exceed 
the threshold automatically get blocked, regardless of their timing. In 
practice, some banks send such payments very early in the day to the 
failing institution, before receiving any payments from that bank. 
These payments would unlikely be stopped at start-of-day. However, 
in the simulations, when very large payments precede smaller ones, 
both are blocked. This is not true when the smaller payments come 
first, so the rule can have different effects on different days 
                                          
18 As much as 25% of all TARGET transactions have a value of less than EUR 1,250.  
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(depending on the order of, among others, recurring payments). The 
influence of these variations on the results is however likely to be 




This paper presents simulations carried our with the payment and 
settlement system simulator developed by the Bank of Finland. It 
shows how participants’ behaviour in the face of a disruption can 
mitigate the impact of such a disruption, both for themselves – in 
terms of the costs of fulfilling their own payment obligations – and for 
the system as a whole – in terms of the payments rejected following a 
liquidity shortage. 
  It seems that the secondary effects of a disruption at a major TOP 
participant are relatively limited at current liquidity levels. Liquidity 
levels that are higher than the upper bounds of liquidity, which 
correspond to the liquidity needed to settle all payments immediately, 
are helpful to reduce the impact of a disruption – but do not guarantee 
that such a disruption will be weathered without further payment 
rejections as the distribution of this liquidity in the system makes a 
difference (abstracting from an interbank money market). The cost of 
such a disruption could be large for some healthy banks as these banks 
normally rely on incoming payments to fund part of their outgoing 
transactions. These would then need to be funded with intraday credit 
and with overnight credit if the stricken bank were to prove unable to 
resume operations at the end of the day. 
  Payment system participants can control their exposure to their 
counterparties by way of internal bilateral limits or by way of 
monitoring the activity of other participants and reacting to outages. 
Simulations seem to show that even a slow reaction (eg 4 hours) might 
be effective in reducing the secondary effects of a disruption. 
However, in some exceptional situations, participants’ reactions could 
slightly increase the impact of the disruption as payments sent by the 
failing participant in advance of the disruption, and waiting in the 
queue, could remain unsettled due to lack of funding. Although 
participants’ actions seem to be effective, they do not completely 
eliminate the secondary effects of a disruption or eliminate the costs 
related to additional overnight funding. Furthermore, simulation 
results seem to indicate that stringent bilateral limits effectively 
mitigate the individual costs of operational outages. A timed stop 
sending rule seems less able to limit additional liquidity costs but  
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more effective in mitigating systemic effects. Even a reaction delay of 
1 or 2 hours would substantially reduce the second-round impact of 
disruptions. In order to achieve this, central banks could share 
information about participants’ outages so as to allow banks to 
respond timely – although such transparency might be incompatible 
with confidentiality obligations. Banks might also be encouraged to 
communicate in a timely manner about their operational difficulties. 
  These results are based on a relatively small sample, and the 
sometimes large variations between days further limit their statistical 
significance. In order to confirm these findings, additional simulations 
would need to be carried out over longer periods of time. It would also 
be interesting to see whether these conclusions hold for other large 
players in TOP and for other payment systems. The combination of 
limits and timed stop sending rules could also be tried out as some 
banks are likely to have relatively high counterparty limits intraday 
while still being capable of reacting to a detected disruption within a 
certain timeframe. Furthermore, the cost of intraday credit, not taken 
into account in this exercise (collateral being deposited ex ante at the 
central bank), could be used to assess the impact of a disruption in a 
system which offers such credit against a direct fee (eg Fedwire). 
Finally, the implications of the use of (centralised) limits by payment 
system participants under normal conditions could be assessed. Limits 
would indeed have the potential to delay settlements and might even 
prevent some payments from being settled at all, although we might 
expect banks to adjust their limits or change their payment flows if 
this risk were to materialise. Delays might lead to various costs for 
payment system participants (reputation costs but also an increased 
risk of payments not settling), which were assumed negligible for the 
purpose of this paper. Before encouraging central banks to introduce 
centralised limits and banks to actively use or reduce their limits, it 
might be useful to compare these costs to the costs imposed on 
participants by the failure of one of their largest counterparties, as 
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9  The impact of unanticipated 
defaults in Canada’s Large Value 
Transfer System 
Abstract 
Canada’s Large Value Transfer System (LVTS) is designed to meet 
international risk-proofing standards at a minimum cost to participants 
in terms of collateral requirements. It does so, in part, through 
collateralised risk-sharing arrangements whereby participants may 
incur losses if another participant defaults. The LVTS is designed to 
be robust to defaults. Its rules, however, do not ensure that individual 
participants are robust to defaults. The author studies participants' 
robustness to default empirically by creating unanticipated defaults in 
LVTS and finds that all participants are able to withstand their loss 
allocations that result from the largest defaults she can create using 




Canada’s Large Value Transfer System (LVTS) is designed to meet 
international risk-proofing standards at a minimum cost to participants 
in terms of collateral requirements. It does so, in part, through 
collateralised risk-sharing arrangements whereby participants may 
incur losses if another participant defaults.
1,2The system is designed so 
that there is sufficient collateral prepledged by participants to cover at 
least the largest possible payment obligation to the system. Therefore, 
the rules ensure that the system is robust to defaults. The system’s 
rules, however, do not ensure that individual participants are robust to 
defaults; it is up to participants to manage their own risks to make sure 
they can withstand potential losses that result from a default. In this 
                                          
1 A participant is deemed to be in default if it cannot meet its end-of-day net debit 
position. 
2 The Bank of Canada guarantees settlement in the extremely unlikely event that more 
than one participant defaults on a single day and the sum of the exposures exceeds 
participants’ prepledged collateral, so the system is robust to even multiple defaults in a 
single day. This provides for intraday finality of payments.  
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paper, I study participants’ robustness empirically by creating 
unanticipated defaults in LVTS. 
  The system’s rules create the incentive for participants to 
prudently manage their risks vis-à-vis other participants. The majority 
of LVTS transactions go through the survivors-pay component of 
LVTS, where participants’ losses in the event of a default are 
governed by the bilateral credit limit (BCL) that they grant to the 
defaulter. The granting of BCLs, as well as their size, is completely 
voluntary. Given the possibility that another participant could default, 
participants have an incentive to set BCLs at a size that would create 
manageable losses for themselves if a default were to occur. 
Furthermore, in a situation where participants believe that another 
participant may be in danger of defaulting, it could be in their interest 
to reduce the BCLs they grant to this participant, to minimise their 
loss exposures. 
  In this paper, I generate a series of unanticipated defaults by 
individual participants to estimate whether surviving participants 
would be able to withstand their allocated losses.
3 I first estimate the 
frequency with which survivors must contribute to cover a defaulter’s 
shortfall and the relative size of these loss allocations, and then assess 
the ability of participants to withstand these losses by calculating 
individual survivors’ capital positions following a default. 
  Results are based on an eight-month (from March to October 
2004) sample of LVTS transactions, collateral holdings and data on 
bilateral and multilateral credit limits, provided by the Canadian 
Payments Association. Each participant’s maximum net debit position 
and the time at which it was incurred are found using the Bank of 
Finland Payment and Settlement Simulator (‘the simulator’). 
Survivors’ additional settlement obligations (ASOs) are calculated 
according to LVTS rules. 
  I find that the shortfalls resulting from the theoretical defaults are 
generally small, but there exists substantial heterogeneity in how often 
individual participants incur shortfalls, each participant’s average 
shortfall size, and the size of shortfalls over different days. Large 
participants generally incur shortfalls that are much larger than those 
incurred by small participants. These factors create a large degree of 
variability in participants’ loss allocations. In both absolute and 
relative terms, participants’ loss allocations are generally small, but 
when losses are compared with assets and capital, small participants 
                                          
3 I believe that loss allocations would likely be larger when a default is unanticipated than 
anticipated since, as already described, participants that anticipate a default may have 
incentives to reduce the BCLs they grant to that participant.  
256 
take on relatively much more risk than large participants. 
Nevertheless, I find that all participants are robust to the defaults 
generated. 
  This paper contributes to the literature in two respects. First, most 
previous work has focused on losses to survivors in uncollateralised 
netting systems; I consider losses in a risk-proofed and collateralised 
system. Second, I apply the simulator to a default analysis, whereas 
most previous studies have focused on questions of liquidity usage or 
operational risk.
4 
  This paper is organised as follows. Section 9.2 provides an 
overview of LVTS’s risk controls and default-resolution procedures. 
Section 9.3 compares this study with the previous literature. Section 
9.4 explains the procedure for generating defaults. Sections 9.5, 9.6, 
and 9.7 describe the findings, and the impact of key assumptions. 
Appendix 1 contains proofs of the efficacy of LVTS’s risk controls 




9.2 LVTS  framework 
To understand the default and loss-allocation procedures used in this 
paper, it is useful to review the main concepts and risk controls within 
LVTS: 
 
•  LVTS is a real-time electronic payments system that provides 
certainty of settlement on a continuous basis for all payments that 
have passed the risk controls. It uses caps, collateral, loss-sharing 
arrangements, and a residual guarantee by the Bank of Canada to 
provide intraday finality and irrevocability of payments. 
•  LVTS is a collateralised, deferred net settlement system. Unlike in 
real-time gross settlement systems, in which settlement defaults 
cannot occur inside the system (because settlement of payments 
involves the immediate transfer of funds across the books of the 
settlement institution), settlement default is possible in LVTS.
5 
                                          
4 See the Bank of Finland website (http://www.bof.fi/eng/3_rahoitusmarkkinat/ 
3.4_Maksujarjestelmat/3.4.3_Kehittaminen/3.4.3.3_Bof-pss2/) for links to studies that 
use the simulator. 
5 However, the collateralised risk controls in the system and the residual Bank of Canada 
guarantee provide for certainty of settlement even where there are multiple defaults.  
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•  LVTS consists of one fully defaulter-pays payment stream and one 
partially survivors-pay stream. In the partially survivors-pay 
stream, a participant is able to incur a larger net debit position than 
the collateral it pledges to support LVTS activity. Thus, survivors 
may have to contribute to cover losses in the event of a default. 
Approximately 88% of LVTS value goes through the partially 
survivors-pay payment stream. 
•  The risk controls are designed so that there will be sufficient 
aggregated collateral in the system to cover at least the largest net 
debit position possible, or, put differently, at least the default of 
the largest single net debtor. 
•  The system will always settle, because all participants contribute 
to a collateral pool and the Bank of Canada provides a residual 
guarantee that, in the unlikely event of multiple defaults on a 
single day, if survivors’ prepledged collateral does not cover the 




Participants first pledge collateral to the Bank of Canada to support 
their LVTS activity, and they then apportion parts of it to collateralise 
each of the defaulter-pays Tranche 1 (T1) and the partially survivors-
pay Tranche 2 (T2).
6 Collateral pledged to the Bank by a participant 
but not apportioned to LVTS is referred to as excess collateral. 
  In T1, each participant, i, apportions collateral to cover its own 
obligations. Its maximum allowed net debit position, referred to as its 
T1 net debit cap (T1NDCi), is set equal to the value of the collateral 
(minus haircuts) that it has pledged to cover these obligations (C1i). 
Thus, each participant fully collateralises its own T1 obligations 
 
i i TINDC 1 C =  (9.1) 
 
In a default, this collateral would be used to cover the defaulter’s 
position, so this stream is referred to as defaulter-pays. 
  In T2, participants determine how much exposure they are willing 
to take on vis-à-vis other participants and extend lines of credit 
accordingly. Each participant i must then apportion collateral (C2i) 
                                          
6 Eligible LVTS collateral includes Bank of Canada funds and government and highly 
rated corporate bonds. The usable value of collateral is the market value of each security 
less a certain amount (a ‘haircut’), to account for market risk.  
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equal to a percentage (θ) of the largest BCL it has extended to any 
other participant j (maxj(BCLij)).
7 This value is called the participant’s 
maximum additional settlement obligation (maxASOi), which is the 
maximum amount that the participant will have to contribute if one or 
more participants to which it has granted a BCL defaults 
 
i ij j i ASO max ) BCL ( max 2 C = θ ⋅ =  (9.2) 
 
In the event of a default, the defaulter’s own T1 and T2 collateral will 
be used first to settle its net debit position. If there is a shortfall, 
however, then survivors’ collateral will be used to cover the 
defaulter’s residual T2 obligations. Thus, although T2 is considered to 
be a survivors-pay tranche, it has a defaulter-pays element as well. 
  Each participant can incur a net bilateral debit position equal to the 
BCL that has been established for it by the grantor. As well as BCLs, 
each participant has a multilateral net debit cap. Each participant i’s 
maximum permitted multilateral T2 net debit position, its T2 net debit 
cap (T2NDCi), is set equal to the sum of the credit lines received from 
all participants, multiplied by the systemwide percentage 
 





ji i BCL NDC 2 T  (9.3) 
 




Throughout the day, individual payments that have passed the risk 
controls are netted, novated, and replaced by a net obligation to 
receive or pay funds.
8 At the end of the day, participants’ T1 and T2 
positions are combined to yield a final multilateral net position that 
they must settle. The Bank of Canada facilitates settlement by debiting 
the settlement accounts of the participants that are in a multilateral net 
debit (short) position and crediting the accounts of participants that are 
in a multilateral net credit (long) position. Through this settlement 
                                          
7 The percentage, referred to as the systemwide percentage, takes into account the effect 
of netting. 
8 The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) (2003) defines novation as the 
‘satisfaction and discharge of existing contractual obligations by means of their 
replacement by new obligations’.  
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process, net debtors discharge their credit obligations and net creditors 
receive Bank of Canada funds. 
  Solvent participants that are short funds at the end of the day in 
LVTS may trade with participants that are long funds to borrow the 
funds needed for settlement. As well, such participants may obtain the 
funds necessary to settle by taking a fully collateralised discretionary 
advance from the Bank of Canada (at the Bank Rate). Under this 
option, the participant pledges collateral to the Bank of Canada with a 
value equal to its deficit position at the close of LVTS, and the Bank 
of Canada credits its settlement account with the funds. The duration 
of this loan is one day (to be paid back by 6 pm the following day). 
  Participants are allowed to use all the collateral that they have 
apportioned in LVTS to cover their discretionary advance: namely, the 
collateral that they have apportioned to support their own T1 
obligations and the collateral that they have apportioned to T2 to 
cover the lines of credit they have granted to others. As well, they may 





A participant is deemed to be in default if it cannot meet its end-of-
day net debit position. A default can occur under two circumstances: 
 
(i) The participant is in a net debit position at the end of the day and 
has insufficient collateral to cover this position; ie, it has a 
collateral shortfall. 
(ii)  The participant has been suspended from further participation in 
LVTS during the current LVTS cycle and has a net debit position 
that must be settled.
9 This will occur if a participant is closed by its 
regulator. 
 
In the event of the default of any participant i, the Bank of Canada 
will seize the defaulter’s apportioned collateral and grant a non-
discretionary advance to participant i (NDAi) equal to the lesser of (i) 
the absolute value of the participant’s combined Tranche 1 and 
Tranche 2 multilateral net positions (T1MNPi and T2MNPi, 
                                          
9 If a participant is suspended from further participation in LVTS, but is shut down with a 
positive position, it will not be declared in default, because it does not owe funds to the 
system.  
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respectively), less any funds the participant is holding in its settlement 




() [] i i i i i i 2 C 1 C ), SF MNP 2 T MNP 1 T ( min NDA + − + =  (9.4) 
 
In other words, the Bank of Canada will lend the lesser of the actual 
position that the participant must settle or the collateral the participant 
has apportioned to cover its position. For the latter case, survivors will 




9.2.4  The ability of participants to generate a shortfall 
A participant can incur a larger net debit position than the collateral it 
pledges for LVTS purposes. Note that participant i’s maximum net 














ji i i BCL NDC 1 T NDP max  (9.5) 
 
The minimum value of collateral pledged by participant i to cover its 
position is 
 
) ) BCL ( (max NDC 1 T 2 C 1 C ij j i i i θ ⋅ + = +  (9.6) 
 
Thus, a participant could incur a position exceeding the value of its 
own collateral. The maximum own-collateral shortfall for any 
participant i (maxOCSi) is equal to equation (9.5) minus equation 
(9.6), or 
 









) BCL ( max BCL OCS max ij j
1 N
1 j
ji i  (9.7) 
 
                                          
10 The balance of a participant’s settlement account at the Bank of Canada will normally 
be zero. 
11 Appendix 1 provides proof that there will be sufficient collateral to cover one but not 
necessarily multiple defaults. 
12 Recall from equation (9.3) that each participant’s T2NDC is equal to the sum of BCLs 
received multiplied by the systemwide percentage.  
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The maximum own-collateral shortfall also represents the maximum 
losses to be divided among survivors. In the case of a default where 
the defaulter has a collateral shortfall, a non-discretionary advance 
will be granted with a value equal to the defaulter’s apportioned 
collateral (C1i + C2i), and the survivors will contribute funds to cover 
the residual shortfall, where the residual shortfall will have an upper 
bound of maxOCSi. 
 
 
9.2.5  Loss allocation to survivors 
If any one participant i defaults, each participant that granted a BCL to 
that participant will have to contribute funds to cover participant i’s 
shortfall. Participant j’s additional settlement obligation (ASOj) is 













OCS ASO  (9.8) 
 
Therefore, survivors cover the defaulter’s shortfall, with each survivor 




9.2.6  Feature of LVTS under analysis 
I have shown that, in most circumstances, the BCLs granted to a 
participant can allow collateral shortfalls (equation 9.7) and defaults. 
The system is robust to defaults. LVTS’s rules give participants the 
ability and incentive, not the requirement, to limit their maximum 
potential losses to a size that they can manage from a solvency 
perspective. However, the impact of losses on participants’ capital 




                                          
13 In this formula, BCLji represents the largest BCL participant j has granted to defaulting 
participant i at any time during the day of default. This is important, because participants 
can increase or decrease their BCLs granted during the day and contribute based on their 
maximum BCLs granted to the defaulter during the day.  
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9.3  Comparison with previous literature 
In his 1992 and 1993 papers, Engert considers risk controls in 
payments systems that provide for a system’s robustness to default at 
a minimum cost in terms of collateral requirements. Through a 
theoretical model, Engert finds that when a payments system is 
designed such that survivors share in a defaulter’s losses, a system’s 
robustness to default does not necessarily indicate that the same is true 
for individual participants. Since LVTS is a system that falls into this 
category, it is important to empirically test whether participants are 
robust to defaults. 
  Previous researchers have studied the potential for contagion 
following an initial default in uncollateralised netting-based payments 
systems (good examples are Northcott, 2002, Humphrey, 1986, and 
Angelini, Maresca, and Russo, 1996). They assume that the defaulter 
cannot pay the funds owed to cover its position, and that the 
participant does not have any collateral to use to fulfill payment of its 
obligation. The researchers make assumptions about key factors such 
as unwind rules, provisional credit granted to customers, and the 
ability of the remaining participants to withstand the losses resulting 
from the initial default to determine whether there are any subsequent 
defaulters. Sensitivity analysis is performed, and the researchers are 
able to determine frequencies and magnitudes of knock-on defaults. 
  As with the previous studies, my aim is to study the effects of 
initial defaults on the payments system. A number of differences exist 
from the previous studies, however, based mainly on the fact that 
LVTS is a collateralised netting system: 
 
•  Rather than assuming that each participant that ends the day with a 
net debit position defaults, I find each participant’s largest net 
debit position during the day and assume that it is shut down at 
that time. If the participant has a net debit position, the participant 
will be a defaulter. Accordingly, a larger number of defaults, and 
larger net debit positions, occur using this method than if 
participants’ end-of-day positions had been used. 
•  Because a defaulters’ own collateral is first used to cover its net 
debit position, losses do not accrue to survivors in all cases of 
default, as they do in the previous studies. Defaulters’ collateral is 
taken into account when determining the losses to survivors. 
•  Payments that have cleared in LVTS are not unwound. Therefore, 
losses are determined based on actual LVTS loss-allocation rules  
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and are not offset by funds recovered from the accounts of 
customers. 
 
Based on these differences, I do not expect knock-on defaults to occur 
in this study. 
  In a recent paper, Galos and Soramäki (2005) explore what the 
potential for systemic risk in TARGET2 would be if it were designed 
as either an uncollateralised deferred net settlement (DNS) system or a 
collateralised DNS system much like LVTS. They find that, under all 
scenarios, the potential for systemic risk is low, but that the loss-
sharing rule is important. The most effective loss-sharing rule is one in 
which banks share in losses relative to their size. 
 
 
9.4  Methodology and choice parameters 
If a participant is closed by its regulator during the LVTS day, it will 
immediately become ineligible for further participation in LVTS. 
Other participants will continue to clear and settle payments among 
themselves for the remainder of the day. At the end of the day, the net 
position of the closed participant as of its time of closure will have to 
be settled. If this is a net debit position, the participant will be 
declared in default. The Bank of Canada will grant a non-discretionary 
advance equal to the lesser of the defaulter’s net position or the value 
of its collateral apportioned to T1 and T2. The Bank of Canada will 
then acquire the collateral as remuneration for the advance. In the 
latter case, survivors that granted a BCL to the defaulter will have to 
contribute to cover the shortfall according to the formula used in 
equation (9.8). 
  In this study, I create defaults by assuming that each participant is 
closed by its regulator at the time it incurs its largest combined T1 and 
T2 net debit position on each day. I find each participant’s largest 
combined net debit position rather than its largest T2 (survivors-pay) 
net debit position because, at settlement, each participant must settle 
its combined T1 and T2 position and can use all its collateral to do so. 
For settlement purposes, a net credit position in T1 will offset a net 
debit position in T2 or vice versa. The maximum potential shortfall 
between a participant’s net debit position and its collateral occurs  
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when the participant incurs its largest combined T1 and T2 net debit 
position.
14 
  I run T1 and T2 transactions together through the simulator and 
obtain each participant’s maximum net debit position, and the time at 
which it occurs, from the simulator’s output statistics.
15,16 If this is a 
net debit position, this is an instance of default. The net debit position 
is then compared with the participant’s collateral and, if the former is 
greater, the participant has incurred a shortfall. The number and value 
of shortfalls for each participant are recorded. In each case, survivors’ 
losses (ASOs) are calculated. The average and maximum losses of 
each surviving participant are compared with their assets and 
regulatory capital requirements to assess whether the survivor can 





The period of study spans the 170 business days from 1 March to 29 
October 2004. Over this period, the average daily volume and value of 
payments were 17,063 and CAD 130.2 billion, respectively. 
  The names and abbreviations of the fourteen institutions that 
participated in LVTS during the sample period are listed in Box 1.
17 
This group contains eight domestic banks (ATB, BMO, BNS, CIBC, 
LAR, NAT, RBC, and TD), two foreign bank subsidiaries (HSBC and 
BNP), one foreign bank branch (BOA), one co-operative financial 
group (CCD), one central finance facility for Canadian credit unions 
(CUCC), and Canada’s central bank (BOC). Participants are classified 
into ‘large’ and ‘small’ participants, with the threshold being assets of 
CAD 200 billion. Total assets of each participant are reported in Table 
9.1. 
                                          
14 Each participant’s end-of-day collateral holdings are used each day for simplicity and 
in most cases represent its maximum collateral holdings for that day. 
15 The data contain only transactions that have passed the LVTS risk controls, so I can run 
simulations without incorporating credit limits. I can combine T1 and T2 in one 
simulation to find participants’ combined maximum net debit position, because credit 
limits are not applied. 
16 To view patterns in the time at which participants incur their largest shortfalls, see 
Figure A2.1 in Appendix 2. 
17 State Street Bank and Trust Company is excluded from the analysis because it joined 





Transactions, collateral and BCL data are used to determine 
participants’ maximum positions, shortfalls, and loss allocations.  
 
•  The transactions data contain the sender, recipient, value, tranche, 
and submission time for each transaction that was successfully 
cleared by LVTS during the data sample. 
•  Collateral data contain each participant’s value of collateral 
apportioned and pledged, and the date and time effective. 
•  BCL data contain the grantee, grantor, value, date and time 
effective of each BCL, which are used to calculate participants’ 
ASOs. 
 
Box 1: LVTS participants 
 
Alberta Treasury Branches Financial (ATB) 
Bank of America National Association (BOA) 
Bank of Canada (BOC) 
Bank of Montreal (BMO) 
Bank of Nova Scotia (BNS) 
BNP Paribas (Canada) (BNP)  
Caisse centrale Desjardins du Québec (CCD) 
Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (CIBC)
Credit Union Central of Canada (CUCC) 
HSBC Bank Canada (HSBC) 
Laurentian Bank of Canada (LAR) 
National Bank of Canada (NAT) 
Royal Bank of Canada (RBC) 
Toronto-Dominion Bank (TD)  
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1 ROYAL  429.26 
2 TD  310.55 
3 BNS  284.89 
4 CIBC  281.72 
5 BMO  267.73 
6 CCD  103.57 
7 NAT  83.45 
8 CUCC  74.77 
9 HSBC  40.71 
10 LAUR  16.50 
11 ATB  14.59 
12 BOA  4.90 
13 BNP  4.26 
      Note: All participants with assets exceeding CAD 200 
billion are classified as large participants. This 
methodology results in five ‘large’ participants and 
eight ‘small’ participants. 
      Source: The Office of the Superintendent of Financial 
Institutions and participants’ websites. 
 
 
As previously described, I also benchmark shortfalls against total 
assets and capital: 
 
•  Information on federally regulated deposit-taking institutions and 
foreign bank subsidiaries is obtained from the website of the 
Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI 
(2005a) and (2005b)). Information on monthly assets is obtained 
from participants’ consolidated balance sheets, and information on 
quarterly Tier 1 and total capital is obtained from participants’ 
capital adequacy reports. 
•  For ATB, information on annual total assets, Tier 1, and total 
capital is obtained from its 2004/2005 Annual Report (Alberta 
Treasury Branches Financial (2005)).
18 
•  For BOA, information on annual total assets, Tier 1, and total 
capital is obtained from its 2004 Annual Report (Bank of America 
National Association, 2005).
19 
                                          
18 The time period for these data is from 31 March 2004 to 31 March 2005. 
19 It is relevant to use figures for the Bank of America National Association rather than 
the Canadian bank branch.  
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•  For CCD, information on total assets and equity (the best estimate 
of regulatory capital for this institution) is obtained from its 2004 
Annual Report (Desjardins Group, 2005). 
•  For CUCC, information on total assets and members’ equity (an 
estimate of regulatory capital) is obtained from its 2004 Annual 
Report (Credit Union Central of Canada, 2005). These figures 
represent aggregates of the credit unions and caisses populaires 




The sample contains 170 days and 13 potential defaulters.
20 Recall 
that, since participants are assumed to be closed at the time of their 
largest net debit position, the methodology is expected to yield 
defaults in almost all cases; that is, for most participants on most days. 
Indeed, defaults occur in 2,167 of the 2,210 potential cases. These 
defaults result in 1,026 shortfalls. 
 
Result 1: Shortfalls are relatively frequent and, on average, small. 
However, there is considerable variability across participants and 
days. 
 
Recall that a participant is considered to have incurred a shortfall in 
each instance that its position at the time of closure exceeds its 
apportioned collateral. I find that shortfalls occur relatively frequently 
– in 46 per cent of cases. Individual participants’ instances of being in 
a shortfall position range from 0% to 95% of days. Large participants 
incur shortfalls 15% more frequently than small participants. 
  Figure 9.1 illustrates the size distribution of shortfalls for all 
participants in the 46% of cases where shortfalls are incurred. As 
shown, most shortfalls are relatively small. Considering the size of 
shortfalls more closely provides the following conclusions: 
 
•  The average shortfall size for all participants is CAD 210.4 
million, with a standard deviation of CAD 181.7 million. 
•  Shortfalls are, on average, four times larger on participants’ worst 
days than on average days. 
                                          
20 The Bank of Canada is not a potential defaulter.  
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•  Large participants incur shortfalls that are, on average, nearly 
three-and-a-half times larger in absolute terms than those of small 
participants. 
•  The average shortfall size for the participant that incurs the largest 
shortfalls is approximately four times that of all participants. 
•  The largest single shortfall in the sample is nearly CAD 2.9 billion. 
However, 95% of all shortfalls are under CAD 1.2 billion. 
 
Figure 9.1  Size distribution of all participants’ 
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Result 2: The shortfalls incurred are much smaller than the maximum 
shortfalls possible. 
 
Recall from equation (9.7) that participants can incur a maximum 
shortfall equal to a fixed percentage of the amount by which their T2 
net debit cap exceeds their T2 collateral. On average, participants 
incur actual shortfalls that are very small – just 18.1% of the 
maximum possible. On each participant’s worst day, shortfalls are, on 
average, 81.3% of the maximum possible. Accordingly, average 
stresses on the system are small. However, at times, participants 
utilise most of the credit granted to them. 
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Result 3: Survivors’ loss allocations are generally small and borne by 
participants that are most able to withstand them. 
 
Recall from equation (9.8) that, following a default, each survivor is 
allocated a share of the defaulter’s shortfall in proportion to the size of 
the BCL that it has granted to the defaulter. Figure 9.2 illustrates the 
distribution of survivors’ losses. As with shortfalls, losses are, in 
general, small but variable.
21 Specifically, 
 
•  The average loss allocation to any participant over the sample 
period is CAD 16.2 million, with a standard deviation of CAD 
38.1 million. 
•  The average worst loss that participants are exposed to on any day 
is 15.6 times larger than the average and amounts to CAD 252.8 
million. Therefore, the day that a default occurs could affect the 
size of participants’ losses. 
•  Large participants’ loss allocations are, on average, 3.7 times those 
of small participants. Large losses are thus borne by large 
participants that are better able to bear them. 
•  The largest loss allocation any participant receives on any day is 
CAD 753.7 million. However, 95% of losses are CAD 136 million 
or lower. 
 
                                          
21 Recall that a defaulter’s shortfall is the amount by which the defaulter’s net debit 
position exceeds its collateral pledged to the system, so survivors’ losses take defaulters’ 
collateral into account.  
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Figure 9.2  Size distribution of all participants’ loss 
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Result 4: Small participants take on the greatest losses compared with 
asset size. 
 
To scale loss allocations for each participant, I compare losses with 
each participant’s total assets and refer to loss allocations divided by 
total assets as loss-to-asset ratios. For participants overall, loss-to-
asset ratios are small. The average loss-to-asset ratio for all 
participants is 0.02%. When the largest loss allocation that each 
participant incurs on any day is considered, the loss-to-asset ratio 
increases to only 0.4%. 
  Figure 9.3 illustrates average and maximum loss-to-asset ratios for 
all participants, and also when grouped as large or small participants.
22 
Small participants withstand losses that are approximately four times 
larger as a proportion of assets than large participants, meaning that 
small participants take on relatively more risk in the system. The loss 
ratios for all small participants but one, however, are very small.  
 
                                          
22 Note that because the Bank of America is a branch, it is considered a large participant, 
since the assets of the Bank of America (not the Canadian branch) are used to benchmark 
its loss allocation.  
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Figure 9.3  Participants’ losses as a percentage of total 
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Result 5: Losses compared with capital are generally small but lead to 
noticeable increases in leverage in some cases. Nevertheless, 
participants are, in all cases, robust to defaults. 
 
Loss allocations are measured against the highest quality Tier 1 capital 
because it is the most conservative estimate of the resources that 
banks have to absorb losses. The results illustrate the capital losses 
that would result from participants’ loss allocations, and whether 
survivors can withstand their losses. 
  Figure 9.4 illustrates loss-to-capital ratios for all participants, and 
also when grouped as large and small participants.
23 Participants’ 
average loss-to-capital ratios are very small: losses as a percentage of 
capital amount to just 0.35% on average. On the worst days, however, 
participants’ loss-to-capital ratios are 17 times larger. Small 
participants’ average loss-to-capital ratios exceed those of large 
participants by approximately three times. Thus, two themes that have 
occurred throughout the results are repeated: (i) the impact of a default 
on a worst day greatly exceeds that of an average day, and (ii) small 
participants are more affected by defaults than large participants. 
                                          
23 The Bank of America National Association’s capital is used and that bank is considered 
to be a large participant.  
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  In the worst case, losses can be as high as one-third of capital. 
Even in the worst case, however, the participant’s capital remains 
better than that required by its supervisor. Therefore, even the most 
significant loss does not cause any participant to subsequently fail. 
 
Figure 9.4  Participants’ losses as a percentage of 
     capital 
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Result 6: If participants were to use all their pledged collateral to 
cover their net debit position, shortfalls and losses would be both 
much smaller and much less frequent. 
 
Recall that shortfalls and losses have thus far been calculated based on 
the collateral that participants have apportioned to Tranches 1 and 2 in 
LVTS. Apportioned collateral represents participants’ minimum levels 
of pledged collateral required for LVTS. On average, however, 
participants pledge approximately three times their apportioned 
collateral to the Bank of Canada and this excess collateral could be 
apportioned (or put into use) at any time.
24 
  When based on total collateral pledged, the instances and values of 
shortfalls decrease significantly. In fact, five participants do not incur 
a shortfall on any day during the data sample. Losses incurred by 
                                          
24 See McPhail and Vakos (2003) for a model of collateral holdings in LVTS that largely 
explains why participants hold excess collateral. Participants' total collateral needs are a 
function of the opportunity and transactions costs of collateral, the variance in payments 
flows and the cost of payments delay.  
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survivors and loss ratios also decrease by between 50% and 90%. The 
implication is that participants’ losses become almost negligible as a 
percentage of their assets. Even the participant that consistently incurs 
the greatest loss ratios sees its largest loss incurred reduced to less 
than 1% of its total assets (Table 9.2). 
 
Table 9.2  Potential shortfalls and losses based on total 
     collateral 
 
 Result  Reduction  compared 
with base case 
(apportioned collateral) 
(%) 
Shortfall on percentage of days  8.3%  71 
Average shortfall  CAD 20.4 million  90.3 
Average of participants’ 
maximum shortfall  CAD 446.0 million  49.0 
Average loss  CAD 1.86 million  88.5 
Maximum loss  CAD 35.44 million  53.6 
Average loss-to-asset ratio  0.002%  90 
Maximum loss-to-asset ratio  0.05%  54.5 
 
 
9.6  Factors affecting shortfalls and losses 
The shortfalls and losses to survivors found in this study are based on 
the assumptions that each participant is closed at the time of its largest 
net debit position incurred, given actual LVTS data and that the 
default is unanticipated. This section considers the effects of changing 
particular assumptions central to the analysis. 
 
(i) Closure occurs during the LVTS day 
 
I have assumed that a participant is closed by its regulator during the 
LVTS day, and my assumptions make it possible to easily generate 
unanticipated defaults and have them occur at the worst moment in the 
day. In all likelihood, a regulator would avoid shutting down a 
participant during the Canadian business day (and during the LVTS 
day). If a participant were closed outside of LVTS hours, the 




(ii) Shortfalls based on positions actually incurred 
 
As section 9.5.2 explains, participants incur shortfalls that are small 
compared with the maximum shortfalls allowed.
25 If a participant 
were to experience large payment outflows prior to a default (if, for 
instance, a bank’s failure were widely anticipated and a bank run 
resulted), the participant might incur a shortfall that was close or equal 
to its maximum allowed shortfall. Increasing participants’ shortfalls to 
the maximum allowed, other things equal, would create losses for 
survivors that are much larger than the ones found here. 
 
(iii) BCLs granted to the defaulter 
 
The assumption that a default is unanticipated means that BCLs are 
likely larger than they would be in the case of an anticipated default. 
Participants have an incentive to reduce BCLs to a participant they 
believe may default in order to minimise their exposure to the 
defaulter. Other things equal, smaller BCLs granted to the defaulter 
would result in smaller losses for survivors than we find here. 
 
 
(iv) Recovery rates are not taken into account 
 
In the event that a participant incurred a loss resulting from the default 
of another participant, it would become an unsecured creditor to the 
estate of the failed institution. It is likely that the defaulter would 
recover some portion of its loss. Other studies point to recovery rates 
of 40% and 95%. See Furfine (2003), James (1991) and Kaufman 
(1994). In Canada, recovery rates for bank failures that occurred 
between 1967 and March 2001 are estimated at 70–80%.
26 
 
I have chosen not to reduce participants’ ASOs by expected recovery 
rates for two reasons. First, participants must meet their entire ASO on 
the day a participant defaults. Thus, using participants’ entire ASOs to 
estimate losses illustrates the upfront and maximum obligation that 
participants will incur before they recover some portion of their funds 
later. Second, I can be very conservative and not account for recovery 
from the estate of the failed institution because I do not observe any 
knock-on defaults. 
                                          
25 See equation (9.7) to understand the maximum shortfalls that participants can incur. 
26 From the Canadian Deposit Insurance Corporation annual reports and Bank of Canada 
staff calculations.  
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9.7 Conclusion 
LVTS incorporates risk controls and a residual guarantee by the Bank 
of Canada that make it robust to multiple defaults. It employs risk-
sharing whereby survivors may be allocated a share of the defaulter’s 
losses in the event of a default. The system’s rules give participants 
both the ability and the incentives to control their exposures to other 
participants so as to keep potential losses manageable. In this paper, I 
have created the largest possible unanticipated defaults based on a 
sample of actual LVTS activity and estimated whether participants are 
adequately controlling their risk to be able to withstand the default of 
another participant. 
  I have found that, in general, participants are easily able to 
withstand their loss allocations. This partly results from the fact that, 
on average, participants, each of which I consider in turn to be a 
defaulter, create net debit positions intraday that are much smaller 
than the maximums possible. In both absolute and relative terms, 
participants’ loss allocations are generally small, but when I compare 
losses with assets and capital, small participants take on relatively 
much more risk than large participants.
27 Nevertheless, I find that all 
participants are robust to the defaults generated here. 
  I have also calculated results based on defaulters covering their 
positions with all their LVTS collateral, including the significant 
amount of excess collateral most keep in reserve for LVTS purposes. 
The frequency and size of shortfalls and survivors’ losses decrease by 
between 50% and 90%. 
  I believe that the losses found in this study are probably larger than 
would occur if a participant were actually to default. First, I have used 
the largest shortfalls I can create based on the data to maximise 
survivors’ losses. Second, I have assumed that the default is 
unanticipated. This prevents participants from reducing or eliminating 
BCLs to the defaulter to avoid sharing losses. Finally, I have assumed 
that survivors do not recover any of their losses. Although the 
theoretical shortfalls generated in this study are small compared with 
the maximums that defaulters could incur, I believe that the other 
three factors, and especially the second, greatly outweigh this fact to 
create losses that are much larger than what one would expect to 
observe in reality. 
                                          
27 This is because small participants on average grant larger bilateral credit limits relative 
to their size than do large participants.  
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  There appear to be two important questions for further study. First, 
why are participants’ net debit positions so small compared with the 
maximums allowed in LVTS? Second, what would be the effect of an 
anticipated default in LVTS? An anticipated default would likely 
affect both BCL-setting behaviour and participants’ positions. I 
believe that the impact of an anticipated default would likely be 
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Shortfalls and coverage by defaulters 
Coverage of the largest net debtor’s position 
 
As noted in the main text, the risk controls ensure that there will be 
sufficient collateral to cover the default of the largest net debtor. 
Recall that all participants that grant BCLs to other participants are 
required to apportion collateral to cover the largest BCL that they 
grant multiplied by the systemwide percentage and, in the event of one 
or more defaults, will have to contribute up to that amount. Thus the 
collateral apportioned by all participants, other than the defaulter 













j ) BCL ( max 2 C  (A1.1) 
 
Using participant i’s maximum own-collateral shortfall from the main 
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j L max  the maximum losses from participant i’s default 
that other participants j could incur. 
  Therefore, the collateral apportioned by survivors always exceeds 


































ji i BCL ) BCL ( max  and 




The default of two participants 
 
If more than one participant defaults on the same day, the maximum 
that each surviving participant, j, will have to contribute to cover the 
losses of all defaulters on a single day is its maximum additional 
settlement obligation (maxASOj), which is set equal to the maximum 
BCL it has granted to any other participant, multiplied by the 
systemwide percentage. Recall that participants apportion T2 
collateral equal to this value, so maxASOj = θ⋅maxi(BCLji) = C2j. 
Participants’ ASOs vis-a-vis each defaulter are calculated, and if any 
participant’s combined ASOs resulting from the multiple defaults on a 
single day exceed its maximum ASO, its actual ASO will be set equal 
to its maximum ASO. 
  Consider a case where participants i and k default on the same day. 














































OCS , ASO max min ASO (A1.4) 
 
Therefore, participant j’s ASO is the minimum of its maximum ASO 
and the sum of its loss allocations to the two defaulters. In the latter 
case, the Bank of Canada will contribute the difference. 
  In this case of two defaulters on a single day, it is possible that the 
second term in equation (A1.4), the survivor’s calculated share of the 
losses, exceeds the first term: the collateral of participant j. Whether 
each survivor’s calculated ASOs are met (that is, whether survivors 
cover all losses) depends
28: 
 
•  positively on the size of the largest BCL it has granted to any 
participant, assuming that the largest BCL is not granted to either 
defaulter; 
•  negatively on each defaulter’s own collateral shortfall; and 
•  negatively on the ratio of the BCL that the survivor has granted to 
each defaulter compared with its maximum BCL granted, 
                                          
28 Recall that the Bank of Canada will have an ASO equal to 5% of each defaulter’s 
losses in this case, because it has granted a BCL to each participant of 5% of the sum of 
BCLs received from other participants.  
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assuming that its maximum BCL is granted to a surviving 
participant. 
 
Therefore, in the case of multiple defaulters on a single day, the Bank 
of Canada may have to contribute.  
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Appendix 2 
Figure A2.1  Time of participants’ maximum net debit 



























































































































The most common time for participants to incur their maximum net 
debit position is between 4 pm and 5 pm, which corresponds to the 
settlement of Canada’s securities clearing and settlement system. The 
next most common time is between 11 am and 12 pm, which 
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10  Simulation of operational failures 
in equities settlement 
Abstract 
This paper presents a simulation model of Finnish securities 
settlement system for equities. With the model, scenario analysis and 
stress testing are performed. The purpose of the study is to analyse 
robustness and efficiency of this equities settlement system and 
systemic risk caused by failures in securities settlement. 
  The analysis is based on real data of settlement transactions and 
flow of post trade process. The main scenarios of the analysis were 
operational failures of different players or components of the post 
trade infrastructure: the clearing participants, the main settlement 
algorithm and the liquidity bridge between the large value payment 
system and securities settlement system. 
  Results of the simulations show that operational failure of 
individual clearing participants should last more than one settlement 
day to cause significant impact in the settlement system under study. 
No contagion from failures in securities settlement system to 
operation of large value payment system was observed. The main 
settlement algorithm mitigated efficiently the impact of the scenarios 
in the settlement system. 
  All the observations are bound to the data set used in this study. 
The constructed model allows only very limited reactions to the 




One of the statutory tasks of many central banks is to ‘promote the 
smooth operation of payment systems’. Oversight of financial market 
infrastructure is derived from this responsibility. The task of oversight 
is to monitor the overall or systemic risks and performance of the 
financial market infrastructure and to contribute to developments to 
foster increased stability and efficiency of the systems. Although the 
quoted wording of the statutes does not directly refer to securities 
settlement systems, they are included in the scope of oversight 
because of the ample liquidity flows between payment and securities 
settlement systems. Also, the handling of collateral for central bank  
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credit connects some securities settlement systems to the transmission 
channel of monetary policy and thus increases their importance to 
central banks and financial markets as a whole. 
  This paper presents a scenario analysis and stress-testing of 
HEXClear. HEXClear is the securities settlement system for equities 
operated by the Finnish Central Securities Depository (APK). The 
main scenarios of this study describe (1) failure of the entire 
settlement process to repatriate funds, (2) failure of individual clearing 
participants in the pre-settlement process, (3) failure of certain ICT 
connections shared by several clearing participants and (4) failure of 
the most commonly used settlement algorithm. 
  The purpose of the analysis is to test the robustness of post-trade 
processing in HEXClear and to quantify the impact of assumed 
scenarios within the settlement system and the contagion effects to 
other connected financial market infrastructure. The impact is 
measured by the number and value of unsettled transactions and the 
magnitude of liquidity shortages faced. Ultimately, the possibility of 
systemic risk due to failures in HEXClear is analysed. The efficiency 
of the settlement process is also studied by comparing the liquidity 
usage of normal and back-up settlement process. The capability of the 
settlement process to mitigate the impact of simulated failure 
scenarios and to reach a relatively high settlement ratio in stress 
situations is also an indicator of the efficiency of the settlement. 
  The analysis is based on real data of settlement transactions and 
book-entry account balances from a one-month observation period 
during June and July 2005. The simulations are performed with a 
model of the HEXClear system in the Bank of Finland payment and 
settlement system simulator (BoF-PSS2). Simulated operational 
failure scenarios are constructed on the basis of an analysis of 
information flows from the post-trade process and data. Thus the 
majority of the simulations in this study do not feature any reactions 
or changes in the behaviour of the clearing participants. In some 
scenarios limited variations from historical actions are allowed in the 
form of the possibility to import more cash to the settlement process in 
a failure situation. This enables the measurement of additional cash 
needs caused by the assumed failure and of the impact of such 
reactions at system level. 
  This study contributes to the scarce literature of simulation studies 
and risk analyses of securities settlement systems and securities 
settlement architectures. Simulation was already mentioned in BIS 
(1992) as the generally applicable method for assessing ’arrangements 
for ensuring timely completion of settlements’. It is known that 
simulations have been used in the design and test phases of several  
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securities settlement systems.
1 Such simulations are, however, seldom 
published and normally focus on the applicability of the proposed 
settlement process instead of systemic risk or efficiency issues. 
  Hellqvist and Koskinen (2005) have reported results from a study 
similar to the current one, which included stress-testing and 
simulations of the Ramses system, ie the Finnish securities settlement 
system for money market transactions. The study presents empirical 
distributions for the liquidity impact of operational failures of clearing 
participants and the scale of cascading settlement failures during 
settlement. According to the results of that study, the Ramses system 
seems not to pose a significant systemic risk to Finnish financial 
markets, even in the most severe scenarios. 
  Besides that, the only published simulation-based studies of 
securities settlement systems of which the authors are aware are by 
Iori (2004) and Devriese and Mitchell (2006). Both of these are based 
on artificial data. Iori compares gross and net securities settlement 
structures and studies the system-wide implications of exogenous 
random delays of individual transactions. The number of settlement 
cycles and several market parameters are also varied in the model. The 
study reported no clear ranking of settlement system architectures 
although gross system structure seemed to be more stable than net 
structure. Devriese and Mitchell construct an artificial securities 
market and settlement system. They analyse the dynamic impact on 
settlement of default of the largest participant in the artificial market. 
According to the authors, central bank liquidity support cannot abolish 
the settlement failures caused by significant market disruptions 
because there are both cash and securities legs in the securities 
transactions, and liquidity support can only affect the cash leg. 
  The current study uses a similar approach to that of Devriese and 
Mitchell, ie failure – although operational – is aimed at institutional 
participants involved in the post-trade process. Iori, instead, models 
the delays of individual trades due to human errors. Thus the focus of 
this study is on abnormal situations, while Iori models the reasons 
behind sub-optimal settlement ratios in normal day-to-day settlement. 
Compared to both referred studies, the current study has the advantage 
of real data and realistic settlement logic. It is also based on a more 
realistic picture of market structure and market practices. The 
                                          
1 See eg Nyholm (2004), who also gives the description for the implementation of 
HEXClear used in this study, and Riksbank (2004), who mention a simulation made by 
VPC, the Swedish CSD, in their assessment of the then new securities settlement system 
in Sweden.  
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resulting settlement ratios observed in this study can be compared to 
the theoretical values presented by Devriese and Mitchell. 
  Some selected results from this analysis have been presented 
earlier in the Bank of Finland Financial Stability Review in 2005 and 
2006. Compared to those articles, this paper presents the analysis and 
also the model used in more detail. In comparison with Hellqvist and 
Koskinen (2005), the approach is similar but the current study 
analyses a different system and uses different data and a more realistic 
settlement process. 
  The structure of the report is as follows. Section 10.2 describes the 
data used in the analysis and market structure of post-trade 
infrastructure in Finland. In Section 10.3 we present the HEXClear 
system, the actual settlement algorithm and the constructed simulation 
model. Section 10.4 presents the scenarios used in simulations and 




10.2 Data and market structure 
Data used in this study were collected from the HEXClear system in 
summer 2005. The detailed data set consists of all transactions on 19 
settlement days in June and July, including all the essential 
information related to transactions that were included in the settlement 
process of the HEXClear system during the observation period. Only 
transactions which had Waiting for Settlement (WFS) status at some 
moment during the observation period were included in the data set. 
  The data set includes information on all trade enrichments or 
allocation data that define the actual bookings of settlement 
transactions in the book-entry accounts. It also contains the history of 
each transaction and enrichment and information on balances and 
registrations in the Central Register. In addition to modelling on the 
BoF-PSS simulator, the data set was directly analysed statistically. 
These results are presented in this section to broaden the description 




10.2.1  Player roles in the post-trade processes 
The Finnish post-trade infrastructure is populated by commercial 
banks, brokerage companies, the Central Securities Depository 
(CSD)
2, the central bank and providers of outsourced post-trade 
processing services. The tasks of the post-trade process are, however, 
divided into a more detailed structure of player roles, which are 
presented below. 
  The final investors, which can be individuals or institutions, access 
the equities market via brokerage companies or broker functions of 
commercial banks. These work as intermediaries between investors on 
the exchange. Brokers are also used in off-exchange trades, ie in the 
OTC market. During the observation period there were 57 brokers 
operating in the Helsinki Stock Exchange. 
  When a trade is concluded it is transferred to the settlement 
system. The clearing party is an institution to which the CSD has 
granted the right to participate in the clearing and settlement system. 
Thus they play an intermediary role between brokers and the CSD 
operating the clearing and settlement system. Each broker needs to 
have a default clearing party, which is responsible for the settlement 
of the broker’s trades. Clearing parties or clearing participants are the 
most important players analysed in this paper. During the observation 
period there were 25 of them in the HEXClear system. 
  The third players in the post-trade process are the account 
operators, who have the right to make registrations on the book entry 
accounts of the Central Register operated by APK. Each clearing 
participant needs to be either an account operator or an agent of 
another account operator. Being an account operator is an 
intermediary role between the Central Register and the brokers, 
custodian banks or clearing participants or, alternatively, an 
enlargement to the role of clearing participant. In the data used in this 
study there were 10 account operators, including APK itself. 
  There are also custodian banks. They offer custody and account 
services for foreign customers, work as account operators towards the 
Central Registry and, based on this, produce for their clients value-
added services such as credit limits, securities lending or processing of 
corporate actions. The custodians are typically large commercial 
banks, which serve foreign brokers or investors under a separate 
clearing party name for their custody functions. One reason for this 
separation of operations to specialised clearing parties is Finnish 
                                          
2 The Finnish CSD uses the acronym APK.  
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legislation, which requires a direct holding account structure for 
Finnish investors. For foreign investors nominee accounts can also be 
used, and even customer specific nominee accounts are known to 
exist. 
  The CSD is involved in the structure by maintaining the Central 
Register of book-entry accounts and the clearing and settlement 
system itself. There is currently no central counterparty clearing 
(CCP) available for equities settlement. The connections between the 
CSD and the central bank – the cash model – are discussed when the 
HEXClear system is presented in more detail in Section 10.4. 
  The definitions of player roles are not the same as the outlines of 
individual companies. Instead, an institution fulfilling the 
requirements is granted the licence to operate in a certain role. As a 
result many institutions serve in multiple roles – for example, some 
individual commercial banks have all of the roles described, except 
from being the CSD or central bank. 
 
 
10.2.2 Settlement  transactions 
The number of settlement transactions in the observation period was 
nearly 906,000. The share of exchange transactions, so-called 1-
transactions, was 83% of this total volume. When the number of 
securities transferred in settlement transactions is considered instead 
of the number of transactions, exchange trades constitute only 29% of 
all transactions. The rest are off-exchange transactions or so-called 5-
transactions. This includes clearing transfers and off-exchange trades 
(OTC-trades). Many 5-transactions are actually related to exchange 
trades. Examples of this include an investor using a brokerage 
company which is not their account operator or custodian. In such a 
situation the broker can execute, for example, a large sell order from 
the investor in a number of individual smaller exchange trades (1-
transaction) and receive the total amount of securities with a single 
off-exchange clearing transfer (5-transaction) from the final investor’s 
custodian. 
  The settlement of exchange trades is normally performed three 
local banking days after the actual trade (T+3). With off-exchange 
trades the participants involved can agree the settlement cycle 
themselves. The settlement system also allows settlement during the 
trade date, ie with a T+0 cycle. This possibility increases settlement 
efficiency and decreases replacement cost risk. It is mainly used for 
off-exchange transactions. In terms of trade volume, 2.7% of these 
were settled during the trade date in 2005.  
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  Not all the transactions are settled on the agreed date. The data 
from the observation period show that altogether 14,834 transactions, 
ie 1.6% of all transactions, were settled later than originally agreed 
between seller and buyer. This is more common for off-exchange 
transactions: 8.4% of them are settled later than originally defined 
while only 0.7% of exchange trades are similarly delayed. A 
significant share of off-exchange transactions (2.3% or 3,400 
transactions) is also settled before the agreed date. This reflects 
flexibility in the use of off-exchange transactions. 
  As to the most liquid equities, the relative share of delayed 
transactions was smaller than for the whole data set. These include 
Nokia, forest industry companies and other equities in the OMX25 
list. Such equities are more often traded by foreign counterparties, 
which could theoretically slow down processing in case of a failure or 
delay. One explanation for the smaller share of delayed trades among 
liquid shares could be the availability of securities lending services for 
the most liquid equities. This was, however, not analysed, since not all 
lending transactions were identifiable in the data. 
 
 
10.2.3 Information  flows  in settlement process 
Information flows in post-trade processes are critical to the smooth 
clearing and settlement of transactions. Impacts of operational failures 
or other scenarios analysed in this study typically emerge via 
disturbances in data flows. Thus understanding the timing and 
structure of information flows is mandatory for system stress-testing. 
  Equity trades executed in the Helsinki Stock Exchange’s SAXESS 
trading system are automatically transferred to APK’s HEXClear 
system for clearing and settlement. These trades are matched in the 
trading platform. Transactions other than exchange trades are entered 
into HEXClear by the clearing participants and matched there. All 
transactions are settled in the same settlement process. 
  Settlement of transactions in HEXClear normally takes place three 
banking days after the trade. All the information needed for settlement 
is not, however, available on the trade date in the trading system. 
Allocation data and other trade enrichments are submitted by the 
clearing participants to the settlement system later on. Transactions 
which have all the necessary data available are labelled as ‘waiting for 
settlement’ (WFS). Figure 10.1 presents the share of securities in 
transactions which have WFS status as the start of the agreed 
settlement day approaches. The figure is based on the number of 
securities because this way it shows the timing of transactions  
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weighted with the transaction size. Free-of-payment transactions are 
also included in this approach. The timeline in the figure is calendar 
days and comprises weekends and bank holidays. Thus, in case of an 
operational failure, all time available for solving the failure is included 
in the timeline of this figure, not only banking days. 
  The figures show that the majority of exchange trades reach WFS 
status before the settlement day begins and 50% are already finalised 
one day before settlement day. Of the other settlement transactions, 
just 12% have WFS status one day before and 68% have reached it 
when the settlement day begins. The remaining 32% of 5-transactions 
only become ready for settlement during the settlement day. 
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Figure 10.1  Cumulative share of book-entries in trades 
      with waiting for settlement (WFS) status as 
      a function of time difference to start of 
      settlement day. Division by marketplace. 
      Days from S-6 are shown in the upper 
      figure and a closer look at days S-1 and S is 





The different usages of transactions depending on their marketplace 
are one explanation for the observed difference in timing of the final 
confirmation of transactions. For example, other settlement 
transactions are more often introduced as T+0 transactions, such as 
securities loans or other transactions derived from the needs of the 
ongoing settlement. 
  The two black vertical lines in the lower figure represent cut-off 
times given in the rules of HEXClear. The 5-transactions, where book-
entries are delivered from a custody situation to another clearing party  
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and where this delivery is linked with some exchange trade, have to be 
confirmed in HEXClear before 3.30 pm during day S-1.
3 This explains 
the first jump in the share of 5-transactions with WFS status. The 
second cut-off time is 3.30 pm during the settlement day, which is the 
last allowed time for confirmation of trades to custody clearing parties 
for settlement during the ongoing day. (It also applies to the 
introduction of T+0 transactions). 
 The blue line representing exchange trades increases 
simultaneously with the increase in 5-transactions during day S-1. 
This indicates that many exchange transactions are only finally 
modified to WFS status after the underlying clearing transfers have 
reached WFS status. This reflects the risk management procedures of 
clearing participants but contradicts the rules of APK, which require 
that ‘a clearing party must, as soon as possible and by no later than 
after the trade has been confirmed, register allocation data relating to 
the trade in the HEXClear system’.
4 
  The figure only includes trades and other settlement transactions 
and excludes account transfers performed in the Central Register and 
other similar events which affect the book-entry account balances. If 
these were included, they would increase the proportion of 
transactions matched during settlement day S. This has been taken 
into account in the simulations and scenario data sets. 
 
 
10.2.4 Market  structure 
The post-trade processing of equities in Finland is rather concentrated. 
This tends to increase the potential impact of operational failures of 
the major participants, which are analysed in the simulations. The 
clearing participants with the eight largest market shares of clearing 
and settlement activities during the observation period
5 are listed 
below in Table 10.1. The table is based on transaction volumes. An 
individual company may operate in the settlement system with several 
clearing party names and the number of clearing parties for each of the 
participants is also listed. 
 
                                          
3 Decisions related to rules of APK, Registration and clearing schedules. 
4 Rules of APK, 4.2.12. 
5 For reference values over longer period see Bank of Finland bulletin, Financial stability 
2005, p. 71.  
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Table 10.1  Participant shares of settlement transaction 
      volumes and the number of clearing party 
      names of individual companies during the 
     observation  period 
 





Nordea Pankki Suomi Oyj  46%  2 
Svenska Handelsbanken AB, Finnish subsidiary  10%  2 
EQ Pankki Oy  6%  2 
Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB, subsidiary in 
Helsinki 6%  2 
Sampo Pankki Oyj  4%  1 
Enskilda Securities AB, subsidiary in Helsinki  4%  1 
Opstock Oy  4%  1 
Fischer Partners Fondkommission AB  4%  1 
Others 16%  13 
 
 
The concentration of the market is different in the settlement of 
exchange trades and off-exchange trades. On the exchange side, the 
clearing participants of companies with the three largest shares have 
together 59% of the total volumes of the whole observation period. 
Day to day variations in this share were rather small, ranging from 
56% to 63%, and with sample standard deviation of 3%. 
  On the off-exchange side the similar share of companies with three 
largest shares of the volume is almost 90%. Variation is smaller, 
ranging from 87% to 91% and with a standard deviation of 1,1%. The 
group of three largest is different in off-exchange than in exchange 
transactions. 
  As another measure for concentration a Herfindahl
6 index was 
calculated for the whole market. For exchange transaction volumes the 
index value was on average 0,14 (range 0,11–0,17). This can be 
compared to a market with an equal division of market shares between 
seven participants. For off-exchange transaction volumes the 
Herfindahl index value was higher, on average 0,42 (range 0,40–0.47). 
This compares almost to a duopoly situation, even if the index was 
calculated based on market shares of clearing participants instead of 
the companies shown in Table 10.1. 
                                          
6 Sum of squared market shares of all participants. Here market shares of clearing parties 
were used.  
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  The Herfindahl index values of HEXClear can be compared to 
similar values from the Ramses system, the APK settlement system 
for money market transactions.
7 There the index values were on 
average 0,26. Thus the Finnish wholesale securities settlement is 
clearly more concentrated than the settlement of exchange trades but 
not as concentrated as off-exchange transactions in HEXClear. 
 
 
10.3 HEXClear system 
The HEXClear system performs the clearing and settlement of 
equities cash market transactions: exchange trades from OMX 
Helsinki, off exchange trades of equities made by Finnish 
counterparties and other settlement transactions. Trades are settled in 
the HEXClear system either by an optimisation process or in a 
continuous trade-by-trade settlement. The optimisation process aims at 
maximising the number of equities in simultaneously settled 
transactions and it takes place at specified moments in the form of 
batch runs during a settlement day. In other words, optimisation is 
used to establish whether a number of individual transactions can be 
settled together, even though it would not be possible to settle them 
one-by-one. The RTGS process settles the trades on a gross basis 
throughout the settlement day. In both processes the settlement is 
performed with a DVP-1 model,
8 and the settlement is final 
immediately after booking of securities and transfer of cash is 
executed. 
  The HEXClear system provides preliminary information about the 
expected outcome of settlement during S-1 day and in the morning of 
the settlement day. These preliminary information batches provide 
forecasts for the amount of cash required in optimisation and ease the 
liquidity management of the participants. The final preliminary 
information batch is based on transactions, which are ready for 
settlement in the morning of the settlement day. These transactions are 
earmarked for inclusion in the first optimisation and clearing parties 
are told of the resulting cash requirements. The first optimisation 
batch, at 10 am Finnish time, includes the earmarked transactions and 
the cash submitted by the participants and it normally settles a very 
large majority of daily totals. During the observation period the share 
                                          
7 See Hellqvist – Koskinen (2005). 
8 BIS (1992), Delivery versus payment in securities settlement systems.  
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of first optimisation was on average 97,3% of total daily transaction 
volume and 79,5 % of the total number of securities settled. 
 
 
10.3.1  HEXClear cash model 
Money transfers of the transactions settled in HEXClear system are 
executed with cash deposited in the APK account in the Bank of 
Finland's BoF-RTGS system. The cash position of this account is 
mirrored into sub-accounts of individual clearing participants in 
HEXClear. It is stated
9 in Finnish law that these funds are owned by 
participants and can be used only for settlement of transactions. Thus 
the overall balance is still the liability of the central bank – central 
bank money in custody. Additionally, the Bank of Finland has not 
outsourced central bank accounts to APK and there are no credits 
granted in the HEXClear system either by APK or the settlement 
process. 
  The different central bank money models of securities settlement 
have been described in a working paper by ECB
10 and illustrated 
below in Figure 10.2. The advantages of the autonomous cash model 
of the HEXClear system are operational robustness, the possibility of 
using DVP model-1 settlement even for retail transactions without 
flooding the BoF-RTGS with transaction volumes, the fact that no 
legal outsourcing of central bank accounts or operations are needed 
and settlement with central bank money. APK’s Ramses system which 
uses a similar model as HEXClear has been approved by the 
Eurosystem for collateral operations. 
  The drawback of the structure is the shattering of liquidity to 
separate systems and sub-accounts. The same problem applies to all 
ancillary system structures of large value payment systems. It can be 
mitigated by efficient and predictable liquidity usage and flexible 
possibility to transfer liquidity in and out of the system. 
 
                                          
9 Securities market act, chapter 4a. Section 9: Safeguarding the position of clearing party. 
10 ECB working papers on various models can be found at 
http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/other/useofcbmoneyforssten.pdf.  
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10.3.2 Settlement  algorithm 
The simulation model used to mimic HEXClear was based on a 
description presented in Nyholm (2004). This was known not to be the 
final blueprint of the algorithm, but sufficiently close to it. The key 
features of the model have been discussed with APK experts to 
ascertain as close a match as currently possible with the structure of 
HEXClear during the observation period. Later on there were changes 
and enhancements in the real HEXClear environment, which are not 






The implementation of HEXClear optimisation in the simulation seeks 
to maximise the number of equities in trades which are selected to be 
settled, ie included in the solution of the optimisation. The selection of 
trades to be settled is a knapsack problem and it thus belongs to class 
of NP-problems. For these there are no known algorithms giving exact 
an optimal solution in guaranteed polynomial time.
12 To limit the 
                                          
11 These include changes in the daily schedule of settlement and connections from 
participants to HEXClear. For up to date information see www.apk.fi. 
12 See eg Papadimitriou (1994), p. 202.  
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computational time the algorithm uses an approximate heuristic 
approach. 
  In the description of the algorithm below, the net position of an 
account is a computational variable. It presents the balance of an 
individual cash or book entry account which would result if all the 
bookings included in the solution were executed. The main logic of 
the algorithm implemented in BoF-PSS2 is presented in Figure 10.3 
below. Two subroutines are presented in more detail in the writing. 
 The  knapsack heuristic algorithm is used to restore the net 
position of the selected account into positive value. This is done by 
excluding some transactions from the solution which debit the current 
resolved account. To select the excluded transactions, debiting 
transactions are first divided into free base and cost base. The free 
base includes such transactions which do not cause or increase a 
negative net position on any other account. Transactions in the cost 
base are those which form a chain of settlement transactions; if such a 
transaction is excluded there are other consequent transactions that 
need to be excluded from the solution as well. 
  The implemented knapsack algorithm tries first to exclude 
transactions from the free base. If this is not sufficient, all transactions 
in the free base are excluded and selecting among the cost base is 
done. Selection is performed in either case with greedy search
13 
according to the price/weight ratio of transactions. The price of a 
transaction is the share of negative net position, which it can remove 
from the account under study if the transaction is excluded. Weight is 
the number of equities in the transaction. 
  For transactions in the cost base Nyholm describes a recursive cost 
calculation method, which elaborates the chain of transactions and 
eventually aggregates the total number of equities in transactions to be 
excluded from each chain. The selection of transactions to be 
excluded in the cost calculation considers at each recursive level of 
the chain only the own weight of each transaction. The new negative 
net positions which may emerge deeper in the transaction chain are 
dealt with separately, which finally gives the aggregated cost of the 
whole chain of transactions. 
  The algorithm implemented in BoF-PSS differs somewhat from 
this. It has a parameter for the maximum depth of cost calculation in 
the transaction chains. Up to this level costs are also calculated 
recursively for each decision. To limit the computational time of 
processing, the level of recursion was limited to one in actual 
                                          
13 See eg Martello and Toth (1990).  
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simulations, ie the weighting of cost base and free base transactions 
was identical. 
 
Figure 10.3  Overall structure of the optimisation 
      process. Shaded steps of the process are 
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The trade-by-trade re-include routine is executed at the end of each 
securities and cash optimisation loop. It works through all individual 
transactions dropped out during the previous cycle and returns them to  
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the solution if it is possible without causing negative net positions. 
This decreases the risk of dropping out transactions unnecessarily. 
  In real HEXClear, the same optimisation process is also used in 
preliminary information batches without cash constraints. Thus the 
result from preliminary information batches is twofold: first it gives 
the group of transactions that, which is settle-able and holds largest 
possible total number of securities. Secondly, it indicates the amount 
of liquidity required for settlement of this group. In the simulations no 
preliminary information batches were executed since their real life 
outcomes were known. 
 
 
The trade-by-trade RTGS process 
 
Trade-by-trade processing begins after the first optimisation cycle of 
the settlement day. In the real system it can also be run simultaneously 
with optimisations later in the day. To avoid conflicts in such cases, 
transactions included in the optimisation are marked and the gross 
amount of securities and cash is reserved for the duration of each 
optimisation. 
  Although the trade-by-trade process is called a real-time process, it 
is not actually executed continuously. It is run in batches and after one 
batch is finished the next starts five minutes later. The steps of the 
process are shown in Figure 10.4 below. 
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Figure 10.4  Trade-by-trade process logic 
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The sleeping time between the batches and the maximum number of 
rounds for workking through the queue in an individual batch are both 
design parameters in the real system. These are also variable 
parameters in the BoF-PSS2 implementation. If a similar system was 
used for money market transactions and collateral management of 
central banks, such delays and a lack of truly continuous settlement 
could be problematic for central bank purposes. It must be noticed, 
however, that some possibly more significant changes in the system 
setup would have to take place if it were used in operations related to 
central bank monetary policy, eg sychronisation of opening hours and 
days between the HEXClear and TARGET systems. 
 
 
User modules in BoF-PSS2 
 
In the simulator, HEXClear optimisation was implemented as a 
multilateral net settlement algorithm module (MNS) and RTGS queue 
release as a partial net settlement module (PNS). This allowed a timed 
start of the latter and the inclusion of both of these in same system 
setup. 
  The allocation data of HEXClear and the possibility that a single 
trade could have an arbitrary number of actual bookings had to be 
taken into consideration in the modelling. This was tackled by 
developing so-called group-code algorithms, which generalise the  
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DVP-link code structure of the simulator. These are presented in more 




Simplifications made in the modelling 
 
Some simplifications were made in the implemented HEXClear model 
compared to the real system. This section presents the known 
differences. All these remaining simplifications are considered to have 
a very small impact on the results. 
  The restrictions and reservations that can be imposed on bookings 
or account balances were not implemented since their number in the 
real data was comparatively small. These include sell reservations, 
clearing reservations and restrictions on disposal of a purchase.
15 In 
terms of volume, only 0.34% of all allocation data involved some of 
these. 
  The optimisation features a heuristic Greedy knapsack-algorithm, 
not an exact algorithm. According to the Nyholm paper, smaller 
optimisation sub-problem instances are solved in HEXClear with 
exact code. Also the cost calculation in the knapsack was more 
restricted in the model, as discussed above. 
  The account balance of one book-entry account was manually 
altered on the basis of trade data and public information after it was 
noticed that some big trades did not settle in the benchmark simulation 
of a normal situation. We are unable to tell whether this is a sign of 
some larger systematic error in the data used or in the process where 
this data was transformed into simulator input. 
  Account transfers made in the central registry were not DVP-
linked in the simulations due to a lack of required data fields. Because 
of this, the credit side can at times be executed without debiting real 
accounts. 
  In a normal situation, cash sub-accounts in HEXClear start each 
day with a zero balance. In the simulation these accounts were given a 
small starting balance (€100) to avoid settlement failures caused by 
rounded cash transaction values in the data. 
 
 
                                          
14 See BoF-PSS2 User manual, Section 4.2.2. 
15 See APK rules, General Definitions.  
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10.4 Scenarios and simulation results 
Hypothetical scenarios were created on the basis of analysis of 
settlement system implementation and information flows of that 
time.
16 All scenarios were considered to be plausible under some 
extreme conditions and based on the known history of similar minor-
scale disturbances. 
  The main scenarios were as follows:
17 
 
1.  Securities settlement system as a liquidity sink: All payments to 
HEXClear are executed but no cash can be repatriated. The failure 
situation lasts one whole settlement day. This scenario measures 
the extreme level of contagion from HEXClear to the operations in 
BoF-RTGS or eventually TARGET. 
2. Internal  operational failure of one individual clearing 
participant for one whole day. This scenario describes a situation 
where all actions performed in the HEXClear user interface by the 
failing clearing participant are cancelled. Two durations of the 
assumed failure were tested: one and two whole settlement days. 
3.  Failure of data connections between APK and VPC. As a result 
all clearing parties which connect to HEXClear via VPC would be 
inoperable as in scenario 2. 
4.  Optimisation in settlement process is inoperable and the backup 
trade-by-trade RTGS process is used to settle all trades. 
 
 
                                          
16 After the observation period of this study, eg the connections from clearing participants 
to APK have been separated from internal VPC-APK data link. 
17 Some other scenarios were also considered but not implemented during the current 
study. Scenario 2 could be altered to the failure of an individual broker or account 
operator rather than a clearing party. The specific points of impact of such a failure 
should be studied properly. Also, failure of one commercial bank in all the roles it has 
could be analysed (account operator, and several clearing parties or brokers in one 
conglomerate) or at least failure of all clearing party codes of one custodian. The failure 
of one commercial bank could also be analysed, focusing on the financing function which 
bigger banks provide to brokers outside the SSS. Similarly, as in the CSD’s network 
failure scenario, multiple participants operating the post-trade infrastructure could be 
stressed simultaneously. For plausible scenarios, description of the whole technical 
structure supporting the information flows should be available. An example would be a 
case where several participants share a common connection provider and thus a common 
vulnerability to ICT problems.  
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10.4.1  Simulation of a normal situation 
The simulated scenarios were analysed by comparing them with a 
benchmark simulation which mimics the real history of securities 
settlement without any form of stress factor. The benchmark data for 
one day included all the transactions that were included in the 
settlement process during that day, ie transactions with a ‘waiting for 
settlement’ (WFS) status. 
  Because of the simplifications in the model, the precision of the 
benchmark simulation formed in this study was not perfect. This was 
shown by the number of trades that did not settle during the correct 
intended day. Instead, some transactions were settled only during the 
following day or consequent days of the undisturbed simulation and a 
small number was always left unsettled. This is illustrated below 
(Figure 10.5) by presenting the final settlement day of the trades that 
were submitted during one example day from the benchmark 
simulation. 
 
Figure 10.5  When did the transactions submitted 
      during one example day (13 June 2005) of 
      benchmark simulation actually settle in 






























































In this example case the final settlement rate of the benchmark day is 
99% (or 98%) in terms of volume (value), but a considerable  
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proportion of this is achieved only during consequent days when a 
new set of transactions is included in the settlement. The simulations 
were limited to calendar weeks. Thus for some days there were more 
consequent days and, as a result, the settlement ratio of individual 
days in the benchmarks varied between 99% and 85% in terms of 
volume. 
  It is worth noting that not all trades involved in the settlement 
process in a given day settle during that same day in the real system 
either. The number of postponed trades in the benchmark simulation 
was still rather high in comparison to the performance of the real 
system.
18 Finding the reason for this difference was left for future 
studies. In the current study it is assumed that when the result of an 
imperfect benchmark is compared to scenario outcomes produced with 
the same logic, the difference gives a realistic picture of HEXClear 
performance in the overall level. 
 
 
10.4.2  Liquidity sink scenario 
In the stress-testing of HEXClear, the BoF-RTGS system was 
included in the model as a separate and independent system. Also, all 
the payments processed in BoF-RTGS were included in the 
simulations. The purpose was to enable measuring of contagion of 
liquidity shortages from one system into another at a realistic level: in 
the form of number or value of delayed or unprocessed payments. 
  The possible worst case of liquidity shortages in BoF-RTGS can 
be analysed from simple BoF-RTGS transactions. Assuming that all 
cash transfers to HEXClear are executed but none of the cash 
repatriations can be made for a one whole day (scenario 1), the 
maximum level of liquidity sink effect is reached – which could be 
caused by problems in HEXClear. 
  From the results of such a simulation it was noticed that no single 
transaction in BoF-RTGS was left unprocessed because of the 
HEXClear liquidity sink during the one-month period under study. 
During one day one single payment was delayed for 19 minutes. 
  One reason why payment delays or other impacts on the BoF-
RTGS level were not observed is the daily schedule of payments to 
and from HEXClear. Most of the time clearing participants transferred 
the required cash to HEXClear in the morning before the first 
                                          
18 During a normal day in the real system the share of transactions transferred to next day 
is 0.2–0.3% of daily volumes.  
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optimisation and repatriated the final amount of cash only at the end 
of day. This was analysed earlier in the Bank of Finland financial 
stability report.
19 Thus, their general liquidity management during the 
day becomes separate from the cash sent to HEXClear and is not 
influenced by incidents in HEXClear as long as HEXClear does not 
require an addition of cash. 
  Based on this analysis a failure in HEXClear is highly unlikely to 
cause any systemic liquidity problems in BoF-RTGS. 
 
 
10.4.3  Failure of a clearing participant in pre-settlement 
process 
Failure of a clearing participant in HEXClear is modelled as a 
problem in the internal systems of the corresponding individual 
clearing participant. This would cause an inability to use the 
HEXClear user interface and cut out the information flow defining the 
allocation data of settlement transactions. For the sake of simplicity, 
only scenarios with failures lasting full calendar days were considered. 
  In this scenario it is assumed that fund transfers from BoF-RTGS 
to HEXClear are not hindered. This is a reasonable assumption 
because there are usually only very few of these payment instructions 
and in case of failure these could be handled as manual transactions or 
via other contingency arrangements, although there might be slight 
time delays in such a process. 
  The data set for the scenario was created by filtering out from the 
original benchmark data such transactions in which the failing 
participant was active and where the status of the transaction had 
changed to ‘waiting for settlement’ (WFS) during the assumed failure 
period. This change of status indicated a flow of some essential 
information that can hinder the settlement if the information is delayed 
or not processed at all in a failure situation. 
  Based on the analysis of timing of information flows related to the 
settlement process presented in Section 10.3.3, two separate durations 
for the failure situation were analysed: one and two whole banking 




                                          
19 Bank of Finland Bulletin, Financial stability special issue 2004, p. 80.  
307 
Operational failure lasting one day 
 
If the assumed operational failure lasted only one settlement day, the 
impact on settlement would be caused by cancelled intraday 
transactions and the consequences of their removal. The share of such 
transactions was shown to be 32% of the 5-transactions and 22% of all 
transactions in terms of the number of book-entries involved.  In this 
scenario cash obligations and the resulting incoming funds are 
assumed to be unchanged. 
  The impact of a failure of one clearing participant was tested with 
55 independent scenarios. Each clearing party was stressed with data 
from one day and the ten biggest ones with three additional days. To 
illustrate the results, the failing clearing participants were divided into 
three groups based on their market shares
20 of the number of securities 
settled during the entire sample period: tiny ones having less than 
1.5% each of total number of securities settled, large ones having 
more than 5% each and small ones accounting for the rest. Each group 
contains at least 4 different clearing participants and 16 or more 
independent scenarios. 
  The average outcome from the 55 simulated scenarios was shown 
in Figure 6 for each group of clearing parties. The failed transactions 
represent the initial impact of the assumed failure, ie filtered 
transactions. Unsettled transactions were included in the simulated 
settlement process but could not settle due to cash or securities 
shortages. The rest were settled normally. The figure represents the 
value of simulated transactions. This means it includes all the 
bookings with their face value and thus the number of securities and 
value of cash transfers in euros are aggregated into the same measure. 
 
                                          
20 This differs from the market shares presented earlier in Section 10.3.4, which were 
based on transaction volumes for each bank. One bank may operate in the system with 
several clearing party names.  
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Figure 10.6  Impact of operational failure of one 
      clearing party lasting one day on the value 
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No extreme system-wide implications were observed in any of the 
simulated scenarios with failure lasting one day. In the worst 
individual cases, the share of settled transactions dropped to 85–88% 
for small participants and to 75% for large ones. 
  The comparison of the results with the benchmark is not very 
straightforward; it is not necessarily the same transactions that become 
unsettled in failure scenarios. The average overall share of settled 
transactions in the benchmark simulation is shown with a black line in 
the figure. The difference between this line and the blue bar gives the 
average decrease in the value of settled transactions. 
  At the level of individual scenarios, the decrease was at most 16% 
of the total daily value of simulated transactions. In transaction 
volumes, the impact was even more modest. The biggest increase in 
number of unsettled transactions was 3.2%. 
  The correlation of the size of the failing participant and the 
additional share of unsettled value in failure scenarios is presented 
below in Figure 10.7. Here the size of the failing participant stands for 
daily share of the value of simulated transactions of the participant 
failing in each particular scenario. Thus it again includes both cash 
and securities bookings. The correlation between the variables is 
evident, with the correlation coefficient at 0.76, but the variance is 
even more significant. Even within this limited set of observations, the  
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impact of scenarios where participants of same size are failing varied, 
eg from almost 0 to 7% of total volumes for participants with roughly 
5% of the daily share of value of bookings, and between 2% and 
14.5% for participants with a roughly 10% share of the bookings. The 
reason for this instability in the outcome of the settlement should be 
studied further. It is unclear whether the true optimal solution for the 
knapsack selection problem of trades to be settled is really very 
sensitive to initial conditions or whether the heuristic algorithm 
implemented and used in the simulations is sensitive to initial 
conditions and sometimes incapable of reaching optimal or near-
optimal solutions. 
 
Figure 10.7  Correlation of the daily share of a failing 
      participant of simulation transaction values 
      and the increase in value of unsettled 
      transactions. Operational failure of one 
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Operational failure lasting two days 
 
When a failure situation is extended to two bank days, the setup 
differs from the previous one. This is because the settlement process 
in HEXClear can adapt to the failure and calculate the cash 
obligations for clearing participants in the preliminary information 
batches for the altered set of settlement trades. Cash shortages should 
therefore not emerge, but cancelled trades can cause securities  
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shortages and consequent failures in settlement. The increase in 
liquidity need was modelled by giving sufficient large balances for the 
cash accounts to make sure no cash shortages would arise in 
settlement. 
  The settled value of payments in this scenario is presented below 
in Figure 10.8. Critical observation of the results indicates that an 
internal failure of some individual clearing participants can cause 
failure of transactions totalling 30% or even 60% of total value if that 
failure continues to the next settlement day. On the basis on our 
exercise, internal systems of the largest clearing participants should be 
considered critical to the operations of HEXClear as a whole. 
It can be noticed that the optimisation of HEXClear efficiently 
mitigates the additional impact of failure in this kind of failure 
situation. The value of transactions remaining unsettled in the process 
did not increase in proportion to the failing participant's market share 
and value of failed transactions. 
 
Figure 10.8  Operational failure of one clearing 
      participant. Impact on settled value after 
      adapting cash positions to changes in settled 





















































Division of failing clearing parties by market share during entire sample period  
 
 
When transaction volumes were analysed instead of values, the same 
structure was observed again. However, the contrast between the 
impact of large clearing parties and small or tiny ones was sharper. 
The share of the failed volume in one individual scenario was 53% of  
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total volume while the median volume of failed transactions from all 
observations was only 2%. 
  If settlement on the second day was executed on the basis of 
preliminary information of trades used in the normal unstressed case, 
ie without adapting the cash positions, shortages of cash would 
obviously be faced in the stressed settlement. The additional share of 
unsettled transactions caused by this assumption varied between 0.1% 
and 2.4% of the total value of transactions. In terms of volume, the 
number of settled transactions was sometimes even higher with 
original cash positions. This can be explained by the objective of the 
optimisation, which seeks to maximise number of equities settled (ie 




10.4.4  Failures in data connections between the CSDs 
The scenario of failure in CSD's data connections is similar to the one 
replicating an operational failure of an individual participant in the 
pre-settlement process presented above. The difference is that several 
clearing participants are excluded from the settlement simultaneously. 
This is possible since during the sample period several clearing 
participants were known to connect to APK systems via an internal 
link between VPC and APK. Thus, this connection in itself involved a 
bigger node risk in relation to the HEXClear process than the internal 
systems of individual participants. 
  The combined market share of clearing participants using CSD's 
connection alternative was 13% of the total value of settlement 
transactions in the sample period. The scenario was tested in 14 
simulations: one- and two-day operational failure starting on seven 
separate days. The results are summarised below in Table 10.2. 
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Table 10.2  CSD’s data connection failure, 
      average scenario results 
 
Values  Filtered  Unsettled  Settled  Change in share of settled 
compared to benchmark 
One-day failure  6.6%  6.6%  86.8%  -4.97% 
Two-day-failure 23.0%  7.4%  69.6%  -19.67% 
        
Values  Filtered  Unsettled  Settled  Change in share of settled 
compared to benchmark 
One-day failure  0.4%  3.5%  96.1%  -0.70% 
Two-day-failure 14.8%  5.4%  79.8%  -16.27% 
 
 
When the results are compared to the average failure of individual 
large participants presented in Sections above, the impact of CSD’s 
network failure was smaller. Thus settlement transactions from 
participants using this connection alternative seem to be less 
connected with the rest of the settled transaction volume. 
 
 
10.4.5 Settlement  with  the  RTGS trade-by-trade process 
In the daily schedule of HEXClear, the RTGS process begins after the 
first optimisation. It is supposed to serve as a swift intraday settlement 
of T+0 trades and settlement transactions. It can also be considered as 
a backup process that can be used instead of optimisation if necessary. 




Liquidity need of RTGS process 
 
The HEXClear system’s optimisation process saves liquidity because 
without optimisation the netting effect of the simultaneous settlement 
of transactions would be lost. The additional liquidity needed in trade-
by-trade settlement was quantified and compared to the amount of 
liquidity actually tied to settlement. The compared value from trade-
by-trade settlement was the maximum total daily amount of liquidity 
tied to settlement at a given moment. 
  The order in which transactions were settled corresponded to a 
situation in which the transactions would be submitted to APK’s 
trade-by-trade process if the optimisation process is not available at  
313 
all. In reality, the order of settlement may differ slightly due to parallel 
processing available in APK, which the simulator cannot replicate. In 
trade-by-trade settlement the order of transactions is essential because 
it may have a key impact on both the liquidity needs and on the 
outcome of the settlement process. 
  The removal of the netting impact of the optimisation also affects 
securities accounts. To cover these shortages the clearing parties in the 
simulation were given the opportunity to borrow securities from 
efficient repo markets at the market value of the securities. In the 
Finnish direct holding structure, shortages can become significant 
because trades are settled directly on the accounts of the individual 
investors. In reality, there is a variety of securities lending products 
available. Moreover, the availability of individual lending facilities 
differs by type of security and size of the investor. An efficient 
securities lending system promotes smooth post-trade processing. 
However, a shortage of securities cannot be covered free of charge, 
and thus the use of the system usually has at least a marginal cost 
effect. 
  The results show that an efficient clearing and settlement method 
may require close to €400 million less liquidity per day. This is a 
relatively large amount since the average of total liquidity tied to 
HEXClear was €160 million during the sample period. In trade-by-
trade settlement, the order of transactions may momentarily cause a 
major shortage of securities, which explains large individual 
variations in the efficiency of clearing and settlement methods from 
one day to another. 
  When the securities shortages were not taken into consideration, 
the difference between the amount of liquidity required by various 
settlement methods was generally smaller. Daily liquidity savings 
amounted to 21% on average, with the savings rising to 83% on the 
most extreme settlement day. 
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Figure 10.9  Liquidity requirement of the RTGS process 
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The results were achieved by comparing the actual amount of liquidity 
tied to equities clearing and settlement to a simulated situation where 
trades are settled trade by trade. In practice the liquidity requirement 
in the trade-by-trade process would be even higher because cash 
would probably be transferred to the settlement system in bulk 
amounts to allow a smooth trade-by-trade settlement process. Another 
alternative would be to make the bookings of fund transfers directly 




Settlement delays and cascading settlement chains in the RTGS 
process 
 
The RTGS process is actually currently executed in batches. In one 
batch, only five consequent settlement rounds are executed, as was 
discussed in section 10.3.2. In the settlement transactions typically 
form chains where one trade can only be settled if another is settled 
first. If the entire volume of transactions is processed in a gross 
process, five rounds can be inadequate to work through all such chains 
and may cause unnecessary delays when the process is sleeping. 
  The length of the settlement chains was studied by forcing all 
trades to the RTGS process. The set of trades included in this analysis  
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was those trades that were submitted and ready to be settled at 10.00 
am on each day of the sample period. These trades would have entered 
the first optimisation in a normal situation. After simulating the 
settlement with the RTGS process, the number of consequent batches 
and number and value of transactions settled on each batch was 
observed. 
  As an initial assumption the cash amount available was the same 
as in the case of normal settlement with optimisation. From the results 
it can be observed that gridlocks will emerge with this liquidity level 
in trade-by-trade settlement; on average only 72% of the value and 
89% of the transactions included in the first batch were settled during 
the trade-by-trade queue release process. It can also be noticed that a 
large majority of those trades which can be settled will settle 
immediately in the first batch, ie during first five queue-release 
rounds. Only 0.94% of the value and 0.70% of the volume of trades 
was left for the consequent batches. 
  The average number of queue-release batches needed was 3.84. 
When the 5-minute sleep period is taken into account, the average 
number of batches would cause more than 14 minutes of additional 
delay for the few transactions settled in the last round. The average 
number of individual queue-release rounds needed was 19.21, which 
can be interpreted as the average length of the longest cascading 
settlement chain in the settlement transactions. However, the expected 
value for sleep delay of individual transactions was only 2.7 seconds, 
with the condition that it will eventually settle in the trade-by-trade 
process. Thus the number of rounds and possible delay caused is 
marginal compared to trades that are left unsettled in trade-by-trade 
processing. 
  For comparison, a case with an abundant cash amount was 
analysed. In this setup only those settlement chains are included, 
which are caused by securities leg of the settlement. The average 
number of batches needed (3.79) was only slightly smaller in this 
comparison. The number of gridlocks was, however, decreased 
significantly since 91.8% of the value and 97.8% of the volume was 
eventually settled with the trade-by-trade process. 
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Figure 10.10  Share of daily trade values settled in 
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The scenario results of the daily share of volume settled in different 
scenarios are visualised in Figure 10.10. The thick dark blue line 
represents the outcome of the scenario with the initial assumption, ie 
with original cash positions. The small difference between this line 
and the lowermost thin red line represents the share of transactions 
which get delayed due to sleeping times in the RTGS process. The 
difference between the dark blue line and magenta line show the size 
of gridlock – the value of transactions unsettleable for the RTGS 
process with original cash positions. Removing cash constraints 
shrinks the total value of the gridlocked transactions. This is shown by 
the thin cyan line representing the total value of transactions settled 
with the RTGS process given unlimited cash. 
  Increasing the share of transactions included in trade-by-trade 
process seemes to increase the share of settled only when cash 
constraints are removed. Also worth noticing are the big differences 
between days. A similar figure for trade volumes would show smaller 
variations. There the lowest value of settlement ratio with the original 





This article focuses on stress-testing of APK's HEXClear system with 
simulations and presents the model constructed for the scenarios. 
  The data from one month in 2005 was studied directly to establish 
a good picture of the market structure of securities clearing and 
settlement. A high concentration of post-trade processing was 
observed in the system. The concentration was strongest in the 
settlement of off-exchange transactions, while the settlement of 
exchange trades is more evenly distributed between the clearing 
parties. An examination the information flows of the settlement 
process showed that 53% of securities belong to transactions that 
receive the final necessary information for settlement during S-1, ie 
the day before settlement day. Similarly, 33% receive final 
information only during the actual settlement day. Most transactions 
finalised at a late stage are off-exchange transactions. High 
concentration rates and timing of information flows close to the 
settlement day increase the potential impact of operational failure 
scenarios on the settlement system. 
  The robustness of the settlement model was tested with four 
simulated main scenarios. It was observed that, due to the cash model 
of HEXClear and current market practices, it is highly unlikely that 
failures in securities settlement could disturb the smooth functioning 
of other systems in the Finnish market infrastructure. Within 
HEXClear, the failure situation of individual participants should 
endure for more than one settlement day to become critical. An 
internal technical failure of some individual clearing participants 
lasting two days was found to be capable of causing the failure of 
transactions of up to 60% or 70% of the total value of settlement. Also 
only the failure of major clearing participants showed a striking 
impact on settlement. Another scenario showed that operational 
failures in the ICT link between VPC and APK would have caused 
considerable stress on settlement in HEXClear. 
  In all of the simulated cases the largest impact was caused by 
transactions filtered out due to a market participant’s assumed internal 
operational problem. Most transactions included in the settlement 
were eventually settled. This underlines the ability of HEXClear to 
efficiently mitigate failure situations via the optimisation settlement 
process. 
  Replacing optimisation with an RTGS process would significantly 
increase liquidity need. It was proven that most transactions would 
still settle without longer delays unless they are involved in a gridlock  
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on the securities leg side. We also made some observations regarding 
enhancements that central bank user needs would require if HEXClear 
was the only SSS used in Finland. 
  Due to developments made in the current study, BoF-PSS2 now 
includes features that allow modelling of retail securities settlement 
systems, such as HEXClear. This capability and the model of current 
study could be utilised, for example, if the potential effects of the 
Nordic Single settlement system planned by the Nordic Central 
Securities Depository
21 were to be analysed. 
  The question of how close to the exact optimal solution of the 
knapsack problem the heuristic optimisation settlement process 
implemented in BoF-PSS2 can come with a severely stressed data set 
is left for future studies. Our evaluation of HEXClear, although 
profound, cannot be fully conclusive since the benchmark simulation 
proves that we have not been able to completely replicate the 
HEXClear algorithm at this stage. Similarly the usability of the RTGS 
process as a contingency depends on the capability of that process to 
handle large transaction volumes in limited time. The real algorithms 
should thus be tested in a load situation in APK’s test environment to 
achieve completely realistic results. Also in that approach the time 
complexity of the implementation could be measured. 
  All the scenarios analysed in this study were bound to the data 
from the observation period. The real system allows participants to 
adapt and react to failure situations, but no such changes were 
assumed or included in the simulations. Behavioural changes on the 
part of clearing participants made during the normal process or as 
reactions to abnormal situations may have feedback effects on the 
systemic level and change the overall results of this study. 
  The analysis presented only focuses on HEXClear but can be 
interpreted more generally as an analysis of the Finnish market 
structure and market practices. It is intended as a contribution to the 
oversight and development work of securities settlement systems by 
illustrating the dependencies, vulnerabilities and scale of events that 
may take place in such infrastructure. 
 
                                          
21 The Nordic Central Securities Depository (NCSD) was created through the 
consolidation of Swedish VPC and Finnish APK at the end of 2004. VPC bought 100% 
of the shares of APK, and this new company operates under the trademark of NCSD.  
319 
References 
Bank of Finland (2006) Bank of Finland Bulletin, Financial 
stability special issue. 2006. 
 
Bank of Finland (2005) Bank of Finland Bulletin, Financial 
stability special issue. 2005. 
 
Bank of Finland (2006) BoF-PSS2 user manual version 2.2.0. 2006 
 
Bank of International Settlements (1992) Delivery versus payment in 
securities settlement systems. Report by CPSS. 
 
ECB (2004) The use of central bank money for settling securities 
transactions. May 2004. 
 http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/other/useofcbmoneyforssten.pdf. 
 
Devriese, J – Mitchell, J (2006) Liquidity risk in securities 
settlement. Journal of Banking & Finance, Vol. 30, Issue. 6, 
1807–1834. 
 
Hellqvist, M – Koskinen, J (2005) Stress testing securities clearing 
and settlement systems using simulations. In Leinonen, H (ed.) 
Liquidity, risks and speed in payment and settlement systems – a 
simulation approach. Bank of Finland Studies E:31. 
 
Iori, G (2004) An analysis of systemic risk in alternative securities 
settlement architectures. European Central Bank Working Paper 
No. 404. 
 
Martello, S – Toth, P (1990) Knapsack problems – algorithms and 
computer implementations. John Wiley & Sons, New York. 
 
Nyholm, T (2004) Optimization Algorithm for Securities 
Settlement. Master’s Thesis, Helsinki. University of Technology, 
System Analysis Laboratory. (In Finnish.) 
 
Papadimitriou, C (1994) Computational complexity. 1st edition. 
Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, New York. 
  
320 
Sveriges Riksbank (2004) Assessment of securities settlement 
systems in Sweden. November 2003 with revisions to Standard 16 








 Bank of Finland Publications
Scientific monographs
 
Series E (ISSN 1238‑1691, print) (ISSN 1456‑5951, online)
(Series E replaces the Bank of Finland’s research publications series B, C and D.) 
E:1  Jukka Vesala Testing for Competition in Banking: Behavioral Evidence from Finland. 1995. 
206 p. ISBN 951‑686‑447‑3.
E:2  Juha Tarkka Approaches to Deposit Pricing: A Study in the Determination of Deposit 
Interest and Bank Service Charges. 1995. 166 p. ISBN 951‑686‑457‑0.
E:3  Timo Tyrväinen Wage Determination, Taxes, and Employment: Evidence from Finland. 
1995. 212 p. ISBN 951‑686‑459‑7.
E:4  Sinimaaria Ranki Realignment Expectations in the ERM: Causes and Measurement. 1996. 
164 p. ISBN 951‑686‑507‑0.
E:5  Juhana Hukkinen Kilpailukyky, ulkomaankaupan rakenne ja taloudellinen kasvu 
(Competitiveness, structure of foreign trade and economic growth). 1996. 134 p.  
ISBN 951‑686‑512‑7.
E:6  Eelis Hein Deposit Insurance: Pricing and Incentives. 1996. 120 p. ISBN 951‑686‑517‑8.
E:7  Vesa Vihriälä Banks and the Finnish Credit Cycle 1986–1995. 1997. 200 p.  
ISBN 951‑686‑537‑2.
E:8  Anne Brunila Fiscal Policy and Private Consumption-Saving Decisions: European Evidence. 
1997. 147 p. ISBN 951‑686‑558‑5. (Published also as A‑131, Helsinki School of Economics 
and Business Administration, ISBN 951‑791‑225‑0, ISSN 1237‑556X)
E:9  Sinimaaria Ranki Exchange Rates in European Monetary Integration. 1998. 221 p.  
ISBN 951‑686‑564‑X.
E:10  Kimmo Virolainen  Tax Incentives and Corporate Borrowing: Evidence from Finnish 
Company Panel Data. 1998. 151 p. ISBN 951‑686‑573‑9.  
(Published also as A‑137, Helsinki School of Economics and Business Administration,  
ISBN 951‑791‑290‑0, ISSN 1237‑556X)
E:11  Monica Ahlstedt  Analysis of Financial Risks in a GARCH Framework. 1998. 181 p.  
ISBN 951‑686‑575‑5.
E:12  Olli Castrén Fiscal-Monetary Policy Coordination and Central Bank Independence. 1998. 
153 p. ISBN 951‑686‑580‑1.
E:13  Antti Ripatti Demand for Money in Inflation-Targeting Monetary Policy. 1998. 136 p. 
ISBN 951‑686‑581‑X.E:14  Risto Koponen – Kimmo Soramäki Intraday Liquidity Needs in a Modern Interbank 
Payment System. A Simulation Approach. 1998. 135 p. ISBN 951‑686‑601‑8.
E:15  Liisa Halme Pankkisääntely ja valvonta. Oikeuspoliittinen tutkimus säästöpankkien 
riskinotosta (Banking regulation and supervision: A legal policy study of risk taking by 
savings banks). 1999. XLIV + 560 p. ISBN 951‑686‑606‑9, print;  
ISBN 951‑686‑607‑7, online.
E:16  Juha Kasanen Ilmoitusvelvollisten osakeomistus ja ‑kaupat Helsingin Pörssissä  
(Corporate insiders shareholdings and trading on the HEX Helsinki Exchanges). 1999.  
146 p. ISBN 951‑686‑630‑1, print; ISBN 951‑686‑631‑X, online.
E:17  Mikko Spolander Measuring Exchange Market Pressure and Central Bank Intervention. 
1999. 118 p. ISBN 951‑686‑645‑X, print; ISBN 951‑686‑646‑8, online.
E:18  Karlo Kauko The Microeconomics of Innovation: Oligopoly Theoretic Analyses with 
Applications to Banking and Patenting. 2000. 193 p. ISBN 951‑686‑651‑4, print;  
ISBN 951‑686‑652‑2, online. (Published also as A‑166, Helsinki School of Economics and 
Business Administration, ISBN 951‑791‑442‑3, ISSN 1237‑556X)
E:19  Juha Kilponen The Political Economy of Monetary Policy and Wage Bargaining. Theory 
and Econometric Evidence. 2000. 180 p. ISBN 951‑686‑665‑4, print;  
ISBN 951‑686‑666‑2, online.
E:20  Jukka Vesala Technological Transformation and Retail Banking Competition: Implications 
and Measurement. 2000. 211 p. ISBN 951‑686‑695‑6, print; ISBN 951‑686‑696‑4, online. 
(Published also as A‑184, Helsinki School of Economics and Business Administration,  
ISBN 951‑791‑518‑7, ISSN 1237‑556X)
E:21  Jian‑Guang Shen Models of Currency Crises with Banking Sector and Imperfectly 
Competitive Labor Markets. 2001. 159 p. ISBN 951‑686‑711‑1, print;  
ISBN 951‑686‑712‑X, online.
E:22  Kari Takala  Studies in Time Series Analysis of Consumption, Asset Prices and Forecasting. 
2001. 300 p. ISBN 951‑686‑759‑6, print; ISBN 951‑686‑760‑X, online.
E:23  Mika Kortelainen Edge: a model of the euro area with applications to monetary policy. 
2002. 166 p. ISBN 952‑462‑001‑4, print; ISBN 952‑462‑002‑2, online. 
(Published also as A‑204, Helsinki School of Economics and Business Administration,  
ISBN 951‑791‑715‑5, ISSN 1237‑556X)
E:24  Jukka Topi Effects of moral hazard and monitoring on monetary policy transmission.  
2003. 148 p. ISBN 952‑462‑031‑6, print; ISBN 952‑462‑032‑4, online. 
E:25  Hanna Freystätter Price setting behavior in an open economy and the determination of 
Finnish foreign trade prices. 2003. 84 p. ISBN 952‑462‑045‑6, print;  
ISBN 952‑462‑046‑4, online.
E:26  Tuomas Välimäki Central bank tenders: three essays on money market liquidity auctions. 
2003. 232 p. ISBN 952‑462‑051‑0, print; ISBN 952‑462‑052‑9, online. 
(Published also as A‑218, Helsinki School of Economics, Acta Universitatis Oeconomicae 
Helsingiensis, ISBN 951‑791‑762‑7, ISSN 1237‑556X)E:27  Heikki Hella On robust ESACF identification of mixed ARIMA models. 2003. 159 p.  
ISBN 952‑462‑112‑6, print; ISBN 952‑462‑113‑4, online. 
E:28  Heiko Schmiedel  Performance of international securities markets. 2004. 275 p.  
ISBN 952‑462‑132‑0, print; ISBN 952‑462‑133‑9, online. 
E:29  Tuomas Komulainen  Essays on financial crises in emerging markets. 2004. 173 p. 
ISBN 952‑462‑140‑1, print; ISBN 952‑462‑141‑X, online. 
E:30  Jukka Vauhkonen  Essays on financial contracting. 2004. 134 p.  
ISBN 952‑462‑172‑X, print; ISBN 952‑462‑173‑8, online. 
E:31  Harry Leinonen (ed.) Liquidity, risks and speed in payment and settlement systems –  
a simulation approach. 2005. Compilation. 350 p. ISBN 952‑462‑194‑0, print;  
ISBN 952‑462‑195‑9, online.
E:32  Maritta Paloviita  The role of expectations in euro area inflation dynamics. 2005. 88 p. 
ISBN 952‑462‑208‑4, print; ISBN 952‑462‑209‑2, online.
E:33  Jukka Railavo  Essays on macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy rules. 2005. 150 p.  
ISBN 952‑462‑249‑1, print; ISBN 952‑462‑250‑5, online.
E:34  Aaron Mehrotra  Essays on Empirical Macroeconomics. 2006. 243 p. 
ISBN 952‑462‑290‑4, print; ISBN 952‑462‑291‑2, online.
E:35  Katja Taipalus  Bubbles in the Finnish and US equities markets. 2006. 123 p. 
ISBN 952‑462‑306‑4, print; ISBN 952‑462‑307‑2, online.
E:36  Laura Solanko Essays on Russia’s Economic Transition. 2006. 133 p.  
ISBN 952‑462‑316‑1, print; ISBN 952‑462‑317‑X, online.
E:37  Mika Arola  Foreign capital and Finland Central government’s first period of reliance on 
international financial markets, 1862–1938. 2006. 249 p.  
ISBN 952‑462‑310‑2, print; ISBN 952‑462‑311‑0, online.
E:38  Heli Snellman  Automated Teller Machine network market structure and cash usage.  
2006. 105 p. ISBN 952‑462‑318‑8, print; ISBN 952‑462‑319‑6, online.
E:39  Harry Leinonen (ed.)  Simulation studies of liquidity needs, risks and efficiency in  
payment networks. 2007. Proceedings from the Bank of Finland Payment and Settlement 
System Seminars 2005–2006. 320 p. ISBN 978‑952‑462‑360‑5, print;  
ISBN 978‑952‑462‑361‑2, online.
  ISBN 978-952-462-360-5
ISSN 1238-1691
Edita Prima Oy
Helsinki 2007
S
i
m
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
s
t
u
d
i
e
s
 
o
f
 
l
i
q
u
i
d
i
t
y
 
n
e
e
d
s
,
 
r
i
s
k
s
 
a
n
d
 
e
f
fi
c
i
e
n
c
y
 
i
n
 
p
a
y
m
e
n
t
 
n
e
t
w
o
r
k
s
 
S
c
i
e
n
t
i
fi
c
 
m
o
n
o
g
r
a
p
h
s
 
 
 
 
E
:
3
9
 
·
 
2
0
0
7